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THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AND SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW:
THE LEGACY OF ROGER TRAYNOR
John W. Poulos*
I. INTRODUCTION
Few issues are more debatable, though less debated, than the
proper role of the judiciary in making substantive criminal law.
Though heated discussions are easily found on the judiciary's role in
creating law of other types, it is generally assumed that judges
legitimately play no significant role in creating substantive criminal
law. This lack of debate is founded upon a generally accepted view
of the legal process as it applies to the substantive criminal law. With
rare exceptions, we are told, there are no common-law crimes in
America. Crimes are created by legislative acts. The common-law
substantive process, the method by which the English courts recog-
nized and defined new offenses, generally was abandoned in America
before the turn of the century. Legislative bodies now create the
substantive crimes and the courts apply them. Courts are assumed to
have no substantial creative role in making substantive criminal law.
What little substantive law they create flows from applying statutory
law to new facts, from the inevitable process of interpreting statutory
law, or from filling in the small gaps left by inadvertent legislative
omission in certain limited circumstances.
This simple statement of the traditional view raises the suspicion
that it does not accurately reflect what courts do, or what they should
be doing, in a mature system of substantive criminal law. We sense
that the common-law process has not, and perhaps should not, be
relegated to a minor role in creating new substantive criminal law.
By nearly universal acclamation, Roger Traynor was one of the
great masters of the judicial process in the twentieth century. For
thirty years he sat on the California Supreme Court, first as an
associate justice and later as Chief Justice of California. There, he
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis.
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used the judicial process to modernize much of California's law. The
Traynor opinions in torts, conflicts, civil procedure, and taxation, to
name a few of the more prominent areas in which he worked, make
special contributions to American law and to the American judicial
tradition. These opinions created and solidified his reputation as one
of the greatest judges of the common law in this century. Indeed,
some would say that Roger Traynor should be ranked as one of the
ten best judges in American history.'
There has been no major study of Roger Traynor's contributions
to substantive criminal law, nor has there been a study of Traynor's
judicial philosophy and how it guided his creation of new substantive
criminal doctrine.2 Furthermore, until very recently, there had not
been a new analysis of Roger Traynor's judicial philosophy in the last
two decades.' A new study of Traynor's judicial philosophy has
recently appeared.4 This Article builds upon that work.
The goal of this Article is to analyze how Roger Traynor
employed his remarkable philosophy of the judicial process to create
a substantial body of new substantive criminal law in California. Our
ultimate goal, of course, is to learn what we can from the legacy left
us by Roger Traynor about how judges appropriately make substan-
tive criminal law in our democracy today.
This discussion is divided into four parts. The first part looks at
Roger Traynor and the status of substantive criminal law as it
developed during his thirty years on the bench in California. We will
see that during Traynor's initial decade on the California Supreme
Court, criminal law was in a moribund state. By the end of that
decade, interest in the criminal law was sparked by a series of events
that were not directly related to criminal law. This change in our
legal culture continued until it developed into a renaissance in the
substantive criminal law during the last decade of Traynor's tenure on
1. E.g., Bernard Schwartz, The Judicial Ten: America's Greatest Judges, 1979 S. ILL.
U. LUJ. 405, 407.
2. The only study of Justice Traynor's contributions to substantive criminal law I am
aware of is by Jerome Hall. Jerome Hall, Chief Justice Traynor and Criminal Law, 35
HASTINGS LJ. 817 (1984). This article makes no systematic attempt to analyze Traynor's
judicial philosophy as it applies across the entire range of his judicial lawmaking in
substantive criminal law.
3. The most comprehensive analysis has been the chapter on Roger Traynor by G.
Edward White. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 292-316
(1988).
4. John W. Poulos, The Judicial Philosophy of Roger Traynor, 46 Hastings L.J.
(forthcoming 1996).
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the bench. As we shall see, Justice Traynor's creativity with the
substantive criminal law was the product of this renaissance. The
second section presents an overview of Justice Traynor's creativity
with substantive criminal law during this thirty year period. The third
section analyzes how Justice Traynor's judicial philosophy produced
this substantial body of judge-made doctrine. The Article ends with
an assessment of Traynor's legacy to the judicial role in creating
substantive criminal law.
11. ROGER TRAYNOR AND THE CONTEXT FOR HIS WORK
At an early point in the founding of our nation, we accepted the
English common-law process as the model for our legal system. But
because the state's authority to make and enforce substantive criminal
law is truly awesome,5 and because there is a long history of its abuse
in the not-too-distant past, the founders of our nation limited
government power over criminal law in the federal constitution.6
With these modifications the common-law process has been used in
American criminal law ever since.
A preference for defining crimes and defenses by statute, rather
than by judicial decision, slowly evolved within the American
common-law system. This change was brought about by a metamor-
phosis in our legal culture, not by constitutional command. The
process began in England well before the American Revolution and
ultimately became part of the legal culture in the New World. The
development of the theft offenses, for example, illustrates the use of
statutes to alter common-law crimes, to fill in unwanted gaps left by
the cases, and to create new statutory offenses unknown to the
5. For example, it authorizes the state to kill its citizens and to coerce them in the
most rudimentary ways, such as depriving us of our freedom.
6. The provisions of the U.S. Constitution restraining federal power over the
substantive criminal law are (1) the prohibitions against bills of attainder in Article I, § 9,
Clause 3; (2) ex post facto laws in Article I, § 9, Clause 3; (3) the treason provisions of
Article III, § 3, Clauses 1 and 2; and (4) the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the
Eighth Amendment. Those provisions applying against the state substantive criminal law
power are the prohibitions of bills of attainder and ex post facto laws in Article I, § 10,
Clause 1. Other provisions such as the First Amendment and the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment have been interpreted as imposing
substantive restraints on the criminal law power. In addition, there are a number of
procedural protections that heavily affect substantive doctrine. The primary example is
the guarantee of trial by jury set forth in Article III, § 2, Clause 3, and in the Sixth
Amendment.
January 19961
432 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
common law.7 It is easy to imagine that at some time there was a
virtual partnership between Parliament and the royal courts in
creating and tending the criminal law. This shared function is part of
the Anglo-American criminal law tradition.
Statutes have always played a significant role in American
criminal law. Hence, we gradually developed a preference for
statutory criminal law. Thus, rather than relying on the common-law
of crimes, the first Congress enacted a comprehensive criminal statute
as one of its initial acts.' By the turn of the twentieth century, much,
if not most, of American criminal law was to be found in the statute
books. Finally, many American jurisdictions have ended the
partnership between the legislature and the courts with respect to
recognizing new offenses. The techniques used to withdraw the
power to "recognize" new crimes from the court vary among
jurisdictions. The most common patterns are to enact statutes that
either abolish all common-law crimes or declare that conduct is not
criminal unless made so by statute.9 On occasion, the judiciary's
power to recognize new crimes has been curtailed by judicial
decision." Where this power has not been officially withdrawn, it
has been virtually abandoned by the courts.
There are undoubtedly many reasons for the triumph of the
legislative process over the judicial process in the creation of new
offenses. The embrace of democracy, the uncritical acceptance of the
doctrine of separation of powers, and the rise in the prestige of
legislatures made it inevitable that legislative attention would be
focused on the power the state wields over its citizens through the
substantive criminal law. By enacting penal statutes, the legislature
preempts executive and judicial power to prosecute and recognize new
crimes. With statutory enactments we need not concern ourselves
with the sources of the criminal law or-because of the ex post facto
clauses-with the problem inherent in the retroactive effect of judicial
decisions. Penal statutes, in other words, because of their binding
effect on the executive and judicial branches, operate as a type of bill
7. Examples are the statutory crimes of embezzlement and false pretenses.
8. Punishment of Crimes Act, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 (1790).
9. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 6 (West 1988) ("No act or omission... is criminal or
punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by this Code, or by some of the statutes.").
10. E.g., United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812) (holding
that the United States Circuit Courts have no common-law jurisdiction in criminal cases).
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of rights against executive and judicial oppression under the guise of
the criminal law.
I do not mean to suggest that high-minded theories of individual
rights alone account for the triumph of legislation in the new-crime-
creation enterprise. Many other concerns helped produce this result
as well. The codification movement demonstrated the superiority of
a theoretically and practically integrated penal code over the ad hoe
judicial process of crime creation." As the common law moved
away from the capital sanction for all felonies, legislation was the
most convenient method of allocating punishment for the previously
capital crimes. It was soon realized that legislation was also the most
efficient method for specifying the punishment to be exacted for all
crimes. As criminal law statutes were enacted to solve these and
other problems, the criminal law became a routine area for legislative
action. Furthermore, crime has always been a troubling social
problem. Legislatures simply could not avoid enacting penal statutes
even if the legislators did not care for individual rights and criminal
law theory. For these and a myriad of other reasons, the business of
creating new crimes is, and has been, since the early part of this
century, almost exclusively a legislative affair.
As most American courts cannot or will not recognize new crimes
in the course of the judicial process, the question remains as to their
proper role in the substantive criminal law. The common-law process
is not dead. It continues to predominate today in such areas as torts,
conflicts of law, and, to a lesser extent, in the traditional areas of
contracts and property. Since the judicial process continues in these
common-law subjects, we are driven to ask, "What is the role of the
courts in the substantive criminal law?" Are the courts limited to
discovering and applying the legislative will or should they invoke the
creative powers they still possess as modem common-law courts?
Though they would not create, or recognize, new crimes out of whole
cloth, what role should the courts play with respect to the develop-
ment of the elements of the crimes defined by the statutes? Are
there similar constraints on the power of courts to recognize new
defenses or to develop their elements? Given his reputation as one
of the great common-law judges of our time, an analysis of Justice
11. See, e.g., GERHARD 0. W. MUELLER, CRIME, LAW AND THE SCHOLARS 151-64
(1969).
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Traynor's treatment of these problems should help us formulate our
answers to these questions.
There are additional reasons for looking to the legacy left to us
by Justice Traynor to answer these questions. The first reason focuses
on Roger Traynor. Justice Traynor had neither specific training nor
a special interest in criminal law when he joined the California
Supreme Court on July 31, 1940.12 At that time he had no identifi-
able criminal law ideology. What he learned about criminal law came
from his typical brief encounter with that subject in the first year of
law school and from his experience on the bench. Furthermore, there
is no indication in either his off-bench writings or in his opinions that
suggests he acquired a criminal law ideology as a result of his judicial
experience. Though he wrote many articles on a variety of topics,
none focused on the substantive criminal law. Yet he wrote a number
of opinions significant enough to be included in criminal law
casebooks.13 This apparent absence of an ideology about criminal
law makes his opinions attractive vehicles for studying the judicial
process in making substantive criminal law. Although Justice Traynor
did not have an apparent criminal law ideology, he did develop a
well-defined, sophisticated ideology about the judicial process.14 His
criminal law opinions thus probably reveal more about his views on
the proper role of a judge in the substantive criminal law than they
do about an ideology on substantive criminal law.
Of equal importance is the era in which he worked. Justice
Traynor's initial stoicism about the substantive criminal law reflected
the legal profession's attitude about crime during his first decade on
the California Supreme Court. Law schools typically had a single
course on criminal law and procedure in the first year. There were
no other criminal law courses in the curriculum. The criminal law
course was generally assigned to the newest law teacher as a service
obligation. Criminal law was not one of the preferred topics in the
decades surrounding the Great Stock Market Crash, the Great
Depression, and World War II. Criminal law writing in that era
narrowly focused on doctrine. With few exceptions, it was not
theoretical, integrative, or related to the then burgeoning social
sciences. It ignored the moral and philosophical underpinnings of the
12. See James R. McCall, Roger Traynor: Teacher, Jurist, and Friend, 35 HASTINGS
L.J. 741, 743 (1984).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 113, 145.
14. Poulos, supra note 4.
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criminal law and eschewed general theories. Instead, it focused on
the minutiae of the crimes and defenses, treating each as though they
were sui generis categories created by the ancient cases or by ad hoc
enactments. Seeing not the forest for the trees, "[t]he literature...
was almost universally, mundane."15
Simply put, criminal law was not a professionally interesting or
engaging topic during Roger Traynor's formative years and for the
first decade he was on the court. Furthermore, Justice Traynor's lack
of interest in criminal law was shared by the great majority of judges
and lawyers at that time. It is thus not surprising to find that Justice
Traynor wrote few significant opinions on substantive criminal law in
his first ten years on the bench. 6
The bells and whistles that closed the decade of World War II
awoke the criminal law as though it were a sleeping giant. In the next
quarter of this century, from the 1950s through the middle of the
1970s, American criminal law entered what appears to be a modem
renaissance. In 1952, the American Law Institute, under the
leadership of Professors Herbert Wechsler and Louis B. Schwartz,
began work on the Model Penal Code (the Code). 7 The Official
Draft was adopted by the Institute on May 24, 1962. The Code is
generally conceded to be one of the more important documents in the
history of Anglo-American criminal law. Drawing upon philosophical,
scientific, and social research, the Code provided the criminal law with
its first modem unifying theory. No longer would the criminal law be
regarded as a collection of unconnected, ad hoc doctrines that
protected various societal interests in disparate ways. Gone were the
sui generis rules and the mystifying language of the common law.
The Code created a common architecture for all crimes and defenses,
and constructed each from the same list of specified materials.
The Code has been pervasively influential. It became the Latin
of American criminal law, altering the way we think and talk about
crime and punishment. We reappraised much of the statutory law in
its light; and we bent common-law concepts to fit its mold. The Code
inspired legislators, judges, lawyers, law professors, and law students
15. Richard G. Singer, Foreword: Symposium-The 25th Anniversary of the Model
Penal Code, 19 RUTGERs L.J. 519, 520 (1988).
16. See infra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
17. See MUELLER, supra note 11, at 156.
18. Id. at 163.
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to think about criminal law, to challenge the old ways, and to create
new theories, principles, and doctrines.
One year before the Code was completed, another process began
that would contribute to the radical change in our attitudes and
thinking about criminal law: 9 The Warren Court started the crim-
inal law revolution. ° It began in the October Term of 1960 with the
decision in Mapp v. Ohio.2' In a series of opinions following Mapp
and extending throughout the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court
applied most of the fundamental principles of criminal procedure
found in the Bill of Rights to the states under the Fourteenth
Amendment.' For our purposes, the most important of these
opinions is Gideon v. Wainwright, decided in 1963. Gideon
established a right to counsel for the indigent accused in any state
felony prosecution.24
The official draft of the Code was only a year old when Gideon
was announced. By requiring the assistance of counsel in state felony
prosecutions, Gideon created the foundation upon which the new
criminal law would be argued and decided in courthouses throughout
the nation. The new ways of thinking about criminal law spread
rapidly from the Ivory Tower into the courtrooms of America.
Gideon made the criminal law a viable area of practice. The
excitement and controversy generated by the Supreme Court's
continuing revolution transformed the institutions of criminal law into
19. Justice Traynor's opinion in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434,282 P.2d 905 (1955)
predated the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
by six years. One could argue that the same forces driving the Warren Court's criminal
law revolution fueled Justice Traynor's Cahan opinion in California years before they were
felt in Washington. A discussion of the California revolution in criminal procedure during
the Traynor years must be left for another day.
20. The point at which a revolution begins usually is discernible only in hindsight.
21. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Court applied the "exclusionary evidence principle" to
state prosecutions, thereby rendering inadmissible at trial evidence seized in violation of
the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 657-60.
22. See, e.g., CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 1-3 (3d ed. 1993); THE BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, INC., THE CRIMINAL
LAW REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH: 1960-1977, at v-ix (1978) [hereinafter CRIMINAL
LAW REVOLUTION]. It is generally agreed that the criminal law revolution began with
Mapp and ended on June 23, 1969, with the Supreme Court's decision in Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). See, e.g., CRIMINAL LAW REVOLUTION at v. In Benton,
the last decision announced by the Court for the 1968-1969 Term, the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment became the last provision of the Bill of Rights to be
applied to the states by the Warren Court. Id. at vii.
23. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
24. Id at 340-41, 344.
[Vol. 29:429
THE LEGACY OF ROGER TRAYNOR
a growth industry. The demand for lawyers, for example, increased,
and law schools responded with their own criminal law revolution.
Criminal law became a vital, respectable subject. Courses were added
to the curriculum, and professors stood in line to teach them. New
casebooks appeared; and scholars began 'to write about the new
criminal law. Much of this literature focused on topics ignored in the
past. Theoretical, philosophical, integrative, and empirical articles
began to appear.
The development of the Code and the Supreme Court's criminal
law revolution were the foundation stones supporting much of the
new criminal law during this period, yet a number of other institutions
and events contributed to what I have called the American Renais-
sance in criminal law. Though the history of this period is yet to be
written, a few examples should suffice to illustrate the depth and
breadth of the interest and innovation in criminal law during this
period.
It is not extravagant to assume that the same forces that begot
the Supreme Court's criminal law revolution contemporaneously
produced the American Bar Association's (the ABA) Criminal Justice
Standards Project (the Project).z  The Project originally was
proposed by the Institute of Judicial Administration during the May
1963 meeting of the American Law Institute, shortly before Gideon
was decided.26 The ABA officially launched the Project at its annual
meeting in August 1964.27 "'The Standards,"' we are told, "'were
born in a climate of deep concern over the burgeoning problems of
crime and the correlative crisis in our courts occasioned by over-
whelming caseloads, recidivism, and a seeming incapacity of the
system to respond to the challenges of the Sixties.' ""
The Project's goal was to modernize the criminal justice system29
by developing standards that "walk the fine line between the
protection of society and the protection of the constitutional rights of
25. See William J. Jameson, The Beginning: Background and Development of the ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 255, 256-57 (1974) (noting that the
Supreme Court's criminal law revolution was partly responsible for the need to create new
standards for criminal justice).
26. Id. at 255.
27. lat at 257,
28. Id. at 255-56 (quoting Tom C. Clark, The American Bar Association for Criminal
Justice: Prescription for an Ailing System, 47 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429 (1972)).
29. See id. at 256-57.
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the accused individual."3  Seventeen sets of standards, covering
nearly every aspect of the criminal justice system, except for the
substantive criminal law, were eventually developed and approved by
the ABA's House of Delegates in the decade between 1964 and
1973.21
The Project symbolized a shift in our attitudes about crime and
the criminal justice system: Crime was recognized to be a national
issue warranting a national response. As the ABA's House of
Delegates was debating the wisdom of the Standards Project, the 1964
presidential campaign transformed crime from a local concern into an
important national political issue. It has remained so ever since.
Borrowing from the war mentality of the mid-1960s, President
Johnson declared a war on crime. On July 23, 1965, he established
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice (the Commission).3 2 Its goals were to inquire into the
causes of crime and delinquency, to report to the President with
recommendations for preventing crime and delinquency, and to
improve law enforcement and the administration of criminal justice.3
This massive project, headed by Professor James Vorenberg of
Harvard Law School, assessed nearly every conceivable aspect of
crime and the criminal justice system in America. On schedule, early
in 1967, the Commission filed its report. It contained over 200
specific recommendations. 34 Though the Commission did not focus
on substantive criminal law, the Commission's work and its recom-
mendations were significant aspects of the American Renaissance in
criminal law.
35
30. Warren E. Burger, Introduction: The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 12 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 251, 252 (1974). Chief Justice Burger served as chairman of the ABA
Project before he was appointed Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Id,
at 251.
31. Jameson, supra note 25, at 259-60. The last set of standards was approved in
February, 1973. Id. at 260.
32. Exec. Order No. 11,236, 3 C.F.R. 329 (1964-1965).
33. Id
34. U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY at v (1967) [hereinafter CHALLENGE OF
CRIMEI.
35. Less than one page of chapter five of the report is devoted to substantive criminal
law. Id at 126-27. After noting that about 30 states and the federal government were
"taking a fresh look" at their substantive criminal codes and were considering revising
them, the report observed, "The American Law Institute has given impetus to this effort
through its Model Penal Code, produced after a decade of sustained labor. The model
code offers a thoughtful and comprehensive re-examination of the substantive criminal law,
[Vol. 29:429
THE LEGACY OF ROGER TRAYNOR
Several of the Commission's recommendations focused on our
ignorance about crime and how the criminal justice system actually
operates, the need for comprehensive empirical research at all levels,
and the need for public support of these research activities. 6 The
Johnson Administration and Congress responded to these and other
recommendations by enacting the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968."T This Act was the master plan for the national
war on crime. It created the Law Enforcement Assistance Adminis-
tration (the LEAA), mandated 'the creation of state planning
agencies, and provided a mechanism for funneling federal funds to
state and local criminal justice agencies.38 During its first seven
years, the LEAA "awarded more than $4 billion to state and local
governments to improve police, courts, and correctional systems; to
combat juvenile delinquency; and to finance innovative crime-fighting
projects."39  On occasion, the agency pursued its own empirical
research projects,' and as part of its campaign to standardize local
planning for the war on crime, in 1971 the LEAA appointed a
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and
Goals.41
The National Advisory Commission was conceived as a follow-up
commission to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
and it has proven to be a sound guide to criminal code reform." kd at 126.
36. I& at x.
37. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3711-3797
(1988 & Supp. IV 1993)). The Safe Streets Act created the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration within the Department of Justice. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 198
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3711-3712 (1988)). This Act was not the first
attempt to address the crime problem on a national level. This office, created by this Act,
which had more modest goals than the LEAA, allocated funds on a categorical grant basis.
Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 198-203 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3711-3764
(1988)). This office was renamed by Pub. L. No. 98-473 the Office of Justice Programs.
Pub. L. No. 98-473 § 603, 98 Stat. 2077 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3711-3712
(1988)).
38. See §§ 101(b), 202, 203(c), 82 Stat. at 197.
39. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN., THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION: A PARTNERSHIP FOR CRIME CONTROL 1 (1976).
40. l at 2; see THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON THE LAW
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN., LAW ENFORCEMENT: THE FEDERAL ROLE 15-16
(1976) [hereinafter TASK FORCE].
41. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & AUSTIN D. SARAT, THE POLICY DILEMMA: FEDERAL
CRIME POLICY AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION 83, 86-87
(1980); see COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STANDARDS AND GOALS OF THE NAT'L
ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURTS iv (1973);
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN., supra note 39, at 5-6.
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Administration of Justice.42 Its task was to create "a clear statement
of national goals, performance standards and priorities, to translate as
quickly as possible the billions of dollars which will be coming to
states and local governments through LEAA into effective crime
reduction."'43 By January 1973, the National Advisory Commission
produced six reports containing standards and goals for the criminal
justice system.' Of particular interest is Standard 13.1 of the Report
on the Criminal Justice System: "Any State that has not revised its
substantive criminal law within the past decade should begin revision
immediately. Federal or State funds should be provided as appropri-
ate."4  The Commentary noted that the Code is "It]he greatest
single force behind the new revisions" of the substantive criminal
law.
46
These were the times in which the Supreme Court revolutionized
criminal law; the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code
rethought and recast the substantive law; the American Bar Associa-
tion's Standards for Criminal Justice articulated the requirements of
a fair system of criminal procedure; and, for the first time in our
42. FEELEY & SARAT, supra note 41, at 86; TASK FORCE, supra note 40, at 73-76. At
the time the National Advisory Commission was created and the report was commissioned,
"Democrats suggested that the motivation behind the report was to give President Nixon
his own Crime Commission." Id at 74.
43. National Commission to Set Standards and Goals, LEAA NEWSLETTER (Law
Enforcement Assistance Admin., Washington, D.C.), Nov. 1971, at 3 (quoting Governor
Russell W. Peterson).
44. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM V (1973) [hereinafter CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM]. The
National Advisory Commission's Standards are compared with the ABA's Standards in
AMERICAN BAR ASS'N SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
STANDARDS AND GOALS OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS WITH STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (1973); see also H. Lynn Edwards, The ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice and the NAC Standards and Goals: A Comparative Analysis, 12 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 363 (1974) (concluding that the two sets of standards can serve to reinforce
each other to improve the criminal justice system despite differences).
45. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 44, at 175. Standard 13.6 addressed the
problem of procedural law revision as follows:
Concurrently with or immediately after criminal code revision, each State that
has not done so within the past decade should thoroughly revise its criminal
procedure law, using the same drafting organization or a separate special
committee. Federal or State funds should underwrite the expense. The draft
rules or code should substantially incorporate the American Bar Association
Standards for Criminal Justice and other uniform or model draft statutes on
specialized topics.
Id at 189.
46. Id at 175.
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history, our national political institutions sought to restructure state
criminal justice systems so they would fairly and effectively solve the
burgeoning crime problem. Crime, and fair and effective means of
controlling it, became two of the most important national issues
during this era of criminal law. We now know, of course, that not all
of these efforts were equally successful or equally enduring.47 Never-
theless, the Court's criminal law revolution, the Model Penal Code,
and, perhaps to a lesser extent, the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice continue to affect criminal law today.
This brief summary, of course, touches only the tip of the iceberg.
There is much more to be told about this era. But enough has been
recounted to remind us of the major themes, and to recall for us that
these were exciting, innovative, and controversial years for criminal
law. For our purpose, this brief sketch provides us with the context
in which Roger Traynor worked on substantive criminal issues in the
last two decades of his judicial career, 1950-1970.
Given our interest in studying the proper role of the judiciary in
the substantive criminal law, Justice Traynor provides a unique focus
for this study. As we have seen, Justice Traynor had no discernible
criminal law ideology when he joined the California Supreme Court.
During his first decade on the court, criminal law was a moribund
subject. Neither the judiciary nor the profession-nor any other
segment of the criminal justice system-were particularly interested
in the substantive criminal law. In the 1940s few issues of any
enduring theoretical or doctrinal significance were presented to the
court by counsel, and of course, few were decided by the court.
Justice Traynor thus had a decade of judicial experience by the time
the criminal law renaissance began to emerge in the 1950s, and twenty
years of experience by the time the era was in full bloom in the 1960s.
Justice Traynor had time to work out a judicial philosophy before
he was faced with the inevitable arguments that California criminal
law should be modernized through the common-law process.
Furthermore, as his off-bench writings demonstrate, Justice Traynor
had an abiding interest in the judicial process.' The absence of a
criminal law ideology and the presence of a decade of experience with
the art of judging, coupled with his self-conscious concern with the
judicial process and his reputation as one of the great common-law
47. See, e.g., FEELEY & SARAT, supra note 41, at 86-87; TASK FORCE, supra note 40,
at 15-16.
48. Poulos, supra note 4.
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judges of this century, indicates the likelihood that Roger Traynor
always had legal process issues in mind when he wrote opinions in
criminal cases in the 1950s and 1960s. We have much to learn about
the proper role of the judiciary in the substantive criminal law by
studying these opinions.
We now turn to a brief overview of Justice Traynor's work in the
substantive criminal law during his thirty years on the bench. Initially,
we will look at the number and type of opinions he wrote, and the
period in which they were written. This will provide us with context
and perspective as we examine these opinions to learn what we can
about the development of substantive criminal law under the modern
common-law process.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF ROGER TRAYNOR'S WORK IN
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
In his thirty years on the bench, Justice Traynor wrote 259
opinions in criminal cases. Of these, 116 are for a majority of the
court, eighty-two are unanimous opinions, and four are written for a
plurality of the justices. There are thirteen concurring opinions and
forty-four dissents. This is an average of nearly nine opinions per
year over the thirty-year period. Justice Traynor's first opinion in a
criminal case was released on January 29, 1942,4' and the last one
was announced on January 27, 1970.50 Most of these 259 opinions
focus on issues of criminal procedure. Only fifty of the 259 opin-
ions-nineteen percent-resolve more than a trivial issue of substan-
tive criminal law. In thirteen of these fifty opinions, the substantive
issue is resolved by a routine application of existing law. The
remaining thirty-seven Traynor opinions are the subjects of this study.
A. The First Decade. 1940-1950
Given the status of criminal law in American legal culture in the
1940s, it is not surprising that fewer than eighteen percent-forty-
five-of Traynor's criminal law opinions were written during his first
49. Greenberg v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 2d 319, 121 P.2d 713 (1942). Since
Greenberg dealt with issues of criminal procedure, it is of interest to us only for the
purpose of noting the day Traynor's first criminal law opinion was announced.
50. Two Traynor criminal law opinions were announced on this day, a dissenting
opinion in People v. Moran, I Cal. 3d 755, 463 P.2d 763, 83 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1970), and a
majority opinion in In re Bushman, 1 Cal. 3d 767, 463 P.2d 727, 83 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1970).
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decade on the bench. Of all of the opinions written this decade, only
eight5' involve a substantial issue of substantive criminal law. 2
In four of these eight opinions, Justice Traynor wrote for a
unanimous court. 3 Two of these four cases focus on a homicide
offense; one, People v. Brown, deals with kidnapping, and the other
case interprets a statutory crime dealing with telephones.55  One of
the homicide cases and the kidnapping case are automatic appeals 6
51. People v. Cornett, 33 Cal. 2d 33, 198 P.2d 877 (1948); People v. Brown, 29 Cal. 2d
555, 176 P.2d 929 (1947); People v. Trieber, 28 Cal. 2d 657, 171 P.2d 1 (1946); People v.
Mitchell, 27 Cal. 2d 678, 166 P.2d 10 (1946); People v. Lindley, 26 Cal. 2d 780, 161 P.2d
227 (1945) (Traynor, J., concurring); People v. Kolez, 23 Cal. 2d 670, 145 P.2d 580 (1944)
(Traynor, J., dissenting); People v. Albertson, 23 Cal. 2d 550, 145 P.2d 7 (1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring); In re Halcomb, 21 Cal. 2d 126, 130 P.2d 384 (1942) (Traynor, J.,
dissenting).
52. Given the subject of this study, cases adjudicating only procedural issues are
excluded, regardless of the importance of the procedural issue. Substantive issues may be,
and frequently are, decided along with important procedural issues. If the case adjudicates
an important issue of substantive law, it is included in this analysis. On the other hand,
if the substantive issue appears in a case in which an important procedural issue is
adjudicated, and if the substantive issue is resolved by a routine application of settled
doctrine, I have excluded the case completely from this study. Only one Traynor opinion
fell into this category during this decade: People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal. 2d 165, 124 P.2d 44
(1942). In Gonzales, Justice Traynor wrote for a majority of five justices. Id. at 167-74,
124 P.2d at 45-49. He rejected the argument that the exclusionary rule was required under
the United States and California Constitutions. Id. at 169-71, 124 P.2d at 48-49. A
sufficiency of the evidence argument and a substantive-jury-instruction issue were also
decided. Id. at 172-74, 124 P.2d at 46-47. But each was decided by a routine application
of existing law. Id. The opinion did not clarify or extend the substantive law in any
meaningful way. Accordingly, Gonzales is not included in the cases that were retained for
further consideration in this study.
53. People v. Cornett, 33 Cal. 2d 33, 198 P.2d 877 (1948); People v. Brown, 29 Cal. 2d
555, 176 P.2d 929 (1947); People v. Trieber, 28 Cal. 2d 657, 171 P.2d 1 (1946); People v.
Mitchell, 27 Cal. 2d 678, 166 P.2d 10 (1946). Justice Traynor wrote 23 substantive and
procedural opinions that announced the decision of the court in criminal cases during this
decade. There were 11 majority opinions and 12 unanimous opinions.
54. People v. Cornett, 33 Cal. 2d 33, 198 P.2d 877 (1948); People v. Mitchell, 27 Cal.
2d 678, 166 P.2d 10 (1946).
55. People v. Brown, 29 Cal. 2d 555, 176 P.2d 929 (1947) (kidnapping); People v.
Trieber, 28 Cal. 2d 657, 171 P.2d 1 (1946). Trieber involved the interpretation of a statute
making it a crime to connect a telephone to a telephone company's line without
permission. Il at 659-61, 171 P.2d at 2-3. Justice Traynor's opinion focused on issues of
statutory construction. Id.
56. The automatic appeals were Brown and Cornett. The death sentence was imposed
in Brown for violating Penal Code § 209-kidnapping for robbery with bodily harm.
Brown, 29 Cal. 2d at 556-57, 176 P.2d at 929-30. The controlling question was whether the
acts of the defendant constituted kidnapping for the purpose of robbery. Id. at 558, 176
P.2d at 930. Brown claimed that the initial act of kidnapping had to be for the purpose
of robbery. Id. at 559, 176 P.2d at 931. Relying on the explicit language of the statute,
the argument was rejected and the death judgment was affirmed. Id at 560, 176 P.2d at
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The remaining homicide case was heard under the court's petition
procedure.' Although each case involves at least one important
substantive issue, no distinctly new law is created in any of these four
unanimous opinions. Instead, the path of the law is tended and
maintained, but no new course is struck.
In two of the remaining important substantive cases, Justice
Traynor wrote a concurring opinion. 8 Both were automatic appeals.
One was reversed-People v. Albertson5g-and the other was af-
firmed-People v. Lindley.0 In both cases, Justice Traynor wrote
for himself alone, and in both opinions the substantive criminal law
is clarified and made consistent. Neither opinion suggests new law for
consideration by some future majority.
The last two substantive opinions are dissents.6 ' The first came
in Halcomb in 1942,62 and the second was filed two years later in
932. The death judgment in Cornett was for first degree murder. Cornett, 33 Cal. 2d at
35, 198 P.2d at 879. The focus of this opinion was substantive instructional errors. Id. at
39, 198 P.2d at 881. The death judgment was reversed due to instructional error, including
the error first identified by Justice Traynor in his concurring opinion in People v.
Albertson, 23 Cal. 2d 550, 581, 145 P.2d 7, 22 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
57. People v. Mitchell, 27 Cal. 2d 678, 166 P.2d 10 (1946) (involuntary manslaughter),
Two cases were affirmed, the one automatic appeal-Brown-and the telephone of-
fense-Trieber, and the other two were reversed-Mitchell and Cornell (the other
automatic appeal).
58. People v. Lindley, 26 Cal. 2d 780, 794, 161 P.2d 227, 235 (1945) (Traynor, J.,
concurring); People v. Albertson, 23 Cal. 2d 550, 581, 145 P.2d 7, 22 (1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring). Justice Traynor filed only six concurring opinions in criminal cas-
es-substantive and procedural-during this first decade.
59. People v. Albertson, 23 Cal. 2d 550, 145 P.2d 7 (1944).
60. People v. Lindley, 26 Cal. 2d 780, 161 P.2d 227 (1945).
61. Justice Traynor wrote a total of 16 dissents in criminal-procedural and substan-
tive-cases during this initial 10-year period. This is the highest proportion of dissents in
criminal cases-36%-in any of the three decades he served on the court. Justice Traynor
did join dissents written by others that raised important issues of substantive criminal law,
but those dissents fall well beyond the scope of this study.
62. In re Halcomb, 21 Cal. 2d 126, 130, 130 P.2d 384, 387 (1942) (Traynor, J.,
dissenting). Three cases raised identical issues: Halcomb, Petrie, and Haynes. Each was
a state habeas proceeding in which the petitioner escaped from custody while serving a jail
sentence on a misdemeanor conviction. Each was charged with the felony of escape.
However, the language of the statute made that crime applicable only to prisoners charged
with, or convicted of, a felony. Since each petitioner was convicted of a misdemeanor,
each argued that the statute did not prohibit his escape from misdemeanor confinement.
Justice Curtis, joined by Chief Justice Gibson and Justices Shenk, Carter, and Schauer,
held that, despite the statute's clear language to the contrary, the statute also applied to
escapes from misdemeanor confinement. Justice Traynor, joined by Justice Edmonds,
dissented. In re Haynes, 21 Cal. 2d 891, 892, 130 P.2d 388, 389 (1942); In re Petrie, 21 Cal.
2d 132, 134-35, 130 P.2d 712, 714 (1942); Halcomb, 21 Cal. 2d at 130-32, 130 P.2d at 387-88.
These three cases were decided on the same day, Oct. 30, 1942. Since Halcomb is the lead
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People v. Kolez.'
The Traynor decisions of interest to us in this first decade thus
can be counted on the fingers of both hands. Furthermore, one of the
concurring opinions concerns the same issues that drew Traynor's
concurring opinion in Albertson and his dissent in Kolez.' Only one
of these eight opinions, the dissent in Halcomb, focuses on the
substantive criminal law creating process.65 The remainder of the
cases fall into the law-maintaining category.'
case, and since Justice Traynor's dissents in Petrie and Haynes simply cite to his Halcomb
opinion, I counted these three cases as a single case.
63. 23 Cal. 2d 670,145 P.2d 580 (1944) (automatic appeal). The sole contention in this
automatic appeal concerned the trial court's instruction on the nature of the jury's
sentencing discretion in a capital case. In essence, the jury was told that it could return
a verdict of life imprisonment only if it found "some extenuating circumstances or facts in
the case." ld. at 671, 145 P.2d at 580. Absent a finding of extenuating circumstances, "it
is the duty of the Jury to find a simple verdict of murder in the first degree, and leave with
the law the responsibility of fixing the punishment." rd at 672, 145 P.2d at 580. The jury
returned a verdict finding Kolez guilty of murder in the first degree "without recommenda-
tion." Id. at 671, 145 P.2d at 580. Expressing the belief that capital punishment was
mandatory in this situation, the judge sentenced Kolez to death. Id. At that time, a series
of California Supreme Court cases indicated that this instruction erroneously interpreted
the capital sentencing statute and that the instruction should not have been given, but it
was not reversible error to do so. In an opinion by the court, the judgment of death was
affirmed. Id at 672, 145 P.2d at 581. Justice Traynor, joined by Justice Schauer,
dissented. Id at 672-76, 145 P.2d at 581-83. After pointing out the instruction was
admittedly erroneous, Justice Traynor argued:
There can be no justifiable reliance on decisions allowing this instruction in view
of the repeated warnings by this court that district attorneys should not offer and
trial courts should not give it. A decision that cannot properly be relied upon
cannot serve to justify adherence to an interpretation it condemns. Nothing is
gained and much is lost by insisting upon a mechanical adherence to precedent
that perpetuates an admittedly erroneous interpretation of a statute and defeats
the very purpose of the Legislature in enacting it.
Id. at 676, 145 P.2d at 583 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
64. Lindley, 26 Cal. 2d at 794, 161 P.2d at 235 (Traynor, J., concurring).
65. In re Halcomb, 21 Cal. 2d 126, 130 P.2d 384 (1942). See infra text accompanying
notes 413-23 for a discussion of Halcomb.
66. We should remember, however, that we are concerned only with Traynor's
opinions on substantial issues of substantive criminal law. The many opinions he wrote
on other subjects during this period, such as criminal procedure, are beyond the scope of
this discussion. Many of these opinions would be of interest to a broader study of the
judicial process. In criminal procedure, for example, the following Traynor opinions
decided during this first decade would be of interest: (1) People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal. 2d
165, 124 P.2d 44 (1942) (majority opinion) (finding that evidence obtained by a
constitutionally invalid search and seizure is admissible under both state and federal
constitutions-changed with respect to state constitution by a subsequent Traynor opinion
in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955)); (2) People v. Adamson, 27 Cal.
2d 478,165 P.2d 3 (1946) (unanimous opinion) (permitting comment on defendant's failure
to explain or deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in case against him), overruled
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The paucity of relevant Traynor opinions during this period
reflects a number of factors. As we have seen, the close of the
decade of the 1940s marked the end of a long period of relative
disinterest in the criminal law. The academy, the courts, and the
profession all shared this apathy. This general indifference to criminal
law profoundly affected the judicial process.67 There was no consti-
tutional right to appointed counsel in the trial courts during this
period,68 and the right to appointed counsel on appeal awaited the
Supreme Court's decision in Douglas v. California69 in 1963. In
addition, the statutory right to the appointment of counsel in criminal
cases was woefully undeveloped during this period.0
Even if the defendant was represented by counsel in the lower
courts, criminal law generally was not practiced with an eye toward
the creative powers of the judicial process. The focus, instead, was on
the traditional fact finding process and on more commonplace legal
issues. The great practitioners of the criminal law during this period,
that come to mind, Clarence Darrow and Lloyd Paul Stryker, for
example, gained their reputations as men who were extraordinarily
skilled in factual practice and advocacy. They were not known as
architects of the criminal law.
Furthermore, even if a case was developed in the lower courts by
defense counsel with the idea of raising an innovative legal argument
on appeal, unless the lawyer was hired or volunteered representation
in the appellate court, the issue probably failed for lack of advocacy
on appeal. If the appeal was from a judgment other than death, the
absence of counsel typically meant that no petition for a hearing was
filed in the Supreme Court. Thus, even if an important legal process
by Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); (3) In re Phyle, 30 Cal. 2d 838, 186 P.2d 134
(1947) (majority opinion) (finding that no judicial determination is required for
certification by superintendent of state mental hospital that capitally convicted defendant
has regained his sanity and for return of defendant to warden for execution of sentence).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 13-20.
68. See supra text accompanying note 24.
69. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). Justice Traynor's concurring opinion in People v. Brown, 55
Cal. 2d 64, 357 P.2d 1072, 9 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1960) anticipated the Supreme Court's holding
in Douglas v. California. Traynor's Brown concurrence describes California practice until
Douglas. Brown, 55 Cal. 2d at 69-75, 357 P.2d at 1075-79, 9 Cal, Rptr. at 819-23.
70. For example, in 1951, an indigent defendant was first given the statutory right to
appointed counsel for a preliminary hearing. CAL. PENAL CODE § 859 (West 1985).
Before this amendment there was no right to appointed counsel at the preliminary hearing.
See, e.g., People v. Campos, 10 Cal. App. 2d 310, 320, 52 P.2d 251, 256 (1935).
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issue was presented, Justice Traynor had no real opportunity to
consider it.
As we would anticipate, many if not most of the criminal cases
decided in the California Supreme Court in this period were
automatic appeals. Throughout most of this period, the court did not
routinely appoint counsel to represent defendants appearing before
the court, even in automatic appeals from a judgment imposing
death." Inasmuch as the appellate system is designed to respond to
arguments made by counsel, few of these cases would engage the
court in challenging legal process issues. It is therefore understand-
able that in the handful of cases in which Justice Traynor did address
interesting issues during this decade, the defendant was represented
by counsel on appeal.72
Furthermore, Justice Traynor, who had no specific interest in
criminal law when he was appointed to the bench, generally went
along with the legal culture of his time. Thus, he silently joined the
opinions affirming the death judgments of unrepresented defendants
for whom no briefs were filed.73 Nevertheless, it is a tribute to his
commitment to the legal process that he did respond to interesting
legal process issues when they were presented in the cases noted
above. Not all of the justices did so.
B. The Second Decade: 1950-1960
In the early 1950s, the moribund period of the criminal law began
to fade away. Professional interest in criminal law started to grow
and flower. While the constitutional right to counsel was yet to be
71. See, eg., People v. Winton, 31 Cal. 2d 467, 189 P.2d 257 (1948); People v.
Johansen, 17 Cal. 2d 479, 110 P.2d 406 (1941) (the defendant was not represented, counsel
was not appointed, and no brief was filed on the defendant's behalf). In Winton, which
was decided on February 10, 1948, the opinion reads:
Defendant is not prosecuting the appeal and has filed no briefs. He has
repeatedly admitted his guilt and expressed his desire to pay the penalty
imposed.
Notwithstanding these facts the record has been closely scrutinized for
possible error prejudicial to defendant. None can be found. Therefore a brief
statement of the facts will suffice to dispose of the appeal.
Id. at 468, 189 P.2d at 257. Justice Carter wrote the opinion for a unanimous court. The
judgment imposing death, of course, was affirmed. Id. at 469, 189 P.2d at 258.
72. See People v. Lindley, 26 Cal. 2d 780,161 P.2d 227 (1945); People v. Kolez, 23 Cal.
2d 670, 145 P.2d 580 (1944); People v. Albertson, 23 Cal. 2d 550, 145 P.2d 7 (1944); In re
Haynes, 21 Cal. 2d 891, 130 P.2d 388 (1942); In re Petrie, 21 Cal. 2d 132, 130 P.2d 712
(1942); In re Halcomb, 21 Cal. 2d 126, 130 P.2d 384 (1942).
73. See cases cited supra note 71.
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announced, the California Supreme Court began routinely appointing
counsel for indigent defendants on appeal,74 and counsel was
routinely provided in lower court proceedings.75 The court began to
hear more criminal cases, and Justice Traynor, responding to his time,
apparently became more interested in criminal law issues. Although
a variety of factors contributed to the court's increasing criminal law
caseload, such as the burgeoning California population, it was partly
fed by the newly discovered interest in criminal law that permeated
all levels of the profession.
In this second decade, Justice Traynor's work product in criminal
cases nearly doubled.76  Thirty-four percent-eighty-eight-of his
criminal law opinions were written during the 1950s. This increase
appears to be attributable to the fact that new arguments were being
made in the court, and the judges began taking these arguments and
the criminal law seriously. Most of the opinions, however, focused on
issues of criminal procedure.77 Of the eighty-eight Traynor criminal
law opinions, only thirteen-fifteen percent of his eighty-eight-
concerned substantive issues of any depth.7" Traynor wrote five of
74. For example, see Justice Traynor's concurring opinion in People v. Brown, 55 Cal.
2d 64, 69-75, 357 P.2d 1072, 1075-79, 9 Cal. Rptr. 816, 819 (1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 970
(1961).
75. See People v. Adamson, 34 Cal. 2d 320, 332, 210 P.2d 13, 19 (1949); People v.
Dorman, 28 Cal. 2d 846, 849, 172 P.2d 686, 688 (1946).
76. In the first decade he wrote 45 opinions of various types. In the second decade
he wrote 88 opinions in criminal cases.
77. See, e.g., People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969);
People v. Brown, 55 Cal. 2d 64, 357 P.2d 1072, 9 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1960), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 970 (1961).
78. Compared with the eight opinions involving substantive issues of any depth for the
prior decade, see supra text accompanying notes 51-63, this is a considerable increase in
Traynor's substantive criminal-law work. These 13 cases are: People v. Camodeca, 52
Cal. 2d 142, 338 P.2d 903 (1959) (attempted grand theft-unanimous opinion); People v.
Stuart, 47 Cal. 2d 167, 302 P.2d 5 (1956) (manslaughter-unanimous opinion); People v.
Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798,299 P.2d 850 (1956) (bigamy-majority opinion-6-1 split); People
v. Burt, 45 Cal. 2d 311,288 P.2d 503 (1955) (solicitation-unanimous opinion); In re Hess,
45 Cal. 2d 171,288 P.2d 5 (1955) (rape-majority opinion-5-1-1 split); People v. Hallner,
43 Cal. 2d 715,277 P.2d.393 (1954) (bribery-dissenting opinion); People v. Baker, 42 Cal.
2d 550, 268 P.2d 705 (1954) (automatic appeal-majority opinion-4-1 split); People v.
Ashley, 42 Cal. 2d 246, 267 P.2d 271, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 900 (1954) (grand
theft-majority opinion-5-2 split); People v. Byrd, 42 Cal. 2d 200, 266 P.2d 505, cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 848 (1954) (automatic appeal-opinion concurring in the dissent of Carter,
J.); People v. Deloney, 41 Cal. 2d 832, 264 P.2d 532 (1953) (automatic appeal-apparent
unanimous opinion-no indication of the votes of three justices); People v. Thomas, 41
Cal. 2d 470,261 P.2d 1 (1953) (automatic appeal---concurring opinion); People v. Martinez,
38 Cal. 2d 556, 241 P.2d 224 (1952) (automatic appeal-unanimous opinion); People v.
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these thirteen opinions for a majority of the court, and five were
unanimous opinions.7 9 There was one concurring opinion" and one
dissent." Justice Traynor wrote no plurality opinions in important
substantive cases this decade.'
Knowles, 35 Cal. 2d 175, 217 P.2d 1, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 879 (1950) (kidnapping for
robbery and robbery-majority opinion-4-3 split).
Justice Traynor wrote seven additional opinions during this decade that disposed of
substantive issues that cannot be fairly characterized as trivial. Nevertheless, these seven
opinions were excluded from the study because they were decided by a routine application
of settled substantive law. In other words, they are simply law-applying cases. These are
the Traynor opinions in the following cases: People v. McCaughan, 49 Cal. 2d 409, 317
P.2d 974 (1957) (involuntary manslaughter-majority opinion-reversed); People v.
Cheary, 48 Cal. 2d 301, 309 P.2d 431 (1957) (automatic appeal-majority opinion-6-1
split); People v. Malotte, 46 Cal. 2d59, 292 P.2d 517, appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 805 (1956)
(conspiracy to commit misdemeanor-majority opinion-affirmed); People v. Caldwell, 43
Cal. 2d 864, 279 P.2d 539 (1955) (automatic appeal-majority opinion--death judgment
affirmed); People v. Carnine, 41 Cal. 2d 384, 260 P.2d 16 (1953) (automatic ap-
peal-majority opinion-death judgment reversed); People v. Mendes, 35 Cal. 2d 537,219
P.2d 1 (1950) (automatic appeal-majority opinion-conviction reduced); People v.
Huizenga, 34 Cal. 2d 669,213 P.2d 710 (1950) (automatic appeal-opinion for a unanimous
court affirming death judgment).
79. The five unanimous opinions-in chronological order-were in Martinez, Deloney,
Burt, Stuart, and Camodeca. See cases cited supra note 78. The opinion in Deloney was
written by Traynor and joined by Chief Justice Gibson and Justices Carter and Schauer
(concurring). There is no indication that Justices Edmonds, Shenk, and Spence
participated in the case. Accordingly, I have counted this opinion as a unanimous opinion.
Justice Traynor wrote for a majority in Knowles, Ashley, Baker, Hess, and Vogel. See
cases cited supra note 78.
80. People v. Thomas, 41 Cal. 2d 470, 261 P.2d 1 (1953) (automatic appeal). During
his first decade on the bench, Justice Traynor wrote few concurring and dissenting
opinions in substantive criminal cases. Adhering to this pattern, he wrote only one
concurring opinion in the second decade-as contrasted with two concurring opinions of
interest to us in the first decade.
81. People v. Hallner, 43 Cal. 2d 715,277 P.2d 393 (1954) (bribery). Justice Traynor
also filed an opinion concurring in part with the dissenting opinion of Justice Carter in
People v. Byrd, 42 Cal. 2d 200, 266 P.2d 505 (1954) (automatic appeal). Traynor did not,
however, join in the portions of the Carter opinion implying that the defendant was denied
due process or equal protection of the laws. Byrd, 42 Cal. 2d at 218, 266 P.2d at 515.
With these reservations, Justice Traynor joined the Carter dissent. Id Because this
opinion is essentially the same as though Traynor joined the Carter dissent, I have
excluded this extremely short opinion from further consideration in this study.
The number of Traynor dissents in criminal cases remained fairly constant in the first
two decades. Justice Traynor wrote 16 dissents in criminal cases during the first decade,
and 18 during the second. See supra note 61. But only two of these 18 dissents involve
significant issues of substantive criminal law. It should be noted here, however, that while
the number of dissents remained fairly constant over these two decades, the proportion
of dissents to other opinions declined significantly during the second decade. During the
first decade, 36% of the Traynor opinions in criminal cases were dissents. See supra note
61 and accompanying text. In the second decade, dissents represent 20% of the opinions.
82. In contrast to the first decade, in which he did not write a single plurality opinion
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Except for the unusual dissent in Halcomb, it is during this
second decade that we first find Traynor opinions that alter the path
of the substantive criminal law. 3 Five of the thirteen opinions either
make important changes in the substantive law or continue to build
and develop new law based upon precedent created during this second
decade.' The remaining eight opinions 5 maintain the path in
several important ways but create no new substantive doctrine.86
in a criminal case, Justice Traynor wrote four plurality opinions in criminal cases during
the second decade. However, since none of them addressed important issues of substan-
tive criminal law, those four opinions are of no further concern.
83. The opinion in In re Halcomb, 21 Cal. 2d 126, 130 P.2d 384 (1942), filed in the first
decade, is not an opinion suggesting that new law be created. In fact, Justice Traynor
dissented from the creation of a new crime by the court in that case. But because the
opinion focuses on the law-creating function, I classified Halcomb as a law-creating case,
84. These law-creating opinions are: People v. Stuart, 47 Cal. 2d 167, 302 P.2d 5
(1956) (unanimous opinion); People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798,299 P.2d 850 (1956) (majority
opinion); People v. Burt, 45 Cal. 2d 311,288 P.2d 503 (1955) (unanimous opinion); People
v. Baker, 42 Cal. 2d 550, 268 P.2d 705 (1954) (majority opinion); and People v. Martinez,
38 Cal. 2d 556, 241 P.2d 224 (1952) (unanimous opinion).
85. People v. Camodeca, 52 Cal. 2d 142, 338 P.2d 903 (1959); In re Hess, 45 Cal. 2d
171, 288 P.2d 5 (1955); People v. Hallner, 43 Cal. 2d 715, 277 P.2d 393 (1954); People v.
Ashley, 42 Cal. 2d 246,267 P.2d 271, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 900 (1954); People v. Byrd, 42
Cal. 2d 200, 266 P.2d 505 (1954); People v. Deloney, 41 Cal. 2d 832, 264 P.2d 532 (1953);
People v. Thomas, 41 Cal. 2d 470, 261 P.2d 1 (1953); People v. Knowles, 35 Cal. 2d 175,
217 P.2d 1 (1950).
The first case, Camodeca, is a close call. In his unanimous opinion in that case,
Justice Traynor overruled a prior opinion of the Supreme Court and a court of appeal
opinion that followed the case which held that to constitute an attempted grand theft on
a false pretense theory, the victim must be deceived by and must rely on the false
representations of the defendant. Camodeca, 52 Cal. 2d at 146-47, 338 P.2d at 906. The
great weight of authority is to the contrary in both England and the United States. Id.
Finding that "the Werner case is unsound in so holding" because "[lt failed to recognize
the crucial distinction between the completed crime of false pretenses and an attempt to
commit such a crime," Werner was overruled. Id. at 146,338 P.2d at 906. Camodeca thus
brought California law into conformity with then-existing California law that rejected the
defense of factual impossibility for the crime of attempt and found that the making of the
false representation, with the necessary culpable mental state, was a sufficient perpetrating
act for attempt liability. Id. at 147, 338 P.2d at 906.
86. Though a purist may argue that new law is made in every case, even cases that
apply settled rules to new facts, in my view the law-making produced by this endeavor is
too minute to be classified as an exercise of a judge's creative powers. But it is not always
easy to distinguish lawmaking from law maintaining. People v. Hallner, 43 Cal. 2d 715,277
P.2d 393 (1954), presents a ready example. The two categories suggested by the foregoing
analysis, law-tending and law-creating, probably are better viewed as representing polar-
opposite extremes on a continuous scale. Our inquiry is better directed to the extremes
since our goal is to learn what we can about the creative role judges play in making
substantive criminal law in modern times; we are more likely to learn from clear examples
than arguable propositions. Forced to choose between these two extremes, I have placed
Hallner in the law-tending group of cases. Thus, seven cases are law-creating and seven
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C. The Third Decade: 1960-1970
Criminal law, as we have seen, reached its golden age during
Justice Traynor's last decade on the bench. A brief recollection of
the indicia of this age should prove helpful here. The Supreme
Court's criminal law revolution, which started in 1961 with the
announcement of the decision in Mapp v. Ohio,' continued unabat-
ed throughout this decade. 8 Of particular interest to our inquiry are
two cases decided during the October, 1962 Term: Gideon v. Wain-
wrighs9 and Douglas v. California.90 In Gideon the Court estab-
lished a right to counsel for the indigent accused in all state felony
prosecutions 1  With representation at trial, the facts and the
arguments crucial to a rebirth of judicial lawmaking in the criminal
law could now be presented to the lower courts and made part of the
record on appeal. What Gideon gave to state felony prosecutions in
the lower courts, Douglas gave to the state appellate court system:
the guaranteed right of indigent defendants to appointed counsel on
appeal.92
Gideon and Douglas were crucial to the renaissance of criminal
law that took place in this decade. The great majority of prosecutions
involve indigents. These two cases and their progeny provided the
means by which the new thinking about the criminal law could be
translated into judicial lawmaking by a court inclined to listen and
participate in the modem golden age of criminal law.
The criminal justice system thus was equipped to handle judicial
lawmaking in criminal law at the same time, and partly as a result of,
a variety of new ideas. New patterns of thinking about substantive
criminal law emerged. For example, the Model Penal Code was
promulgated; empirical research on criminal law issues was carried on
with funding from foundations and government; the horrors disclosed
are law-tending in important ways during this second decade.
87. 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
88. The criminal law revolution is said to have ended "with a flourish, on June 23,
1969. On that date, the last day of the 'Warren Court' era, the Double Jeopardy Clause
became the last Bill of Rights provision that the Court has applied to the states."
EDITORS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW REPORTER, THE CRIMINAL LAW REVOLUTION AND ITS
AFTERMATH: 1960-1977 v (1978).
89. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
90. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
91. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
92. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 355.
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by the Second World War reminded us of the importance of criminal
law as a "bill of rights"; and the Civil Rights Movement gave us proof
that much injustice thrived throughout the nation by virtue of the
then-existing criminal justice system. 3
The California Supreme Court faced the renaissance in criminal
law with new tools in place, new empirical evidence of how criminal
law actually worked, and with new modes of thinking about substan-
tive criminal law and its purposes.
In this era Justice Traynor's work product increased by nearly
seventy percent compared to the previous decade. He wrote 126
criminal law opinions during the decade of the 1960s. From the
perspective of his thirty years on the bench, nearly one-half of all of
his criminal law opinions were written during this period. 4 This
amounts to slightly more than twelve opinions each year, an average
of one opinion each month.
Again, most of these opinions focused on problems of criminal
procedure. Of these 126 opinions, sixteen-thirteen percent-were
concerned with important substantive issues." Eleven were majority
93. Speaking in an entirely different context, Justice Traynor once said:
We like to believe that rules of law are free of tyranny and caprice, as men are
not. For better or worse, however, they are man-made. There is always the risk
that a rule may be defective at the outset or may become so in time. It could
even prove as despotic as a despot. Whatever assurance we have against such
risks depends upon our appellate judges, whose opinions set forth the rules of
law. They must reason anew on each case to keep constant their watch on the
law.
Roger Traynor, The Supreme Court's Watch on the Law, in 2 J. EDWARD JOHNSON,
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES OF CALIFORNIA, 1900-1950, at 207, 210
(1966).
94. During his 30 years on the bench, Justice Traynor wrote 259 opinions in criminal
cases. The 126 criminal law opinions written in this last decade thus amount to 49% of
his total criminal law opinion writing.
95. People v. Moran, 1 Cal. 3d 755, 763, 463 P.2d 763, 767, 83 Cal. Rptr. 411, 415
(1970) (Traynor, C.J., dissenting) (drug conviction-4-3 split); People v. Hood, I Cal. 3d
444,462 P.2d 370,82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969) (assault-unanimous opinion); In re Culver, 69
Cal. 2d 898, 447 P.2d 633, 73 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1968) (escape-majority opinion-6-1 split);
People v. Chacon, 69 Cal. 2d 765, 447 P.2d 106, 73 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1968) (automatic ap-
peals-unanimous opinion); In re Murdock, 68 Cal. 2d 313,437 P.2d 764,66 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1968) (traffic offense-majority opinion-5-2 split); People v. Butler, 65 Cal. 2d 569,421
P.2d 703,55 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1967) (automatic appeal-majority opinion-5-2 split); People
v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966) (first-degree mur-
der-majority opinion-5-1-1 split); People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal. 2d 690,408 P.2d 365,47 Cal.
Rptr. 909 (1965) (automatic appeal-majority opinion-5-2 split), vacated, Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130,44 Cal.
Rptr. 442 (1965) (first degree murder-majority opinion-5-2 split); People v. Perez, 62
Cal. 2d 769, 401 P.2d 934, 44 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1965) (possession of marijuana-majority
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16opinions, and four expressed the views of a unanimous court.
There was one dissent,97 but no plurality or concurring opinions. In
varying degrees, and in all but one case,98 new substantive criminal
law was made in each of these Traynor opinions.99
Compared with Justice Traynor's work in the first two decades,
this represents a substantial increase in judicial lawmaking. In the
first decade, the moribund years, only one of Justice Traynor's
opinions focused on the law-creating function."°  In the second
decade, the transition years, five of the thirteen opinions, thirty-eight
percent, created new substantive criminal law in one degree or
another. During the last decade, fifteen of the opinions deciding a
significant substantive issue created or urged new substantive
doctrine-one hundred percent. 1' Thus, while Justice Traynor's
opinions on substantive criminal issues remained fairly stable over the
last two decades he was on the bench-thirteen of these opinions
were written during the second decade and sixteen in the third-the
opinion-5-2 concurring); People v. Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d 879, 395 P.2d 893,40 Cal. Rptr. 845
(1964) (conspiracy-unanimous opinion); People v. Quicke, 61 Cal. 2d 155, 390 P.2d 393,
37 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1964) (automatic appeal-majority opinion-5-1-1 split); People v.
Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963) (automatic ap-
peal-majority opinion-5-2 split); People v. Modesto, 59 Cal. 2d 722,382 P.2d 33,31 Cal.
Rptr. 225 (1963) (automatic appeal-majority opinion-5-2 split), overruled by People v.
Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631 (1964); People v. Jackson, 59 Cal. 2d 468,381 P.2d 1, 30 Cal. Rptr.
329 (1963) (narcotics offense-majority opinion-5-2 split); Benson v. Superior Court, 57
Cal. 2d 240, 368 P.2d 116, 18 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1962) (solicitation-unanimous opinion).
96. The unanimous opinions were in Benson, Pierce, Chacon, and Hood. Except for
Moran, in which Justice Traynor dissented, all of the remaining important substantive
opinions were written for a majority of the court. Id.
97. The dissent was in Moran.
98. 1 classify Jackson as a law-maintaining case.
99. 1 eliminated five Traynor opinions from this study because the substantive issues
were resolved by a routine application of settled law. These routine issues generally
appeared in automatic appeals or in cases in which the substantive issue was joined with
an important issue of criminal procedure. The cases are as follows: People v. Aranda, 63
Cal. 2d 518, 407 P.2d 265, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1965) (first-degree robbery-majority
opinion-6-1 split); People v. Hall, 62 Cal. 2d 104, 396 P.2d 700, 41 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1964)
(second-degree murder-majority opinion-5-2 split); People v. Imbler, 57 Cal. 2d 711,371
P.2d 304,21 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1962) (automatic appeal-majority opinion-6-1 split); People
v. Mason, 54 Cal. 2d 164, 351 P.2d 1025, 4 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1960) (automatic ap-
peal-unanimous opinion); People v. Love, 53 Cal. 2d 843, 350 P.2d 705, 3 Cal. Rptr. 665
(1960) (automatic appeal-majority opinion-5-2 split).
100. In Re Halcomb, 21 Cal. 2d 126, 130, 130 P.2d 384, 387 (1942) (Traynor, C.J.,
dissenting). See infra text accompanying notes 413-23 for a discussion of Halcomb.
101. As seen above, most of these routine issues appeared in either automatic appeals
or were joined with an important issue of criminal procedure. See, e.g., supra text
accompanying notes 71-72.
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number of opinions creating new substantive criminal law increased
substantially in the last decade. Of these twenty-nine opinions, five
opinions in the second decade created new substantive doctrine, while
fifteen did so in the third decade.
Before we turn to the specific cases to learn what we can about
the judicial role in making substantive criminal law, a summary of
these opinions may be helpful." z There are thirty-seven opinions
spread over three decades: 3 There are thirteen unanimous opin-
ions,1 4 seventeen majority opinions,"' three concurring opin-
ions,"°6 and four dissents."° If we exclude the moribund first de-
102. The type of opinion and the number of opinions within each type speak to the
judge's judicial style in making new substantive law and to the judge's ability to persuade
other members of the court to join his or her opinion.
103. There are 8 in the first decade, 13 in the second decade and 16 in the third decade.
See supra notes 51-57, 76-81, 95-99, and accompanying text.
104. These unanimous opinions were written in the following cases: People v. Hood,
1 Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d 370,82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969); People v. Chacon, 69 Cal. 2d 765,447
P.2d 106, 73 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1968); People v. Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d 879, 395 P.2d 893, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 845 (1964); Benson v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 240,368 P.2d 116, 18 Cal. Rptr. 516
(1962); People v. Camodeca, 52 Cal. 2d 142,338 P.2d 903 (1959); People v. Stuart, 47 Cal,
2d 167, 302 P.2d 5 (1956); People v. Burt, 45 Cal. 2d 311, 288 P.2d 503 (1955); People v.
Deloney, 41 Cal. 2d 832, 264 P.2d 532 (1953); People v. Martinez, 38 Cal. 2d 556, 241 P.2d
224 (1952); People v. Cornett, 33 Cal. 2d 33, 198 P.2d 877 (1948); People v. Brown, 29 Cal.
2d 555, 176 P.2d 929 (1947); People v. Trieber, 28 Cal. 2d 657, 171 P.2d 1 (1946); People
v. Mitchell, 27 Cal. 2d 678, 166 P.2d 10 (1946).
105. These are the Traynor opinions in the following cases: In re Culver, 69 Cal. 2d
898, 447 P.2d 633, 73 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1968); In re Murdock, 68 Cal. 2d 313, 437 P.2d 764,
66 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1968); People v. Butler, 65 Cal. 2d 569, 421 P.2d 703, 55 Cal. Rptr. 511
(1967); People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966); People
v. Gilbert, 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965), vacated, Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777,402 P.2d 130,44 Cal.
Rptr. 442 (1965); People v. Perez, 62 Cal. 2d 769, 401 P.2d 934, 44 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1965);
People v. Quicke, 61 Cal. 2d 155, 390 P.2d 393, 37 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1964); People v.
Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963); People v. Modesto, 59
Cal. 2d 722, 382 P.2d 33, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1963), overruled by People v. Morse, 60 Cal.
2d 631 (1964); People v. Jackson, 59 Cal. 2d 468, 381 P.2d 1, 30 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1963);
People v. Cheary, 48 Cal. 2d 301,309 P.2d 431 (1957); People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299
P.2d 850 (1956); In re Hess, 45 Cal. 2d 171,288 P.2d 5 (1955); People v. Baker, 42 Cal. 2d
550, 268 P.2d 705 (1954); People v. Ashley, 42 Cal. 2d 246, 267 P.2d 271 (1954); People v.
Knowles, 35 Cal. 2d 175, 217 P.2d 1 (1950).
106. These are the Traynor concurring opinions in the following cases: People v.
Thomas, 41 Cal. 2d 470, 475, 261 P.2d 1, 4 (1953) (Traynor, J., concurring); People v.
Lindley, 26 Cal. 2d 780, 794, 161 P.2d 227, 235 (1945) (Traynor, J., concurring); People v.
Albertson, 23 Cal. 2d 550, 581, 145 P.2d 7, 22 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
107. These are the Traynor dissenting opinions in the following cases: People v. Moran,
1 Cal. 3d 755, 763, 463 P.2d 763, 767, 83 Cal. Rptr. 411, 415 (1970) (Traynor, C.J.,
dissenting); People v. Hallner, 43 Cal. 2d 715, 721, 277 P.2d 393, 397 (1954) (Traynor, J.,
dissenting); People v. Kolez, 23 Cal. 2d 670, 673, 145 P.2d 580, 581 (1944) (Traynor, J.,
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cade from this calculation, there are twenty-nine opinions in twenty
years.' G° This is an average of one and one-half opinions each year.
IV. ROGER TRAYNOR'S JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY AND CREATIVITY
IN THE SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
Before we turn to the lawmaking opinions, we will take a brief
look at the Traynor substantive criminal law opinions that pursue
other goals. These cases fall into two categories: error-correcting
cases and law-maintaining cases.
A. Error Correction
In any legal system that enforces criminal law through courts, it
is axiomatic that judges will exercise a law-applying function. It is
neither problematic nor controversial that our judges perform this
task. It is, of course, inevitable that errors will be committed when
this is done. Part of the reason we have created appellate courts is to
correct errors committed in the courts of original jurisdiction. This
error-correcting function falls squarely within our expectations for
appellate judges in our common-law system; it is what we demand
they do. Indeed, this is the first function that comes readily to mind
when we think of the business of appellate court judging.1
In a system with intermediate appellate courts, this task usually
is discharged by the lower appellate courts, rather than by the highest
court in the state. Although this is generally true in California, where
the district courts of appeal do the bulk of the error-correcting work,
the California Supreme Court performs this task in automatic appeals,
or when the court grants a hearing on one issue and error-correcting
issues also are presented in the same case. Since the court must
dispose of all issues that might affect the case, the court decides these
error-correcting issues along with the issues that moved it to grant a
hearing. These opinions have been eliminated from further consider-
ation because generally they do not raise significant legal process
dissenting), overruled by People v. Green, 47 Cal. 2d 209 (1956); In re Halcomb, 21 Cal.
2d 126, 130, 130 P.2d 384, 387 (1942) (Traynor, J., dissenting). See supra note 62 for an
explanation as to the Traynor opinions in Petrie and Haynes.
108. In terms of the type of opinion, there are 9 unanimous opinions, 17 majority
opinions, 1 concurring opinion, and 3 dissents.
109. For that reason, I have excluded the simple law-applying cases from our current
inquiry.
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issues nor do they raise substantial questions of substantive criminal
law.
B. The Law-Maintaining Cases
Given the common-law system's commitment to precedent and
to stare decisis, and to the equality of the application of law inherent
within those two concepts, appellate courts are also given the task of
maintaining a uniform, consistent common law throughout the
jurisdiction. This function of the appellate courts is the major reason
for the pyramidal structure given to appellate court systems in the
common-law world. Hence, appellate judges should make sure that
precedent forms a logical, cohesive, understandable body of law that
must be used in the law-applying function by all agencies throughout
the legal system. All of our great common-law judges, including
James Kent, Joseph Story, Lemuel Shaw, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Benjamin Cardozo, and Roger Traynor have been masters of the law-
maintaining function.' In no small part, it is because of their great
skills in tending the common law that we remember them from among
the thousands who have practiced the craft of appellate judging.
With one exception, all of Traynor's substantive criminal law
opinions written in the first decade, eight of those written during the
second decade, but only one of the substantive criminal law opinions
in the third decade pursue this law-maintaining goal."'
In a system with intermediate appellate courts, it is generally
agreed that this is an important function of a supreme court with
110. See RoscoE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 4-5,4 n,2 (1938);
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 407.
111. This task apparently was discharged by other justices during the third decade.
Justice Traynor became Chief Justice of California in 1964. These new responsibilities may
have affected the number and type of opinions that he wrote while he was Chief Justice.
In reminiscing on the appointment of Roger Traynor as Chief Justice, Donald Barrett
(Justice Traynor's chief of staff for a number of years) tells us:
I felt in a way it was unfortunate that Judge Traynor was made Chief Justice
because I think when he was an Associate Justice he had more time available for
pursuing his jurisprudential interests, than he did as a Chief Justice. I am not
sure that the trade-off was worth it. Having the freedom from administrative
chores of the Chief Justice position might well have been better in a way than
having Justice Traynor made Chief. He was, however, certainly the logical
choice.
Interview with Donald P. Barrett, Research Attorney, Supreme Court of California, 1948-
1981, San Francisco, Cal. 16 (May 28, 1986 & July 28, 1986) (transcript on file with the
Roger J. Traynor Memorial Room, Hastings College of the Law Library) [hereinafter
Barrett Interview].
[Vol. 29:429
THE LEGACY OF ROGER TRAYNOR
respect to lower appellate court opinions. The law-maintaining
function, for example, promotes the uniformity of law within the state
by overruling discordant authority in the lower appellate courts. It
harmonizes the supreme court's own precedent when multiple cases
produce inconsistent lines" of authority, and it assures that the law
articulated by the supreme court is taken seriously by the lower
courts. The law-maintaining function also clarifies existing law by
reformulating its expression, by explaining its purpose and the policy
that drives it, and by providing additional examples of how it should
function. In essence, law-maintaining work, in Justice Traynor's
words, keeps "the law straight on its course."'n2 It tends the path
of the law, restoring its surface, removing obstructions, and repainting
its signposts. Construction work is done to preserve the existing way,
not to create new routes, when the court is exercising this function.
Justice Traynor's law-maintaining opinions fall squarely within
this tradition. Four examples of this type of Traynor opinion should
sufficiently illustrate this point. Two opinions are taken from the first
decade and two from the second decade.
His first law-maintaining opinion is his concurrence in People v.
Albertson."' In a murder trial, the court instructed the jury that
California Penal Code section 1105" 4 allocates the "burden of
proving" mitigation, justification, or excuse to the defendant."5
Several early cases interpreted this section as placing a burden of
persuasion on the defendant.1 6 The defendant, it was said, must
prove these issues by a preponderance of the evidence. These early
cases were overruled and it was thereafter uniformly held that the
burden mentioned in this section is the burden of producing enough
evidence to raise a reasonable doubt about guilt."7 In Albertson's
trial for murder, the jury was instructed that the burden of proving
these issues falls upon the defendant. The instruction gave no
explanation of what was meant by the burden of proof."8 After
noting that it is illogical to impose a burden of raising a reasonable
112. Roger J. Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle of Law, 56 VA. L. REV. 739, 749 (1970)
[hereinafter Traynor, Reasoning]; R. J. Traynor, The Courts: Interweavers in the Reform-
ation of Law, 32 SASK. L. REv. 201, 212 (1967) [hereinafter Traynor, Interweavers].
113. 23 Cal. 2d 550, 581, 145 P.2d 7, 22 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
114. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1105 (West 1985).
115. People v. Albertson, 23 Cal. 2d at 586, 145 P.2d at 25 (Traynor, J., concurring).
116. 1l (Traynor, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 586-87, 145 P.2d at 25 (Traynor, J., concurring).
118. See id. at 586, 145 P.2d at 25 (Traynor, J., concurring).
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doubt upon a defendant when the prosecution must prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, Justice Traynor explained that the
defendant need only introduce evidence of justification, excuse, or
mitigation to satisfy the section's requirements.' 9 The jury instruc-
tion was thus erroneous for it failed to explain the defendant's
burden. It permitted a reasonable juror to believe incorrectly that the
defendant bears the burden of persuasion on justification, excuse, or
mitigation." Having rationalized, simplified, and explained the
court's own caselaw, Justice Traynor then noted that an inconsistent
precedent from the court of appeal should, accordingly, be over-
ruled.
121
The Traynor opinion thus welds the cases into a logical, cohesive
body of law and clearly informs the lower courts that a jury should
not be instructed in the language of section 1105. Furthermore, the
lower courts were assured that Justice Traynor meant what he said as
the error was found prejudicial: His concurring opinion provided the
crucial fourth vote for a reversal of Albertson's death judgment.'
An equally important law-maintaining issue is the focus of Justice
Traynor's dissent in People v. Kolez,2 a another automatic appeal.
The instruction on the jury's sentencing discretion in a capital case
was the sole issue before the court in Kolez. 24 The jury was told
that once it found the defendant guilty of first degree murder, unless
it also found some extenuating facts or circumstances, it was the jury's
duty to find a simple verdict of murder in the first degree and leave
with the law the responsibility of fixing the punishment.'2 The
defendant argued that existing precedent condemns this instruction
and that the court should find the error prejudicial.'26 In a per
curiam opinion, the court affirmed the death judgment with a single
dispositive sentence: "It has been held in a long line of decisions that
the giving of an instruction similar to the [instruction given in this
119. Id at 587, 145 P.2d at 25-26 (Traynor, J., concurring).
120. Id at 588-89, 145 P.2d at 26-27 (Traynor, J., concurring).
121. Id at 588, 145 P.2d at 26 (Traynor, J., concurring).
122. Id. at 581-89, 145 P.2d at 22-27 (Traynor, J., concurring).
123. 23 Cal. 2d 670, 145 P.2d 580 (1944) (Traynor, J., dissenting).
124. Id at 671-72, 145 P.2d at 580 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
125. Id at 672, 145 P.2d at 581 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
126. Id (Traynor, J., dissenting).
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case] is not erroneous."'" The opinion then cites eighteen cases in
support of its holding."u
Justice Traynor, joined by Justice Schauer, dissented.29 His
analysis of these cases shows that they tolerate giving the instruction
they condemn. Seeking the middle ground between approving the
instruction and overruling precedent, these cases admonish the trial
courts not to give the instructions but to affirm the death judgments
produced by them.3 ' Justice Traynor objected.
If the instruction is erroneous it should be held to be so
outright. The dilemma is not resolved but perpetuated when
this court, in deference to precedent, sanctions an incorrect
instruction and at the same time admonishes the trial court
to cease giving it. The repeated disregard of such admoni-
tions demonstrates that if the correct rule is to be applied,
this court must join in its enforcement and reverse the
judgments of trial courts that vitiate it... . Nothing is gained
and much is lost by insisting upon a mechanical adherence
to precedent that perpetuates an admittedly erroneous
interpretation of a statute and defeats the very purpose of
the Legislature in enacting it.'
People v. Thomas,32 another automatic appeal, focuses on the
validity of one of the lying in wait instructions. Thomas argued that
the trial court erred because the instruction referred to a "killing" by
lying in wait rather than to a murder by lying in wait.' Justice
Shenk's opinion for the majority "assumed that the instruction
standing alone is not as exact as it might be."'" Nevertheless, the
death judgment was affirmed on the ground that the instruction did
not prejudice the defendant.' When the instruction was read in
conjunction with the other lying in wait instructions, Justice Shenk
argued, the reference to a "killing" was reasonably understood by the
jury to be a killing that constituted murder.
136
127. Id. (Traynor, J., dissenting).
128. Id (Traynor, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (Traynor, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 675-76, 145 P.2d at 582-83 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (Traynor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
132. 41 Cal. 2d 470, 261 P.2d 1 (1953).
133. Id. at 474-75, 261 P.2d at 3-4.
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Although Justice Traynor concurred in the majority opinion, he
wrote separately as well. The goal of his concurrence was to clearly
and unambiguously hold that the challenged instruction was "a gross
misstatement of the law."'37 In a scholarly opinion analyzing most,
if not all, of the relevant authority, Justice Traynor demonstrated the
instruction's fundamental error."' Nevertheless, after painstakingly
reviewing the evidence, he concluded that the instruction was
harmless error. 9 Despite the affirmance of the judgment, Justice
Traynor's concurring opinion made very clear what the majority
opinion did not; the instruction was erroneous and should not be
given in any future case.
The last of the four examples of law-maintaining cases is People
v. Ashley." Ashley gained sufficient renown to be reprinted in
several casebooks and to be noted in the two standard student texts
on criminal law. 1' It remains one of the leading cases in the United
States on whether the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses
can be committed by a false promise. The cases in the California
courts of appeal were in conflict on this issue. The older cases
adhered to the majority rule, supported by the great weight of
authority, that a false pretense must relate to an existing state of facts
and that a false promise would not suffice as it refers to future
events.1 42 The newer cases held that a false promise is a misrepre-
sentation of the culprit's current state of mind, and as such it is a
misrepresentation of an existing fact sufficient for false pretenses
under the California statute.43 The California Supreme Court
granted a hearing to resolve this important conflict in the California
case law-an important aspect of the law-maintaining function.
Justice Traynor began his opinion by tracing the evolution of the
crime of false pretenses from its birth in the English statute enacted
137. kd. at 480, 261 P.2d at 7 (Traynor, J., concurring).
138. See id. at 476-80, 261 P.2d at 4-7 (Traynor, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 480, 261 P.2d at 7 (Traynor, J., concurring).
140. 42 Cal. 2d 246, 267 P.2d 271, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 900 (1954).
141. Ashley is also frequently cited in the standard texts on criminal law. E.g., WAYNE
R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 742 n.25 (2d ed. 1986); ROLLIN M.
PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 372 n.58 (3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter
PERKINS & BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW]. Ashley is one of the cases discussed by Professor
Jerome Hall in Chief Justice Traynor and Criminal Law, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 817, 817-21
(1984).
142. Ashley, 42 Cal. 2d at 260-62, 267 P.2d at 280.81 (listing the cases).
143. Id. at 262, 267 P.2d at 281.
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in 1757,'" to the dubious interpretation given to the statute by the
early English cases when they created the no-false-promise rule, to
the importation of that rule into American law, and its adoption by
the great weight of authority." Although the conflict in the
California cases focused on the existing-fact-future-conduct character-
ization of a false promise, this debate produced no convincing
rationale for accepting or rejecting the no-false-promise rule." A
rule without a sufficient rationale was an anathema to Justice
Traynor. Reason, rationale, and utility were, for him, synonymous
with the common law.
Unlike larceny and embezzlement, the two remaining crimes in
the theft trilogy, the crime of false pretenses governs sales transac-
tions. Criminalizing a false promise may unduly encumber the market
by the ever present threat that the buyer or seller might be convicted
of theft if, at the time of the transaction, the promising party was
mentally a cheat.47 This would put power into the hands of the
party on the losing end of a bad bargain to even the score against a
judgment-proof adversary in the criminal courts. Though seldom
articulated, this concern apparently is the rationale for adopting the
majority no-false-promise rule, for surely the misrepresentation of a
present state of mind is a misrepresentation of an existing fact.
The market concern supposedly driving the no-false-promise rule
is the fear of erroneous prosecution and conviction for a simple
breach of contract.'" In the typical case the false pretense is
capable of objective verification-the brick is not gold or the bridge
does not belong to the seller. When the false pretense is a misrepre-
sentation of the culprit's state of mind, there is little to tie the offense
to the objective world. Thus, the charge can be made in every case
in which a promise is made and the deal later goes sour.
A false promise is actionable in the tort of deceit, and something
more than mere proof of nonperformance is required to prove the
defendant's intent not to perform the promise at the time it was
made.49 Since the majority of jurisdictions recognize this tort and
adhere to this rule, Justice Traynor argued that the existence of the
144. 30 Geo. 2, ch. 24, § 1 (1757) (Eng.).
145. Ashley, 42 Cal. 2d at 259-62, 267 P,2d at 279-81.
146. See id. at 262, 267 P.2d at 281.
147. Id. at 262-63, 267 P.2d at 282.
148. Id. at 264,267 P.2d at 282.
149. Id. at 263, 267 P.2d at 282.
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tort is not seen as unduly encumbering the market."' Moreover, in
those few jurisdictions in which a false promise suffices as a false
pretense, the same rule is followed-more than nonperformance is
required to prove that the promise was false when made. Further-
more, the problem of proving the required mental state for this crime
is no easier when the false pretense is a false promise than when it is
a misrepresentation of some other existing fact. 1' The prosecution
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt both that the promise was
false when made and that it was made with the intent to deceive the
other party. Just as nonperformance of the promise does not suffice
as proof that the promise was false when made, so it is also insuf-
ficient to prove that the maker made the promise with an intent to
deceive.152 There is thus little reason, Justice Traynor wrote, to
suspect that a threat of criminal liability will more encumber the
market than the threat of civil liability existing in nearly all American
jurisdictions.'53 In addition, in a note falling squarely within Realist
thinking, Justice Traynor cites the available empirical evidence
suggesting that the market has not been adversely affected by
allowing false promises to suffice as a false pretense.'4
Finally, sound policy reasons support extending criminal liability
to false promises:
If false promises were not false pretenses, the legally
sophisticated, without fear of punishment, could perpetrate
on the unwary fraudulent schemes like that divulged by the
record in this case.... To hold that false promises are not
false pretenses would sanction such schemes without any
corresponding benefit to the public order.55
Accordingly, Justice Traynor's opinion held that a false promise
suffices as a false pretense under the California statute.
5 6
These four cases exemplify the law-maintaining function as
Justice Traynor practiced it. The case before the court is resolved
with an eye toward weaving its holding into the fabric of the law
while simultaneously examining the fabric for logical flaws, for breaks
150. Id. at 265, 267 P.2d at 283.
151. Id. at 263, 267 P.2d at 282.
152. lad at 263-64, 267 P.2d at 282.
153. Me at 265, 267 P.2d at 283.
154. lit at 265 n.6, 267 P.2d at 283 n.6.
155. ld. at 265, 267 P.2d at 283 (citations omitted).
156. See il
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in the pattern, for the soundness of thread, and for its utility. Jury
instructions, for example, should faithfully and unambiguously
communicate the law to the jury, and appellate opinions should
clearly and unambiguously articulate the rules they apply. The system
should not suffer with the logical blemishes 57 and ambiguity found
in Albertson, with the equivocation and its fatal consequences encoun-
tered in Kolez, and with the flabby, but fatal, assumption the majority
willingly embraced in Thomas. Nor should the continuity of the law
be broken out of speculative fear that the system will be abused by
those who lose in market transactions, and by prosecutors and juries
who might fail to adhere to the criminal law's vigorous proof
requirements. As the no-false-promise rule would have it, these fears
outweigh the inducement the rule creates to cast deceit in a form not
punishable by the criminal law despite their felonious intent to
deceive and the success of their otherwise criminal endeavor.
In Albertson, Thomas, and Kolez, the majority opinions, written
by others, focus on the dispute and pay little heed to the opinions'
impact on the path of the law. In Ashley, had Justice Traynor
embraced the predominate rule, the purpose of the law would have
been frustrated out of fear that the system would not function in false
promise cases as it is assumed to work in other cases. This was not
Roger Traynor's way.
He looked at his work from two perspectives: as a weaver of the
law, a maintainer of the path; and as a just judge of the dispute at
hand. Indeed, I suspect that if either role predominated in his mind,
Justice Traynor preferred tending the law to dispensing justice in the
case at hand. In that way, by primarily focusing on the vitality, the
utility, and the relevance of the law to the age of decision, both goals
are arguably best served. The California Supreme Court was not
vigorously exercising the law-maintaining function in the criminal law
before Traynor was appointed to the court. That changed with his
appointment. Tending the common law was one of his many
strengths. He began that work shortly after he joined the court, and
it continued throughout his judicial career. In his later years the
California Supreme Court was regarded as a great common-law court,
157. This logical flaw is, of course, the inconsistency between imposing a burden on a
defendant to raise a reasonable doubt as to guilt when the prosecution already has the
burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Albertson, 23 Cal. 2d at 587, 145 P.2d
at 25 (Traynor, J., concurring).
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perhaps the greatest in the land. Much credit for this must go to
Roger Traynor.
You might be skeptical of this assertion. You might suspect that
I have chosen too few cases for discussion and that the Traynor
opinions in Albertson, Kolez, Thomas, and Ashley are exceptions to
Justice Traynor's normal practice. If you read the Traynor opinions
I have collected and categorized as law-maintaining opinions, I believe
you will agree that these four cases are examples of the law tending
apparent in all of his law-maintaining cases. However, just as they are
coupled with the law-applying function, so the law-maintaining
function frequently is coupled with the law creating function. Had
Ashley not presented the task of resolving conflicting precedent in the
courts of appeals, it would have been classified as a law-creating case.
But Ashley selected between the conflicting lines of precedent in the
district courts of appeals. The law creation primarily was done in the
lower appellate courts. Had the Traynor opinion created the rule
approved in Ashley out of whole cloth, the Ashley opinion would be
characterized as a law-creating case.
Before we proceed to examine the more controversial cases, the
cases creating substantive criminal law, we should take note of the
tools Justice Traynor used to maintain the common law. The body of
precedent relevant to the dispute before the court is both the source
of the law and the subject of the law-maintaining process. This body
of law is researched; described, often in its historical context; and then
analyzed for errors in logic, consistency, and clarity. It is also
evaluated in terms of its suitability to achieving the goals of the law.
Defects are occasionally repaired by overruling inconsistent cases, as
Justice Traynor would have done in Albertson'58 and Kolez.'59
The newly rationalized and often reformulated precedent is then used
to resolve the dispute at hand. Precedent, reason, logic, and analysis
are used by the .worker to produce a rational, consistent, and
understandable body of law that is enforced by the court through the
doctrine of stare decisis and the law-applying function.
158. See id at 588, 145 P.2d at 26 (Traynor, J., concurring).
159. See 23 Cal. 2d at 675-76, 145 P.2d at 582-83 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
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C. The Judicial Creation of Substantive Criminal Law
1. Introduction
As we have seen before, in the early stages in the development
of the common law, the courts began creating the common law of
crimes. After the discovery of legislatures in the middle ages,
Parliament began supplementing the common law with statutory
offenses meant, primarily at first, to fill gaps in the common law.
Familiar examples are the statutory crimes of embezzlement and
obtaining property by false pretenses. Although this tradition was
brought to America in the baggage of our nation's founders, it was
rapidly altered to allocate the criminal lawmaking function primarily
to the legislative branches of government. Our distrust of government
and our commitment to democracy fueled this allocation of power to
the legislative branches of government. Once the power to make
substantive criminal law became firmly entrenched in the legislative
halls, we began to withdraw that power from the courts. On occasion,
this is done by statute. But even when there is no statute aimed at
extracting this common-law power from the courts, it is generally
agreed today that courts lack authority to create new crimes out of
whole cloth.
Despite his belief that courts and legislatures share substantive
lawmaking power today, Justice Traynor's opinions assiduously
respect this modem tradition. He never sought to create a new crime
in any of the opinions he wrote during his three decades on the
bench. Nevertheless, in a country that enforces criminal law through
a common-law system, it is inevitable that courts exercise considerable
power over substantive criminal law. There is no question that
appellate courts properly exercise the error-correcting function and
the law-maintaining function even in substantive criminal cases. With
respect to the latter function, few would argue, for example, that it is
improper for a state supreme court to correct disparate lines of
authority in the intermediate appellate courts' interpretation of a
penal statute. Justice Traynor's opinion in Ashley," in other words,
is never challenged as an illegitimate exercise of judicial authority.
Our inquiry goes further. Though we accept the tradition that
courts have no authority to create new crimes, do courts retain power
160. 42 Cal. 2d 246, 267 P.2d 271, cert denied, 348 U.S. 900 (1954).
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to create substantive criminal law of lesser scope? We know that
Roger Traynor created substantive criminal law on a number of
occasions in the second and third decades of his judicial career. Our
goal is to learn what we can from his example. We will first look at
the law he created and the process by which he did it. Later, we will
analyze these law-creating opinions in the light of his judicial
philosophy.
2. Four examples of Traynor lawmaking opinions
At the margins, it may be difficult to distinguish between the law-
maintaining and the law-creating functions. As we have seen, the
overruling of precedent provides no litmus test for law creation since
that tool is used to maintain the law as well. For example, Justice
Traynor would have overruled inconsistent precedent in Albertson
61
and Kolez, 62 and both are law-maintaining cases.
An opinion's reliance upon precedent can be equally deceiving.
Though the care and upkeep of precedent are hallmarks of the law-
maintaining function, we recognize that judges are constrained by the
very process they invoke to create new law:
Unlike the legislator, whose lawmaking knows no bounds,
the judge stays close to his house of the law in the bounds
of stare decisis. He invariably takes precedent as his
starting-point; he is constrained to arrive at a decision in the
context of ancestral judicial experience; the given decisions,
or lacking these, the given dicta, or lacking these, the given
clues. Even if his search of the past yields nothing, so that
he confronts a truly unprecedented case, he still arrives at a
decision in the context of judicial reasoning with recogniz-
able ties to the past; by its kinship thereto it not only
establishes the unprecedented case as a precedent for the
future, but integrates it in the often rewoven but always
unbroken line with the past."6
The reliance on precedent thus is a hallmark of judicial law
creating, just as it is the currency of the law-maintaining function.
Indeed, the creation of new law may be barely discernible on the face
161. 23 Cal. 2d at 558, 145 P.2d at 26 (Traynor, J., concurring).
162. 23 Cal. 2d at 675-76, 145 P.2d at 582-83 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
163. Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 112, at 742; Traynor, Intenveavers, supra note 112,
at 203.
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of the opinion because it is so skillfully woven into the ever expanding
pattern of the common law.16"
Law creating is best distinguished from law-maintaining not by
the form the opinion takes or the tools used by the judge to reach the
result, but by looking at the substance of the opinion. During his
thirty years on the bench, twenty of Traynor's opinions created new
substantive criminal law: five were written in the second decade,"
and fifteen in the third decade."6 Another opinion, the first decade
dissent in Halcomb, addresses the judicial lawmaking process in the
substantive criminal law.67
Four of these lawmaking opinions are directed at the actus reus
elements of a particular crime. Burt, decided in the second decade,
expands the crime of solicitation to include soliciting a crime within
the state which is to be committed outside the state.'6 Washing-
ton169 and Gilbert'70 restrict the application of the felony-murder
rule to killings committed by one of the felons; and Culver limits the
crime of escape from custody to escapes after the culprit has been
booked in preparation of incarceration in a jail or other place of
164. See Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 112, at 743; Traynor, Interweavers, supra note
112, at 204.
165. People v. Stuart, 47 Cal. 2d 167,302 P.2d 5 (1956); People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798,
299 P.2d 850 (1956); People v. Burt, 45 Cal. 2d 311,288 P.2d 503 (1955); People v. Baker,
42 Cal. 2d 550, 268 P.2d 705 (1954); People v. Martinez, 38 Cal. 2d 556, 241 P.2d 224
(1952).
166. People v. Moran, 1 Cal. 3d 755, 463 P.2d 763, 83 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1970); People v.
Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969); In re Culver, 69 Cal. 2d 898,
447 P.2d 633,73 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1968); People v. Chacon, 69 Cal. 2d 765,447 P.2d 106,73
Cal. Rptr. 10 (1968); In re Murdock, 68 Cal. 2d 313,437 P.2d 764,66 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1968);
People v. Butler, 65 Cal. 2d 569, 421 P.2d 703, 55 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1967); People v. Conley,
64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966); People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal. 2d 690,
408 P.2d 365,47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965), vacated, Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967);
People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965); People v.
Perez, 62 Cal. 2d 769, 401 P.2d 934, 44 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1965); People v. Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d
879, 395 P.2d 893, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1964); People v. Quicke, 61 Cal. 2d 155, 390 P.2d 393,
37 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1964); People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr.
77 (1963); People v. Modesto, 59 Cal. 2d 722, 382 P.2d 33, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1963),
overruled by People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631 (1964); Benson v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d
240, 368 P.2d 116, 18 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1962).
167. In re Halcomb, 21 Cal. 2d 126, 130-32, 130 P.2d 384, 387-88 (1942) (Traynor, J.,
dissenting).
168. Burt, 45 Cal. 2d at 314-15, 288 P.2d at 505-06.
169. 62 Cal. 2d at 783, 402 P.2d at 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
170. 63 Cal. 2d at 704-05, 408 P.2d at 373-74, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 917-18.
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confinement. 7' The latter three cases were decided in the third
decade.
Three opinions create new mens rea-the culpable mental
state-elements of several crimes. Stuart restricts the crime of
involuntary manslaughter on an unlawful-act theory to unlawful acts
committed with criminal intent or criminal negligence."' Butler
recognizes that the absence of a claim of right is a necessary compo-
nent of the mens rea of robbery-and of first degree murder
predicated on a felony-murder-robbery theory;" and Murdock
requires actual, not "constructive," knowledge for the crime of driving
an automobile with "knowledge" that the operator's license was
suspended. 74 Stuart was decided in the second decade, Butler and
Murdock in the third decade.
Three opinions either abolish an existing defense or reject a new
defense, and four opinions create or expand new defenses. Justice
Traynor's Benson opinion refused to recognize a defense of impossi-
bility to the crime of solicitation." Pierce abolished interspousal
immunity for the crime of conspiracy when the spouses conspire
between themselves alone.'76 On the other hand, Justice Traynor's
Vogel opinion created the defense of honest-and-reasonable-belief-of-
freedom-to-remarry to the crime of bigamy;'" and his Chacon
opinion recognized the rule of provocation as a "defense" to the
crime of assault with a deadly weapon by a life prisoner.'78
The Traynor opinions in Perez and Moran dealt with the defense
of entrapment. In Perez the court overruled a long line of authority
in the courts of appeal requiring a defendant to incriminate herself
before invoking the entrapment defense.'79 Justice Traynor's dissent
in Moran, the last opinion he filed in a criminal case before he retired
from the bench, urged his brethren to abandon the origin-of-intent
test for entrapment as that test is inconsistent with the deterrence-of-
171. Culver, 69 Cal. 2d at 904, 447 P.2d at 637, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
172. Stuart, 47 Cal. 2d at 172-74, 302 P.2d at 8-10.
173. Butler, 65 Cal. 2d at 573-74, 421 P.2d at 706-07, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
174. Murdock, 68 Cal. 2d at 315-17, 437 P.2d at 766-67, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 382.83.
175. Benson, 57 Cal. 2d at 243, 368 P.2d at 118, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 518.
176. Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d at 882, 395 P.2d at 896, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 848. In Quicke-one
of the error-correcting cases-Justice Traynor refused to abandon the M'Naughton test
and adopt the standard proposed by the Special Commissions on Insanity and Criminal
Offenders. Quicke, 61 Cal. 2d at 159, 390 P.2d at 395-96, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 619-20.
177. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d at 803-04, 299 P.2d at 854-55.
178. Chacon, 69 Cal. 2d at 781, 447 P.2d at 116, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
179. Perez, 62 Cal. 2d at 775-76, 401 P.2d at 937-38, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 329-30.
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police-misconduct theory of the entrapment defense.' 8  The
Pierce'8' and Vogelff opinions are still reproduced or discussed in
contemporary casebooks and treatises.
Six of Traynor's opinions focus on theories of exculpa-
tion-evidence that disproves a mental element of the charged
offense. One of the most important developments in the substantive
criminal law in the 1960s was the recognition and elaboration of the
theory of exculpation known as the "diminished capacity defense."
Although this ground for exculpation began with the use of evidence
of mental disease or defect falling short of the proof necessary for the
insanity defense, it expanded to include exculpation on the theory of
voluntary intoxication as well. Thus, although evidence that the
defendant was voluntarily intoxicated was used well before the
diminished-capacity defense was created in California, that theory of
exculpation was so stimulated and affected by the mental-disease-or-
defect version of diminished capacity as to become commonly joined
with the new diminished-capacity defense in the mind of the
profession. Traynor's six exculpation opinions all concern the
diminished-capacity defense in the mental-disease-or-defect version,
the voluntary-intoxication version, or, as is commonly the case, a
mixture of the two.
One of these opinions refuses to extend the diminished-capacity
defense as urged by the defendant," and five expand or elaborate
the defense in important ways." Two of these opinions, Conley"S
180. Moran, 1 Cal. 3d at 765-66, 463 P.2d at 768-69, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 416-17 (Traynor,
J., dissenting).
181. E.g., LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 141, at 563 n.242; ROLLIN M. PERKINS &
RONALD N. BOYCE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 361
n.la (6th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PERKINS & BOYCE, CASES AND MATERIALS]; PERKINS &
BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 141, at 693 n.92, 1019 n.16.
182. E.g., LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 141, at 409 nn.26-27; PERKINS & BOYCE,
CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 181, at 672; PERKINS & BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW,
supra note 141, at 864 n.58, 917 & n.27, 1036 n.61, 1051 n.70, 1053 n.84; STEPHEN A.
SALTZBURG, ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 251 (1994).
183. People v. Martinez, 38 Cal. 2d 556, 562-64,241 P.2d 224, 228-29 (1952).
184. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d at 455-59, 462 P.2d at 377-79, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 625-28; Conley, 64
Cal. 2d at 319-20, 411 P.2d at 917, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 821; Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d at 490-94,
386 P.2d at 682-84,35 Cal. Rptr. at 82-84; Modesto, 59 Cal. 2d at 729-30,382 P.2d at 37-38,
31 Cal. Rptr. at 229-30; Baker, 42 Cal. 2d at 571-77, 268 P.2d at 718-21.
185. 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966).
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and Hood,186 are frequently reproduced or cited in contemporary
criminal law casebooks and treatises.'7
Halcomb,'" the last of the Traynor law-creating opinions that
we will consider, is concerned with the constraints upon judicial
lawmaking. Halcomb will be considered after examining the tools and
methods by which Justice Traynor created new substantive criminal
law.
The principal tools for judicial lawmaking include the tools used
for the law-maintaining function: precedent, logic, and reasoned
analysis. The way these tools are employed may differ in varying
degrees from the way they are used to maintain the law. Since by
definition there is no case directly on point supporting the new
rule,18 precedent generally must be used differently. Logic, princi-
pally inductive reasoning, is frequently employed to extract principles
from existing precedent in related doctrines. These principles are
then used both as authority for the new rule, which is applied through
deductive reasoning, and as the common threads that weave the new
law into the existing body of substantive doctrine. The path of the
law is extended into new ground, *but it is always clearly connected to
the existing way.
The purpose of the crime or the rule under consideration, the
severity of the punishment, and the general legal policy on the topic
covered by the crime are commonly used in the law creating function
as well. In addition, there is the assessment of the utility of the
existing law-sometimes, though rarely, based upon empirical
evidence-and the anticipated utility of the new rule. Finally, there
is the leveling influence of experience and common sense. All of
these considerations are found in various Traynor lawmaking
opinions, though each, of course, is not found in every case.
186. 1 Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969).
187. E.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 111 (Hood)
(1994); SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 463 (Conley), 949-52 (Hood) (1989); LAFAVE &
SCOTT, supra note 141, at 329-30 (Conley); PERKINS & BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra
note 141, at 130 n.91, 1014 n.49 (Conley); SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 182, at 203 &
240 (Hood), 303 (Conley) (1994); RICHARD G. SINGER & MARTIN R. GARDNER, CRIMES
AND PUNISHMENT: CASES, MATERIALS AND READINGS IN CRIMINAL LAW 874 (Conley),
909-11 (Hood) (1989).
188. 21 Cal. 2d 126, 130 P.2d 384 (1942).
189. It is not uncommon, of course, to find precedent rejecting the new rule. In that
case, the inconsistent precedent must be overrdled.
190. See People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 804, 299 P.2d 850, 855 (1956).
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It would extend the length of this discussion beyond reasonable
limits if we were to consider all of Justice Traynor's lawmaking cases
in detail. I have, therefore, selected four cases as examples of the
judicial creation of substantive criminal law doctrine in Justice
Traynor's opinions. These four cases are People v. Vogel, 9' People
v. Washington,"9 People v. Pierce,193 and Benson v. Superior
Court.'94
a. People v. Vogel 
5
Justice Traynor's opinion in Vogel provides a ready example of
how many of these tools and techniques are used to create new law.
The issue in Vogel is whether the defendant's honest, though
mistaken, belief that he is free to remarry is a defense to the crime of
bigamy.' This defense was squarely rejected in two previous
cases."9 Putting these cases aside for the moment, Justice Traynor
finds the relevant principles in People v. Harris98 and in the penal
code's requirement that "there must exist a union, or joint operation
of act and intent." '199 Although Harris involved the use of evidence
of voluntary intoxication to negate the existence of guilty knowledge
for the crime of voting twice in an election, Justice Traynor extracts
these fundamental principles from the case:
[T]o constitute what the law deems a crime there must
concur both an evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit
reum nisi mens sit rea.... When the act is proved to have
been done by the accused, if it be an act in itself unlawful,
the law in the first instance presumes it to have been
intended, and the proof of justification or excuse lies on the
defendant to overcome this legal and natural presump-
tion.2 0
191. 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956).
192. 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
193. 61 Cal. 2d 879, 395 P.2d 893, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1964).
194. 57 Cal. 2d 240, 368 P.2d 116, 18 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1962).
195. 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956).
196. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d at 801, 299 P.2d at 852.
197. People v. Hartman, 130 Cal. 487,490-91, 62 P. 823,824 (1900), overruled by People
v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956); People v. Kelly, 32 Cal. App. 2d 624, 625,
90 P.2d 605, 605-06 (1939).
198. 29 Cal. 678 (1866).
199. CAL. PENAL CODE § 20 (West 1988).
200. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d at 802, 299 P.2d at 853 (citation omitted) (quoting People v.
Harris, 29 Cal. 678, 681 (1866)). Justice Traynor did not need to use inductive reasoning
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Noting the reliance on these principles by the commissioners who
drafted the penal code, Justice Traynor concludes that the omission
of any reference to a wrongful intent in the statute was not meant to
exclude intent as an element of the crime."' The omission of a
mens rea element from the definition of the offense is simply a device
"to shift to defendant the burden of proving that he did not have the
requisite intent."2" Accordingly, Justice Traynor concludes that
guilty knowledge was omitted from the statute in order to reallocate
the burden of proof on that issue in a bigamy trial. 3
This conclusion is bolstered by the severity with which bigamy is
punished:
The severe penalty imposed for bigamy, the serious loss of
reputation conviction entails, the infrequency of the offense,
and the fact that it has been regarded for centuries as a
crime involving moral turpitude, make it extremely unlikely
that the Legislature meant to include the morally innocent
to make sure the guilty did not escape.'
The severity of the sanction strongly implies moral fault on the part
of the remarrying spouse. And moral fault is brought into the crime
by the culpable mental state of guilty knowledge. Only then will the
punishment fit the crime.
Furthermore, as a matter of general policy, remarriage is favored
in California.' 5 Thus, under California family law a marriage
contracted in the belief that the former spouse is dead is valid until
it is annulled.2  "It would be anomalous to hold," Justice Traynor
wrote, "that although in the Civil Code the Legislature sanctions such
a marriage and makes it valid until it is annulled ... , in the Penal
Code the Legislature makes such a person guilty of bigamy."2  In
to abstract this principle for it is explicitly discussed in the Harris opinion.
201. IML at 801-02, 299 P.2d at 853.
202. Id. at 802, 299 P.2d at 853.
203. Id at 802-03, 299 P.2d at 854.
Thus, the prosecution makes a prima facie case upon proof that the second
marriage was entered into while the first spouse was still living, and [the
defendant's] bona fide and reasonable belief that facts existed that left the
defendant free to remarry is a defense to be proved by the defendant.
IL at 803, 299 P.2d at 854 (citations omitted).
204. Id at 804, 299 P.2d at 855 (footnote omitted).
205. Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Cal. 2d 108, 118, 109 P.2d 701, 707 (1941) (Carter, J.,
dissenting).
206. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2201 (West 1994).
207. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d at 803-04, 299 P.2d at 854.
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other words, there is a policy favoring remarriage that would be
frustrated if an honest belief in the freedom to remarry were not
recognized as a defense to bigamy. The honest-belief defense
harmonizes bigamy with California family law.
Justice Traynor overrules prior inconsistent authority' °8 and
holds that a defendant's honest, though mistaken, belief that he is free
to remarry is a defense to bigamy.2°9
The skill with which Traynor's rule in Vogel is woven into the
fabric of existing law obscures the creative forces that fathered it.
The opinion gives the impression that the guilty-knowledge element
was created by the legislative enactment. Thus the statute, properly
understood, has always required guilty knowledge for bigamy in
California. The omission of this mens rea element from the definition
of the offense is simply the code's way of allocating the burden of
proof on this issue to the defendant. Furthermore, this interpretation
of the statute was revealed by applying the fundamental principles set
forth in California Penal Code section 20 and in People v. Harris to
the language of the statute. The overruled precedent, People v.
Hartman, simply erred by reaching the wrong conclusion.
The creativity of this decision is best seen by looking at the
opposing arguments. If the legislature had meant for guilty knowl-
edge to be an element of the offense, then why was it not spelled out
in the statutory definition of the crime? Justice Traynor's explanation
that it was omitted in order to shift the burden of proof to the
defendant is not overly persuasive. When the drafters of the code
wished to allocate the burden of proof to the defendant, they knew
how to do so in explicit language. For example, section 1105, which
is the subject of Justice Traynor's Albertson concurrence,210 express-
ly provides that in a trial for murder, "the commission of the
homicide by the defendant being proved, the burden of proving
circumstances of mitigation, or that justify or excuse it, devolves upon
him."2"' Thus, if the legislature had meant to have guilty knowledge
208. People v. Kelly, 32 Cal. App. 2d 624, 90 P.2d 605 (1939) is disapproved; and
People v. Hartman, 130 Cal. 487, 62 P. 823 (1900) is overruled. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d at 805,
299 P.2d at 855; see supra note 197 and accompanying text.
209. Justice Traynor also found that the previous supreme court case that rejected this
defense, People v. Hartman, had been overruled sub silentio in Matter of Application of
Ahart, 172 Cal. 762, 159 P. 160 (1916). See Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d at 805, 299 P.2d at 855.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 113-22.
211. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1105 (West 1985) (repealed and superseded in 1989 by CAL.
PENAL CODE § 189.5).
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operate as a defensive matter similar to mitigation in a homicide case,
as Justice Traynor would have us believe, a statute could have provid-
ed-in much the same way as California Penal Code section 1105
does-that "the contracting of a second marriage during the continua-
tion of an existing marriage being proved, the burden of proving an
honest belief in freedom to remarry devolves upon the defendant."
More importantly, the next section in the code following section
1105 covers the question of the proof required in a trial for bigamy.
Section 1106 reads as follows:
Upon a trial for bigamy, it is not necessary to prove either
of the marriages by the register, certificate, or other record
evidence thereof, but the same may be proved by such
evidence as is admissible to prove a marriage in other cases;
and when the second marriage took place out of this State,
proof of that fact, accompanied with proof of cohabitation
thereafter in this State, is sufficient to sustain the charge.
Since the drafters of the code created a specific provision
governing proof in a bigamy trial, and since that provision follows
immediately after the statute that allocates the burden of proof to the
defendant on various defensive issues in a murder trial, how likely is
it that the drafters of the code would select ambiguous silence as the
method for allocating the burden of proof on the guilty-knowledge
issue instead of adding a sentence to section 1106 as they drafted it?
Certainly, reasonable minds readily could differ with Justice Traynor's
conclusion that the drafters of the code preferred ambiguous silence
as the allocating device rather than add a single sentence to be
included in the other material covered in section 1106.
It is at least equally probable that: (1) the drafters did not think
about the guilty-knowledge issue and therefore did not make any
provision for it in any way, by silence or otherwise; or (2) the drafters
rejected guilty knowledge as an element of bigamy, thus an honest
belief in freedom to remarry is irrelevant to the crime and is not
mentioned in any respect.
Justice Traynor's argument with respect to California Penal Code
section 20 is equally doubtful. Section 20 requires a "union[] or joint
operation of act and intent." '213 This provision is honored by the
traditional definition of bigamy: The spouse must intentionally per-
212. Id § 1106 (repealed and superseded in 1989 by CAL. PENAL CODE § 281).
213. CAL. PENAL CODE § 20 (West 1988). This section has not been amended between
1872 and 1994.
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form the act proscribed by the actus reus of the crime. In other
words, the spouse must intentionally enter into a second marriage.
Thus, there is a joint operation of act and intent. This is all that
section 20 requires. Indeed, that is precisely the holding in People v.
Hartman, the case Justice Traynor overrules in Vogel. Further-
more, Hartman explicitly rejects the argument that People v. Harris
requires the court to imply a guilty-knowledge requirement for
bigamy.
2 15
In the Harris case, David Harris was charged with the felony of
having voted twice in an election.2 6 Harris first voted around ten
o'clock in the morning. About two or three o'clock in the afternoon
he returned to the same polling place very much intoxicated and
offered to vote again. He was told he already voted and that he
would get himself in trouble if he voted again. In reply, Harris
vehemently protested that he had not voted and declared his
willingness to make the oath required by the election law to overcome
the challenge. The oath was administered and Harris voted a second
time. His defense was that he was too intoxicated to know what he
was doing at the time of the second vote.217 The Hartman court
characterized Harris as holding:
[T]hat if he was unconscious at the time that he cast the
second vote, he was not responsible under the criminal law
for the act done. But that case is not in point here. ....
[H]ere the defendant did know exactly and fully what he was
doing when he married the second time .... The intent of
defendant, as referred to in the code, is the intent to do the
act, namely, contract the marriage.21
In fairness to both the Hartman court and to Justice Traynor, we
should acknowledge that the holding in Harris is wonderfully obscure.
When Harris refers to the intent necessary for the offense, one cannot
tell from the opinion if the court is referring to the intent to vote on
the second occasion or the knowledge that Harris had already voted
214. 130 Cal. 487, 492, 62 P. 823, 825 (1900), overruled by People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d
798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956).
215. I at 491-92, 62 P. at 824-25.
216. People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 678, 679 (1866).
217. Id. at 681.
218. Hartman, 130 Cal. at 491-92, 62 P. at 824-25.
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when he voted the second time. Both interpretations are possible
from the wording of the opinion.219
Furthermore, the language from Harris quoted by Justice Traynor
simply restates the traditional doctrine with respect to the burden of
going forward with evidence of justification and excuse. It does not
purport to imply unnamed culpable mental states in the many crimes
created in the code, nor does it purport to allocate the burden of
going forward with evidence tending to disprove these unnamed
mental states to the defendant. This language simply refers to the
accepted categories of justification and excuse and allocates the
burden of going forward on those issues to the defendant. The code
commissioners quoted this language from Harris to make it clear that
section 20 did not alter the traditional rules governing the burden of
proof of justification and excuse.m
Turning away from arguments based upon principles found in
statutes and precedent to considerations of policy, we see that Justice
Traynor's arguments fare no better. Except for a few constitutional
constraints, the traditional view regards the measure of punishment
as a legislative issue. The severity of the punishment for bigamy is
meant to provide a strong incentive for those who remarry to make
sure they are free to do so. Furthermore, the common law evolved
in an environment of harsh punishments. At one time in the
development of the common law, the death penalty was typically the
punishment prescribed for all felonies. In addition, the common law
frequently did not draw nice distinctions between the degree of a
person's culpability and the severity of punishment. The felony-
murder rule provides an excellent example. If one wishes to calibrate
punishment to culpability, then one should seek a remedy in the
legislative halls as was donefor example, with the division of murder
into degrees.
Finally, there is no tension between the law of bigamy as it is
traditionally understood and California family law. The crime of
bigamy seeks to prevent bigamous marriages. Everyone understands,
however, that the criminal law does not always achieve its goals. The
law will be violated. There will be a number of bigamous marriages.
The California code makes specified bigamous marriages valid until
they are annulled to protect the innocent partner of the second
219. This ambiguity simply underscores the fact that Justice Traynor was not "bound"
by Harris in any meaningful way.
220. CAL. PENAL CODE § 20.
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marriage. Though the example may sound distinctly quaint today, the
validity of the marriage means that the innocent partner bears no
moral fault for engaging in intimate relations with the bigamous
spouse. Thus the rejection of the honest-belief defense for bigamy is
perfectly consistent with California family law that makes certain
bigamous marriages voidable, but not void.
The point of considering these arguments is to illustrate that each
has a plausible counterargument. Justice Traynor was faced with a
clear choice: Either follow the traditional doctrine announced in
People v. Hartman or overrule Hartman and announce a new rule for
bigamy in California. The "law" did not compel either choice. Either
decision could have been woven into the fabric of existing law.
Having chosen to abandon the traditional rule and to fashion a new
rule that would fit into the existing system, Justice Traynor took the
threads of his argument and skillfully interweaved them into existing
doctrine. Without a doubt, new substantive criminal law was created
in Vogel; yet Vogel's rule also seems to have always been the law.
b. People v. Washington22
Justice Traynor's -opinion in People v. Washington2 creates
new substantive criminal law on a different topic: the actus reus of
murder. Washington was convicted of first-degree murder on a
theory of felony murder-robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Washington's accomplice was killed by the robbery victim in the
course of resisting an armed robbery. Washington was charged with
first-degree murder for this death under California's felony-murder
rule. On appeal, the dispute focused on whether a killing committed
by someone other than the defendant or an accomplice sufficed for
the felony-murder rule. The attorney general argued that the
accomplice's death was proximately caused by the perpetration of the
robbery. A case from the California court of appeal, People v.
Harrison,2' and precedent from the Supreme Courts of Pennsylva-
nia and Michigan supported this argument"z4
The defendant did not dispute the proximate cause theory.
Instead he argued that California should embrace the exception
221. 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
222. lt
223. 176 Cal. App. 2d 330, 1 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1960), overruled by People v. Washington,
62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
224. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d at 780, 402 P.2d at 132, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
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recognized in the Pennsylvania and Michigan cases that the killing of
one of the felons by a person resisting the felony is not within the
scope of the felony-murder rule.' Such a killing, it is argued, is a
justifiable homicide. Only unlawful homicides fall within the felony-
murder rule. In other words, the defendant sought to create an
exception to the proximate-cause rule recognized in Harrison.
At the outset of the dispositive portion of his opinion, Justice
Traynor rejects the defendant's submission:
A distinction based on the person killed... would make the
defendant's criminal liability turn upon the marksmanship of
victims and policemen. A rule of law cannot reasonably be
based on such a fortuitous circumstance. The basic issue
therefore is whether a robber can be convicted of murder for
the killing of any person by another who is resisting the
robbery.26
Turning then to the felony-murder statute, he argued that the
common understanding of the phrase "'murder... which is commit-
ted in the perpetration ... [of] robbery"' is a killing committed by
one of the felons.' If the felon does not kill, "the killing is not
committed to perpetrate the felony."'
This interpretation of the statutory language is reinforced by the
goal of the felony-murder rule: to deter felons from killing negligent-
ly or accidentally by holding them strictly responsible for killings they
commit." "This purpose," Justice Traynor writes, "is not served by
punishing them for killings committed by their victims."'  It could
225. Id.
226. Id. at 780, 402 P.2d at 132-33, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 444-45.
227. Id at 781,402 P.2d at 133,44 Cal. Rptr. at 445 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 189).
228. Id.
229. Id. Justice Traynor cites Holmes's The Common Law, a tentative draft of the
Model Penal Code, and the Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment for
this assertion. He dismisses the attorney general's argument that a second purpose of the
felony-murder rule is to prevent the commission of robberies.
Neither the common-law rationale of the rule nor the Penal Code supports this
contention. In every robbery there is a possibility that the victim will resist and
kill. The robber has little control over such a killing once the robbery is
undertaken as this case demonstrates. To impose an additional penalty for the
killing would discriminate between robbers, not on the basis of any difference
in their own conduct, but solely on the basis of the response by others that the
robber's conduct happened to induce. An additional penalty for a homicide
committed by the victim would deter robbery haphazardly at best. To "prevent
stealing, [the law] would do better to hang one thief in every thousand by lot."
Id. (quoting O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 58 (1881)).
230. Id.
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also lead to absurd results, as where one felon is arrested and held in
custody at the time an unarmed co-felon is killed by a pursuing police
officer.
Finally, the felony-murder rule itself is called into question:
The felony-murder rule has been criticized on the grounds
that in almost all cases in which it is applied it is unnecessary
and that it erodes the relation between criminal liability and
moral culpability... Although it is the law in this state
(Pen. Code, § 189), it should not be extended beyond any
rational function that it is designed to serve."'
Accordingly, the Traynor opinion holds that a felon is liable for
murder under the felony-murder rule only if the act of killing is
committed by the felon or an accomplice acting in furtherance of their
common design. Insofar as it is inconsistent with this holding, People
v. Harrison is disapproved.
Justice Burke's elaborate dissent establishes that each of Justice
Traynor's points are highly debatable z2 Justice Traynor's interpre-
tation of the statutory language, for example, is highly problematic.
The words "in the perpetration of robbery" 3 do not so clearly
mean that the felon must commit the killing to perpetrate the felony.
"Common understanding," which Justice Traynor rallies to
support his argument, permits us to read this language as requiring
that the killing occur during the perpetration of the robbery. In other
words, the language refers to the duration of the felony-murder
liability, not to the identity of the killer or the purpose of the killing.
Indeed, Justice Traynor's statutory interpretation argument is
inconsistent with his argument about the purpose of the felony-
murder rule. If the purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter
felons from killing negligently or accidentally, then the killing need
not be "to perpetrate the felony." "How can it be said," Justice
Burke asks in his dissent, "that such [an accidental killing] takes place
to perpetrate a robbery?" 5
Little would be gained here by going through the remainder of
Justice Traynor's arguments as we did for his Vogel opinion. The
point to be made is that, Justice Traynor was just as free to choose
231. Id. at 783, 402 P.2d at 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
232. kL at 785, 402 P.2d at 135, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 447 (Burke, J., dissenting).
233. 1& at 786-87, 402 P.2d at 136-37, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 448-49 (Burke, J., dissenting).
234. l at 787, 402 P.2d at 137, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 449 (Burke, J., dissenting).
235. 1&L
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the traditional rule already recognized in California law by the
Harrison case or the new rule he created in his Washington opinion
as he was when he addressed the issue presented to the court in
Vogel. He chose a new path for the law of felony murder.
Though Vogel and Washington create new law with similar
techniques, the Washington opinion is more overtly a law-creating
case. This fact has nothing to do with the overruling of precedent, as
both opinions cast aside existing law. Though legislative intent was
never mentioned in Vogel, the opinion creates the impression that the
linchpin of the decision is the code commissioners' use of the Harris
case as an illustration of the proper interpretation of section 20. This
argument comes very close to a traditional argument about legislative
intent. A legislative intent argument carries with it all of the
trappings of the law-maintaining, rather than the law-creating, function
of the judicial process. If the court is simply discovering and
enforcing legislative intent, then there can be no challenge to the
legitimacy of the court's methodology. Justice Traynor's Washington
opinion makes no such argument. The wording of the statute is
considered, but the weakness of the argument, the simple, question-
able assertions, informs us that the heart of the decision is elsewhere.
While the Washington holding is woven into the fabric of the law, that
accomplishment does not obscure the fact that law is created in
Washington to the same degree that the interweaving veils the law
creation in Vogel.
c. People v. Pierce236
Although Vogel and Washington restrain the sweep of the
substantive criminal law, Justice Traynor's law-creating activity did
not always do so. In People v. Pierce, 7 an appeal by the prosecu-
tion, his opinion abolishes a defense created by California Supreme
Court precedent in the 1889 case of People v. Miller." Based upon
the common-law fiction that a husband and a wife are one person,
Miller held that when spouses conspire only between themselves, they
cannot be prosecuted for conspiracy." "The fictional unity of hus-
band and wife," Justice Traynor wrote, "has been substantially
236. 61 Cal. 2d 879, 395 P.2d 893, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1964).
237. Ld
238. 82 Cal. 107, 22 P. 934 (1889).
239. Id at 108, 22 P. at 935.
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vitiated by the overwhelming evidence that one plus one adds up to
two, even in two-getherness."2z
By 1964, when Pierce was decided, the marital harmony rationale
for spousal immunity had been rejected in torts and in criminal law
when one spouse acts against the other. When spouses act in concert
to pursue lawful ends, the law poses no threat to their domestic
harmony. Why then should the law promote harmony in unlawful
activity? Seeing no indication "that either a husband or a wife is
more subject to losing himself or herself in the criminal schemes of his
or her spouse than a bachelor or a spinster is to losing himself or
herself in the criminal schemes of fellow conspirators," Justice
Traynor rejects the marital harmony rationale for the spousal
immunity rule. 4'-
The Pierces' final argument is that the long-established immunity
rule should not be overruled except by the ,legislature. "In effect,"
wrote Justice Traynor,
the contention is a request that courts abdicate their
responsibility for the upkeep of the common law. That
upkeep it needs continuously, as this case demonstrates. In
view of the fact that the fiction underlying the rule in
question has long been dead, we overrule People v. Miller
... [and] hold that even when a husband and wife conspire
only between themselves, they cannot claim immunity from
prosecution for conspiracy on the basis of their marital
status.242
Pierce unabashedly creates new law. But it does so in the least
controversial context. Miller is judge-made law. Only the most
conservative view of the legal process refuses to concede the power
of a court to overrule its own decisions, especially when the case is
incorrectly decided. The court probably decided Miller incorrectly.
But even if we assume that Miller reflected contemporary values in
1889, few would argue that its rationale remained viable in the 1960s.
With its original rationale "long dead," and with no discernible
contemporary foundation or policy to support it, the Pierce spousal-
immunity rule is easily cast aside as an anachronistic artifact of
another era.
240. Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d at 880, 395 P.2d at 894, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
241. 1& at 881, 395 P.2d at 895, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
242. Id. at 882, 395 P.2d at 895-96, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 847-48.
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Unless there is some independent reason for refusing to exercise
the overruling power, the modem view is that a court may overrule
its own moribund precedent. Indeed, Justice Traynor frequently
referred to his Pierce opinion as an example of judicial creativity that
falls squarely within the American common-law tradition.243
d. Benson v. Superior Court"4
The creation of new law does not always produce a positive rule.
A well-considered opinion rejecting a proposed rule is sometimes as
important to the growth of the law as a positive statement of new law.
Ralph Benson, a lawyer in Los Angeles, was charged with soliciting
perjured testimony in violation of California Penal Code section
653(f).'45 In an investigation of adoption practices in Los Angeles,
Benson was consulted by an undercover investigator. The investigator
told Benson that she was pregnant and that she wanted to put the
child up for adoption. Benson agreed to handle the matter. To
facilitate the anticipated adoption, he solicited perjury from another
undercover investigator who was posing as the supposedly pregnant
client's friend. He was then arrested on the soliciting charge. In
preliminary proceedings on that charge, Benson claimed that he could
not have committed the crime of solicitation because the perjury
would not have occurred. The investigator was not pregnant and thus
there never would be an adoption proceeding. The trial court
overruled his objection and these writ proceedings commenced.246
The California Supreme Court decided to hear the case since it
presented an issue of first impression: Is the "impossibility" of the
commission of the crime solicited a defense to solicitation? Writing
for a unanimous court, Justice Traynor rejected the defense.
He began his analysis with the goal of the crime: Solicitation is
designed not only to prevent solicitations from resulting in the
commission of the crimes solicited but also to protect people from
243. See, e.g., Roger J. Traynor, Some Not So Lost Causes of Action, 22 SW. L.J. 551,
560-61 (1968) [hereinafter Traynor, Lost Causes]; Roger J. Traynor, Statutes Revolving in
Common-Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U. L. REV. 401,409-10,414 (1968) [hereinafter Traynor,
Statutes]; Roger J. Traynor, The Unguarded Affairs of the Semikempt Mistress, 113 U. PA.
L. REV. 485, 490-91 (1965) [hereinafter Traynor, Affairs]; Roger J. Traynor, What
Domesday Books for Emerging Law?, 15 UCLA L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1968) [hereinafter
Traynor, Domesday].
244. 57 Cal. 2d 240, 368 P.2d 116, 18 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1962).
245. IL at 243, 368 P.2d at 117, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
246. Id. at 241-43, 368 P.2d at 116-17, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 516-17.
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being exposed to inducements to commit crime.247 How is this goal
achieved? Justice Traynor answered this question by quoting from
the recently published tentative draft of the Model Penal Code
provision on solicitation: "'Purposeful solicitation presents dangers
calling for preventive intervention and is sufficiently indicative of a
disposition towards criminal activity to call for liability."' 2 "If the
solicitor believes that the [act] can be committed, 'it is immaterial that
the crime urged is not possible of fulfillment at the time when the
words are spoken.... ,
Traynor fleshes out the opinion by citing supporting precedent
from other states and concludes that "[s]olicitation itself is the evil
prohibited by the Legislature, and prosecution therefor is particularly
appropriate for the very case in which the crime solicited does not
take place.""0
Benson thus creates new law in California, although it produces
a negative rule: Factual impossibility is not a defense to solicitation.
These four cases, Vogel, Washington, Pierce, and Benson, provide
us with the full range of Justice Traynor's substantive criminal
lawmaking. New positive rules are created in Vogel and Washington
and two defenses, one existing and one proposed, are rejected in
Pierce and Benson. In each case Justice Traynor exercised judicial
choice. He chose to create new law in Vogel and Washington rather
than follow the traditional rule. The old common-law rule that
produced interspousal immunity from conspiracy liability was cast
aside in Pierce, and Benson reflects the modem approach to the
defense of impossibility.
D. The Judicial Philosophy of Traynor and the Creation of
Substantive Criminal Law
1. Introduction
It is clear, of course, that Traynor created substantive criminal
law in each of these cases. By what authority does a judge create
substantive criminal law in our democracy? And how is it done? The
247. Id. at 243, 368 P.2d at 117-18, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 517-18.
248. Ia at 243, 368 P.2d at 118, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 518 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 5.02 cmt. (Tentative Draft No. 10, 1960)).
249. 1& (quoting GLANVILLE L. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 468 (1953)).
250. Id. at 244, 368 P.2d at 118, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 518.
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answers to these questions may be found in the judicial philosophy of
Roger Traynor.
As one would expect, Traynor's philosophy evolved from the
jurisprudential disputes raging in the United States during his
formative years at Berkeley."1 The late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries were times of rebellion against the traditional
Blackstonian view that judges did not make law, they applied it. In
other words, in this traditional theory, appellate judges exercise error-
correcting and law-maintaining authority, but they have no truly
creative role. Law is made by some authority external to the judge.
The judicial role is thus confined to finding the applicable law and
applying it to the facts of the case at bar. 2
Holmes, Pound, Cardozo, and the Realists rebelled against this
traditional view of the judge's role.3 Once Realism faded as an
active movement, Reasoned Elaboration and "neutral principles"
continued the rebellion against traditional theory and offered answers
to Realism's critics. Building upon these ideas, Roger Traynor
rejected the traditional view of the judge's task. In our democracy,
which adheres to the common-law tradition, judges share lawmaking
authority with the legislative branch of government. Judges have
creative power to make new law; and that power, which is an essential
part of the judicial process, should regularly be exercised in accor-
dance with the common-law tradition. And, under that tradition, all
judge-made doctrine is subject to the superior authority of legislative
law. 5 The idea that judges make law is heresy in the traditional
Blackstonian view of the legal process. It is the backbone of Roger
Traynor's judicial philosophy.
The judicial creation of law appears to be antithetical to three
distinct but related beliefs about our democracy. First, the authority
to make law is exclusively allocated to the legislative branch of
government. Second, our system is founded on the rule of law: It is
the law, not the personal will of the people in power, that legitimately
governs us. Third, the judicial role is properly devoted exclusively to
the law-applying and error-correcting functions: Judges should not
251. For a summary of Traynor's judicial philosophy, see an earlier article which is also
the product of my research as the inaugural Roger Traynor Summer Research Professor






THE LEGACY OF ROGER TRAYNOR
make law, for the law they would make would not be founded on the
consent of the people. Traynor's theory rejects each of these
concepts.
It is true, of course, that primary lawmaking authority is allocated
to the legislative branch of government in our democracy. But this
grant of lawmaking authority is not exclusive. The heritage that
produced the concept of our democracy also gives lawmaking power
to the courts. The judicial creation of law for the resolution of cases
submitted for decision lies at the heart of our common-law system,
and the common-law system is part of our democracy. The power of
the people to ultimately create the rules by which they are governed
is retained, for that power is generally exercised by the legislative
branch of government and the legislative branch of government has
the power to replace judge-made law by statute. The primacy of
legislation, the trumping power of statutes, thus preserves the
authority of the people. 6
The fact that judges properly make law in our democracy means
that there is no real inconsistency between judicial lawmaking and the
power of the people to make the law that governs them. Judicial
lawmaking thus is part of the legitimate role of the judiciary in our
democracy. Though lawmaking is part of the judicial role, the
interesting problem of how judicial law is rightfully made remains.
Rather than asking judges to make law based upon their own
personal values, the common-law tradition requires judges to resolve
disputes with the use of reason and precedent. Appellate opinions
are thus exercises in reason, logic, precedent, and policy. They are
not vehicles for the implementation of a judge's personal preferences.
But the Realists' critique of our judicial process, which reached its
apex in Roger Traynor's formative years, claims that the form of
appellate opinions masks their substance. Law is indeterminate, and
a judge's use of reason and precedent obscures the real basis upon
which law is made. Judges are, in fact, quite free to convert their
personal preferences into judge-made law. 7
Much of Roger Traynor's judicial philosophy is aimed at
answering this critique by establishing the methods judges should use
to make new law.. Yes, as we have seen, Traynor agrees that judges




486 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
bind them to decide cases in given ways. But the choice is not
personally made in the sense in which judges make decisions about
their own affairs. The judge's decision is circumscribed by the judicial
office. It must first be a choice made without any personal interest
at stake. But that alone is not enough. A judge, Justice Traynor tells
us:
is painfully aware that a decision will not be saved from
being arbitrary merely because he is disinterested. He
knows well enough that one entrusted with decision,
traditionally above base prejudices, must also rise above the
vanity of stubborn preconceptions, sometimes euphemistical-
ly called the courage of one's convictions. He knows well
enough that he must severely discount his own predilections,
of however high grade he regards them, which is to say he
must bring to his intellectual labors a cleansing doubt of his
omniscience, indeed even of his perception. 2
8
"[H]e can strive to deepen his inquiry and his reflection enough to
arrive at last at a value judgment as to what the law ought to be and
to spell out why." 9
Personal disinterest and this "cleansed" judgment work in tandem
to produce judicial, not personal choices. They allow the judge to
arrive at a judicial "value judgment as to what the law ought to
be. ,21 Judicial integrity, the ability of a judge to make law with
"cleansed" disinterested judgment, is critical to Justice Traynor's
philosophy of the judicial process.2 1 But judicial integrity is merely
a necessary condition for the creation of judge-made law.262 The
actual lawmaking decision is made by assessing the relative strength
of a series of countervailing powers. 21 Two types of forces apply
whenever a judge considers the law he or she should use to decide a
given issue. These are the creative forces that urge the judge to
create new law, and the restraining forces that counsel the judge to
apply existing doctrine. Any decision the judge makes is the product
258. Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 112, at 750-51.
259. Roger J. Traynor, La Rude Vita, La Dolce Giustizia; Or Hard Cases Can Make
Good Law, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 223, 234 (1962) [hereinafter Traynor, Hard Cases].
260. Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 112, at 751.
261. ld.
262. See Traynor, Hard Cases, supra note 259, at 234.
263. See Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 112, at 743-47.
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of the relative strength of these opposing forces at the time the
judicial choice is made.
The relative strength of the creative and restraining forces varies
with a number of factors. Precedent prevails and the judge chooses
to adhere to the common understanding of existing law when, for
example, the forces of repose overpower what Holmes calls the "felt
necessities of the time.'""4 On the other hand, when the creative
forces overcome the restraining forces, the judge creates new law. In
Justice Traynor's theory, this is the process he employs to decide all
cases?6 This is the way the judge keeps a constant watch on the
law.
266
The predominantly creative forces, which are discussed at length
in another article,267 are (1) the rapidly changing world, (2) pragma-
tism, (3) empiricism, (4) intuition, and (5) policy?' The predom-
inantly restraining forces are (1) stare decisis, (2) the common-law
tradition, (3) the tenet of lag, (4) deference to the legislature, (5) the
internal institutional restraints, and (6) the external institutional
restraints?69 Reason, which plays a central role in Justice Traynor's
judicial philosophy, is the power that mediates between these creative
and restraining forces." The individual factors, the elements of
creativity and constraint, push and pull against each other until an
equilibrium is reached. This equilibrium is the judgment on the issue
in dispute. In Justice Traynor's words, it is the judge's "rational
outcome,"" the "value judgment as to what the law ought to
be."' This, according to Justice Traynor, is the choice we pay
264. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
265. See Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 112, at 743-47.
266. Poulos, supra note 4.
267. Id.
268. Id I have noted the references to the discussion of each of the individual factors
in the prior article at the beginning of each of the following sections.
269. Id
270. See Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 112, at 743.
271. Id. at 751.
272. Id. The complete quotation is as follows:
He comes to realize how essential it is also that he be intellectually
interested in a rational outcome. He cannot remain disoriented forever, his mind
suspended between alternative passable solutions. Rather than to take the easy
way out via one or the other, he can strive to deepen his inquiry and his
reflection enough to arrive at last at a value judgment as to what the law ought
to be and to spell out why. In the course of doing so he channels his interest in
a rational outcome into an interest in a particular result. In that limited sense
he becomes result-oriented, an honest term to describe the stubbornly rational
search for the optimum decision. Would we have it otherwise? Would we give
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judges to make.273 It fully comports with our democracy and with
our conception of the rule of law. Individual judges make awesome
choices, but the restraining forces strip that choice of all of the
attributes of both purely personal choice and arbitrary action.
In the final analysis, Justice Traynor thus agrees with the Realists
that law is indeterminate, that judges make law, and that their
lawmaking is dependent upon their individual choice. But the judicial
process, properly understood, produces the individual choice of judges
that we have embraced since the founding of our nation.
With this summary of his judicial philosophy in mind, we will
now return to our four example cases to learn what we can about how
this philosophy produced new substantive criminal law. We begin
with the creative forces and how they influence a court to create new
doctrine.
2. The predominantly creative forces
a. the rapidly changing world274
Justice Traynor believed that it is a judge's duty to constantly
review the common-law with a vigilant eye toward its maintenance
and revision. "[E]verything," Justice Traynor tells us, "is in flux,"
275
and the common law "must prove itself able to find reasonable
solutions for conflicts that proliferate as people make quantum leaps
and quaky landings in every field."'276
In slightly more than a single decade our interest in the substan-
tive criminal law quickened and our conception of its structure began
to change.2' Well before Justice Traynor's first decade on the
California Supreme Court, as we have seen, criminal law had become
a moribund subject.27 The judges gave little, if any, attention to
revising the criminal law through the judicial process. If the substan-
up the value judgment for an abdication of judicial responsibility, for the toss of
the two-faced coin?
Ma. A passage in an earlier article written for the University of Chicago Law Review is
virtually the same. See Traynor, Hard Cases, supra note 259, at 234.
273. See Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 112, at 751.
274. Poulos, supra note 4.
275. Roger J. Traynor, Transatlantic Reflections on Leeways and Limits of Appellate
Courts, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 255, 255 [hereinafter Traynor, Transatlantic].
276. Id. at 257.
277. See supra text accompanying note 17.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
[Vol. 29:429
THE LEGACY OF ROGER TRAYNOR
tive criminal law were to be revised, the legislature should do so. The
courts were primarily, if not exclusively, concerned with the error-
correcting function in criminal cases. - Their lack of interest in the,
substantive criminal law is evident from their neglect of even the law-
maintaining function. No other judge, for example, joined Justice
Traynor's law-maintaining concurring opinions in People v.
Albertson279 and People v. Lindley,20 and only Justice Schauer
joined Traynor's law-maintaining dissent in People v. Kolez."' His
brethren apparently saw no point in maintaining the California
common law of crimes during the first decade Traynor was on the
bench. It is thus accurate to say that the court did not see the world
of criminal law in a state of flux during the 1940s in California.
As we have seen, criminal law began changing in the 1950s at an
escalating pace. Professional interest in the criminal law quickened.
Lawyers began representing indigents in criminal cases under court
appointment, and they began pressing new issues in the California
courts. The California Supreme Court began paying attention to
these arguments and taking them seriously. The American Law
Institute started the Model Penal Code project, and criminal law
began to be taken seriously in American law schools. Interesting
substantive cases began to be decided and the new precedent begot
a seemingly ever increasing body of new substantive criminal law
doctrine.
The 1950s faded into the 1960s. Early in that decade, the Model
Penal Code was promulgated and the United States Supreme Court
began the criminal law revolution.' Modern criminal law, con-
cerned with the mental elements and with the relationship between
culpability and the criminal sanction, developed and flowered.
As our perceptions of the criminal law rapidly changed, and as
the newly perceived problems were presented to the court by lawyers
caught in the enthusiasm of the rapidly developing "new criminal
law," Justice Traynor and his colleagues on the California Supreme
Court focused their attention and their judicial powers on the newly
framed issues. The belief that new law must be created for new
problems was one of the principle forces driving the judicial creativity
279. 23 Cal. 2d 550, 581-89, 145 P.2d 7, 22-27 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
280. 26 Cal. 2d 780, 794, 161 P.2d 227, 235 (1945) (Traynor, J., concurring).
281. 23 Cal. 2d 670, 672-76, 145 P.2d 580, 581-83 (1944) (Traynor, J., dissenting).
282. See supra text accompanying note 17.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
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we see in People v. Vogel,' People v. WashingtonM People v.
Pierce,25 Superior Court v. Benson,27 and the other Traynor law-
creating cases of his last two decades on the bench.' "[I]nnovative




Law is not theology to Justice Traynor. It is a tie that binds a
people together, adjusts their relationships, and assists in achieving
their goals. His concern is thus not for the paper rule, but for how
doctrine actually works to achieve the goals we have set for it. This
pragmatic view of law, which was undeniably influenced by the
writings of Holmes, Pound, and the Realists, is a fundamental
component of Justice Traynor's philosophy of the judicial process.29
Pragmatism, as we shall see, is one of the primary forces that drives
the creation of new judge-made criminal law.
A pragmatic analysis of criminal law takes into account: (1) the
aims of the criminal law; (2) the goals of the doctrine at issue;292 (3)
the efficacy of the rules used to achieve those goals; (4) and the
impact the questioned doctrine has on the offender and on soci-
ety-especially the relationship between the actor's culpability and the
severity of the punishment.
The primary aim of the criminal law as it is written is to prevent
socially harmful conduct. A secondary aim is to create the prevention
system-the articulation of the rules of just punishment and the like.
One of the hallmarks of the modern golden age of the criminal law
is rethinking its general aims, including rethinking the type of conduct
the criminal law should suppress. This has called into question, for
example, the use of criminal law to enforce the majority's moral code
when there is no palpable injury to others. The crime of bigamy, the
284. 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956).
285. 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
286. 61 Cal. 2d 879, 395 P.2d 893, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1964).
287. 57 Cal. 2d 240, 368 P.2d 116, 18 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1962).
288. On the other hand, a judge.who perceives a stable world sees no new problems
in need of new law to solve them.
289. Roger J. Traynor, The Limits of Judicial Creativity, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1, 9 (1977)
[hereinafter Traynor, Limits].
290. Poulos, supra note 4.
291. Id.
292. This is true whether it concerns the elements of a crime, a defense, or some other
substantive criminal law doctrine.
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offense involved in Vogel, provides a ready example. When both
parties to the second marriage know of the continuation of the prior
marriage, there is no injury to the "innocent" partner of the second
marriage. In these circumstances, the law of bigamy enforces the
moral values of the majority though there is no specific victim of the
crime. Undoubtedly the possible victimless nature of bigamy partially
explains why it was not a crime under the common law of Eng-
land.293 Bigamy was punished as an ecclesiastical offense.294 Al-
though the Traynor opinion in Vogel does not expressly allude to
ambivalence about using the criminal sanction to enforce morality, he
apparently gave that aim less weight in deciding the case.295 As-
sume, for example, the highly debatable proposition that the
imposition of absolute liability on the issue of freedom to remarry will
enhance the deterrent effect of the crime. The value of achieving this
aim may be entitled to less weight when it is weighed against the
burden imposed on the defendant who honestly and reasonably
believes he is free to remarry. Apparently this is what Justice
Traynor had in mind when he wrote that it is "extremely unlikely that
the Legislature meant to include the morally innocent to make sure
the guilty did not escape. 2 96 A judge's attitude about the general
aims of the criminal law and the crime in question obviously affects
the law the judge creates.
The second consideration is of the goals of the crime or defense
under analysis. As seen in our discussion of bigamy, these differ from
the judge's view of the general aims of the criminal law and the
offense in an important way. Here the suitability of the crime for
inclusion among the penal statutes is not called into question. Justice
Traynor, for example, did not question the propriety of making
murder a crime in the Washington case, nor did he question the
criminal law's general goal of deterring socially undesirable conduct.
The focus of this variable is on the socially harmful conduct the
specific crime or rule seeks to prevent.
293. In California the "victimless" nature of the crime is enhanced by the family laws
that make certain bigamous marriages voidable but not void. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2201
(West 1994).
294. 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 543 (1959).
295. Justice Traynor obviously did not agree with Justice Shenk's assertion in his Vogel
dissent that bigamy "creates a serious mischief to society which the law seeks to prevent
by penal sanctions." Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d at 807, 299 P.2d at 857 (Shenk, J., dissenting).
296. Id. at 804, 289 P.2d at 855.
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The purpose or goal of the crime is an analytical focal point in
each of our four example cases. Thus the socially harmful conduct
sought to be suppressed by the crime of bigamy is a critical element
in Traynor's analysis in Vogel. The purpose of the felony-murder rule
is a principal point of analysis in Washington.297 The goal of the
crime of solicitation is a principal issue in Benson,98 as is the
purpose of the spousal-immunity defense in Pierce.299
Once the purpose of the doctrine is identified, the rules used to
achieve that goal are assessed in terms of their suitability to the task.
This is a pragmatic judgment. Thus Justice Traynor found that
holding felons strictly responsible for homicides committed by others
in resisting the felony does not serve the purpose of the felony-
murder rule.3" Nor does holding a person strictly responsible for
her actual marital status serve to prevent a second marriage when the
actor honestly and reasonably believes that she is legally free to
remarry.30' But the purpose of the crime of solicitation is amply
served even when the solicited crime is impossible of commission;
and granting immunity to spouses who conspire only with each other
does not promote the type of marital harmony the law should
protect.
303
297. According to Traynor, the felony-murder rule's goal is "to deter felons from killing
negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly responsible for killings they commit."
Washington, 62 Cal. 2d at 781, 402 P.2d at 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
298. The court in Benson stated that solicitation "is designed not only to prevent
solicitations from resulting in the commission of the crimes solicited, but to protect
'inhabitants of this state from being exposed to inducement to commit or join in the
commission of the crimes specified.'" Benson, 57 Cal. 2d at 243, 368 P.2d at 117-18, 18
Cal. Rptr. at 517-18 (quoting People v. Burt, 45 Cal. 2d 311,314,288 P.2d 503,505 (1955)).
299. Justice Traynor assumes that the purpose of the common law's fictional unity of
wife with husband is "domestic harmony." Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d at 880-81,395 P.2d at 894-95,
40 Cal. Rptr. at 846-47.
300. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d at 781, 402 P.2d at 133.
301. Vogel, 446 Cal. 2d at 804, 299 P.2d at 854.
302. Benson, 57 Cal. 2d at 243-44, 368 P.2d at 117-18, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 517-18.
303. Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d at 881-82, 395 P.2d at 895, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 847. Thus Justice
Traynor wrote that
[t]he law, however, poses no threat to their domestic harmony in lawful pursuits.
There is nothing in the contemporary mores of married life in this state to
indicate that either a husband or a wife is more subject to losing himself or
herself in the criminal schemes of his or her spouse than a bachelor or a spinster
is to losing himself or herself in the criminal schemes of fellow conspirators.
Id. at 881, 395 P.2d at 895, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
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A pragmatic approach to law promotes the creation of new law
by challenging the efficacy of paper rules to achieve the goals we set
for them.
c. empiricism 4
Empiricism is pragmatism's chief tool. In the context of the
criminal law, it is the method of choice for deciding whether the
doctrine of a given crime or defense actually achieves its professed
goals.
The common law has always included an empirical element in its
judicial process. Empiricism enters the judge's analysis, though
perhaps under another label, through the facts of the case at hand.
The common law tethers legal rules to the relevant facts presented in
the cases. Vogel's honest and reasonable belief that he was free to
remarry, for example, suggests that the imposition of criminal liability
in those circumstances does not further the goal of deterring second
marriages during the pendency of a valid existing marriage. And the
existence of the mistake, as we shall soon see, removes the moral
culpability that justifies the imposition of just punishment. Based
upon the facts presented in Vogel's case, we suspect that the
challenged rule does not actually further the doctrine's goals. The
pragmatic judgment is thus assisted by the empirical inferences drawn
from the facts of the case at bar.
Although the empiricism inherent in the common-law process is
a necessary component of our system, it is also poor science. The
creation of the rule that permits an honest and reasonable mistake of
fact to function as an excuse in the crime of bigamy, based upon the
single experience presented in Vogel, makes no scientific sense. These
facts may be sufficient to generate a hypothesis for testing, but they
can never support a scientifically significant inference that the old
absolute liability rule at issue in Vogel does not further the goals of
the law of bigamy; or that the proposed rule does so in a much more
efficient way.
As we have seen; empiricism beyond the facts related directly to
the dispute was introduced into our legal system during Justice
Traynor's formative years. Brandeis, for example, used empirical
evidence in his famous "Brandeis Brief' in support of the empirical
assumptions underlying the Oregon maximum hour statute he
304. Poulos, supra note 4.
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defended in Muller v. Oregon;°  and Professors Pound and Frank-
furter completed their empirical study in Criminal Justice in Cleve-
land.'°6 Stimulated by these and other examples, legal empiricism
was championed by the Realists in the 1920s and the 1930s. The need
for empirical analysis of legal rules became a fundamental tenet of the
Realist creed. 7 Building upon this heritage, Justice Traynor em-
braced empiricism as an important tool for creating new law.3"'
Unfortunately, there were few soundly based empirical studies of
legal issues at the time Justice Traynor created the new law in our
four example cases. No relevant empirical studies existed that would
have aided Traynor's pragmatic analysis of the relationship between
absolute liability and the prevention of a second marriage that could
be used to accept-and thus create new law-or reject-and thus
maintain the status quo-the submission in Vogel. There was a
similar lack of empirical evidence on the crucial issues presented to
the Court in Washington, Pierce, and Benson. In the absence of such
evidence, judges must "assume the risk of dubious a priori assump-
tions"3" and decide the case the best way they can. After al, that
is the way the common law of England was created, and that is the
way courts create new law today.
Empiricism is not simply a tool that enhances the accuracy of
pragmatism. It also operates as a force for creating new law in much
the same way as does the view that society is in constant flux-the
force we have called the Rapidly Changing World. As empirical
studies reveal new truths, they sometimes demonstrate that the "a
priori assumptions" upon which the law is based are inaccurate and
that the actual facts support the abandonment of the old rule and the
creation of a new one. Quite obviously, empirical studies about a
given rule may be a critical force in the revision or abandonment of
that rule. But empirical studies may also promote the reexamination
of rules even when the study is not directly relevant to their validity.
New empirical insights generate new questions. When they do,
lawyers and judges may be convinced to challenge the assumptions
upon which various rules are based. Empiricism thus becomes part
305. 208 U.S. 412 (1908); see JOHN W. JOHNSON, AMERICAN LEGAL CULTURE, 1908-
1940, at 29-46 (1981).
306. THE CLEVELAND FOUNDATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND (Roscoe
Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds., 1968); see JOHNSON, supra note 305, at 108-09.
307. Poulos, supra note 4.
308. ld
309. Id.; Traynor, Limits, supra note 289, at 12.
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of the legal culture and it may foster the pragmatic review of a variety
of rules in a given field such as the criminal law. 1°  Thus the
empirical studies of various areas of criminal law, which were being
carried out in the 1960s, may well have induced the lawyers and
Justice Traynor to create new law during Traynor's last decade on the
bench.
But what precisely does a judge do when he is committed to a
pragmatic approach to law and there are no relevant empirical studies
to assist the judge's analysis?
d. intuition
In the absence of relevant, reliable empirical evidence, the judge
must use "combinations of analysis and intuition" 312 to make the
pragmatic assessment and to arrive at a prophetic judgment.3 3 The
"innovative decision," Justice Traynor tells us, "is the most difficult
for a judge to elucidate, for it usually concerns a controversy that has
compelled him to evaluate conflicting interests in terms of a changing
social or economic context. 314 In making the pragmatic decision,
the judge must take
a long look at the past, in terms of the present, to evaluate
whether once useful precedents are impaired by obsoles-
cence, or whether there are no useful precedents, and then
by a long look at the present in terms of the future, to
evaluate what the long-range prospects of currently visible
change are.15
There are special problems, however, with the criminal law:
Prophecy is more difficult in areas such as the criminal
law, whose development has rested with the courts since
time immemorial. Had the world always known what we
know now, had the learned judges of other days enjoyed the
advantage of later learning, had more of them been coura-
geous and imaginative as well as merely learned, had
customary beliefs not always constituted a phalanx against
310. See, e.g., Traynor, Domesday, supra note 243, at 1107.
311. Poulos, supra note 4.
312. Roger J. Traynor, Badlands in an Appellate Judge's Realm of Reason, 7 UTAH L.
REV. 157, 160 (1960) [hereinafter Traynor, Badlands].
313. Poulos, supra note 4.
314. Traynor, Limits, supra note 289, at 8-9.
315. Id. at 9.
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new ideas, we might have had a rational development of
criminal law. Instead, its development has been warped by
successive irrationalities that have matched the potions and
bloodletting of medicine. The persistent inadequacy of our
senseless hodgepodge of precedents is the more shocking in
comparison with such undertakings as the Model Penal Code
of the American Law Institute now evolving under the
leadership of Professor Wechsler of the Columbia Law
School.
3 16
As difficult as prophecy may be in criminal cases, Justice Traynor
did not hesitate to use intuition, or what is frequently called "common
sense," in making the judgments in criminal cases that he would have
preferred to base on sound empirical evidence.3 7 Justice Traynor's
assessment of the utility of absolute liability for bigamy to prevent
second unlawful marriages was thus based on his "analysis and
intuition. 3 s There were no available empirical studies to assist
him. His assessment in Washington3t9 of the efficacy of the felony-
murder rule in deterring killings committed by a person who was
resisting the felony was similarly based upon his analysis and intuition.
How else can the pragmatic judgment be made in the absence of
sound environmental facts? If he had not used his own analysis and
intuition, informed as it was by "the advantage of later learning,""
he would have been reduced to accepting the analysis and intuition
of bygone judges who performed their judicial task in less learned
times. Could Justice Traynor, in the latter half of the twentieth
century, embrace the marital-exemption rule that conferred immunity
from conspiracy liability at issue in Pierce?21  Justice Traynor
thought not:
Certainly we need to proceed from a little learning to a
great deal more in history and political science. The orderly
evolution of common-law rules depends very largely on the
judge's understanding of the historical context in which the
rules have evolved. The fictional unity of husband and wife,
316. Roger J. Traynor, Comment on Breite The Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL
INSTITUrlIONs TODAY AND TOMORROW 48,56 (Monrad G. Paulsen ed., 1959) [hereinafter
Traynor, Comment on Breitel].
317. Poulos, supra note 4.
318. See Traynor, Badlands, supra note 312, at 160.
319. 62 Cal. 2d 77, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
320. Traynor, Comment on Breitel, supra note 316, at 56.
321. 61 Cal. 2d 879, 395 P.2d 893, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1964).
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for example, can hardly be understood except in a historical
context. In a recent case a wife who conspired with her
husband to commit a crime sought to evade responsibility
through the disappearing act of fictional unity with her
husband. The court took leave of the historical fiction,
noting that in a modem context "one plus one adds up to
two, even in twogetherness."3"
Analysis and intuition also convinced Justice Traynor to reject
the claim that the marital-exemption rule promoted the type of
matrimonial bliss the criminal law should foster.3 Intuition thus
supports judicial creativity in the criminal law in the same way it is
supported by empiricism.
e. policy324
Justice Traynor did not dwell on the use of policy in judicial
lawmaking.3" Initially he distinguishes between the use of policy by
legislatures and courts."2 He then tells us that policy may be "a
basic consideration" in the judicial creation of law, and that judges
sometime "weigh competing policies" in the lawmaking process 27
Although he did not write extensively about the use of policy in his
off-bench writings, we see his use of policy in each of the four
example cases.
i. the policy of equal applicability
There is a general common-law policy which favors the equal
application of common-law rules. This policy is one of the driving
forces behind the doctrines of precedent and stare decisis. Like cases
should be treated alike. What is good law for the litigant currently
before the court must be good law for all future litigants similarly
situated. Properly understood, this policy of equal treatment deter-
mines what is and what is not "the same situation" for any given
judge-made rule. It determines the "validity" of the process by which
322. Traynor, Domesday, supra note 243, at 1107 (discussing People v. Pierce, 61 Cal.
2d 879, 395 P.2d 893, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1964) (footnotes omitted)). Justice Traynor
reviewed the history leading up to the Pierce decision in Traynor, Statutes, supra note 243,
at 412-15.
323. Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d at 880-81, 395 P.2d at 894-95, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 846-47.
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we distinguish one case from another for purposes of the doctrines of
precedent and stare decisis. No common-law lawyer, for example,
would argue that the holding in Pierce2 abolishing the spousal-
immunity rule for the crime of conspiracy should apply only to
women named "Pierce," or that the Washington 9 holding that the
killing must have been committed by one of the felons to qualify for
the felony-murder rule applies only to defendants named "Washing-
ton." The equality principle would invalidate any such conception of
"the same situation" for the doctrines of precedent and stare decisis.
Of course our conception of facts that permissibly draw the line
between "the same situation" and cases that are sufficiently different
to render existing precedent inapplicable, changes over time and is at
best illusive, for it is part of the lawmaking process we are discussing.
This process is, in other words, part of the growth of the common law.
This policy of equality was a major factor in Justice Traynor's
lawmaking in Pierce.3 In one of his many articles on the judicial
process, Justice Traynor traces the development of gender equality at
common law, and its impact in Pierce:
Though the law habitually moves in slow motion, it occa-
sionally takes one step backward or two steps forward of
remarkable span. An invigorating new environment in-
creases the chances of forward motion, particularly in the
traditional status of people. Women, who in recent centuries
in some parts of the world have been recognized as people,
played so significant a role in the everyday pioneering of this
country that some significant developments in its law can be
viewed as a tribute to their identity. In modern laws,
trouvez la femme. She has not been easy to find as a person
in her own right. We need not look back very far to note
how scarce she was even in relatively modem law, how
phantom an existence she eked out on the isles of man.
Who today would condemn his mother or sister, let alone his
wife or daughter, to banishment in the world of Blackstone?
In that nineteenth-century world, he scarcely noticed a
phantom until she emerged briefly from the shadows to walk
down the aisle and become wedded to the idea that she had
no life of her own. Blackstone made it plain that "the
328. 61 Cal. 2d 879, 395 P.2d 893, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1964).
329. 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
330. 61 Cal. 2d 879, 395 P.2d 893, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1964).
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husband and wife [became] one person in law," and then
made it plainer that the wife was not the one. He found
eminently right magic words for this blunt fiction: "the very
being or legal existence of the woman [was] suspended
during the marriage ......
By the late nineteenth century, the negative status of
married women had become markedly anachronistic in the
light of major departures from moral dogma and major
changes in the economic facts of life. Given the omnipres-
ent force of inertia, there is little cause for surprise that
common-law judges nonetheless continued to apply old rules
to women as if nothing had changed. It took legislation,
commonly known as the Married Women's Statutes, to give
impetus to new judge-made rules....
The new status symbols that married women acquired
were substantial recognition that they were on the way to
full participation in the legal benefits of living. It was
inevitable that sooner or later they would be called upon to
share corresponding legal burdens. Once the courts recog-
nized that a married woman could enter into a contract
independently, they automatically made her subject to rules
of contract. She was coming of age in the world of law.
It took a long time for courts to recognize that she was
an independent person . ... The tempo at which courts
advance in these matters depends not only upon their
willingness to advance but also upon fortuitous cases that
enable them to do so. In 1889 the Supreme Court of
California had ruled that there could be no conspiracy
between husband and wife. Not until 1964 was it able to
overrule this decision on the ground that "[t]he fictional
unity of husband and wife has been substantially vitiated by
the overwhelming evidence that one plus one adds up to
two, even in twogetherness."
Though three quarters of a century elapsed before the
court could advance to such simple addition, preceding cases
paved the way.331
331. Traynor, Statutes, supra note 243, at 412-15 (footnotes omitted). This article was
written only four years after Justice Traynor wrote Pierce, and the last quotation comes
directly from Pierce. The cases Justice Traynor refers to as paving the way for gender
equality at common law are the cases in which the California Supreme Court judicially
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Justice Traynor did not invoke the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause or the equivalent provision in California's Constitu-
tion to abolish the old rule granting immunity from liability for
criminal conspiracy to spouses who conspire only among themselves.
He relied on the developing common law and its evolving policy of
equality.
In a less dramatic way we can see the equality policy also at work
in Washington.332 In essence, the question in that case was whether
first-degree murder should include situations where the homicide was
committed by a person resisting the felony, not by one of the felons.
From the standpoint of the equality principle, the question is whether
Washington's conduct and his mental state are sufficiently similar to
the conduct and the mental states of others included within the
category of first-degree murderers to permit his inclusion in that
group. Finding important distinctions between Washington and other
first-degree murderers, Justice Traynor created a rule that excluded
him from that group.3 The common-law's equality policy discour-
ages wrongful inclusions-Washington-as well as wrongful exclu-
sions-Pierce.
The common law's evolving policy of equality thus exerts
pressure on courts to create and maintain laws that are equally
applicable to all.
ii. the policy of equal punishment
Another evolving general policy of the common law, applicable
only to criminal law, is that culprits should be equally punished for
crimes of equal severity. When the common-law judges were con-
fronted with the continuing evolution of the law of homicide, for
example, they developed the two major categories of crimes we see
today-murder and manslaughter. Murder at common law, before
legislation intervened, was punished by mandatory capital punish-
ment?3' Manslaughter received a lesser punishment.3 The poll-
abolished spousal immunity and parental immunity from tort liability when one spouse
injures another or when a parent injures a child. See Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d
65,26 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1962) (abolishing spousal immunity); Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421,
289 P.2d 218 (1955) (abolishing parental immunity).
332. 62 Cal. 2d at 781, 402 P.2d at 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
333. Id. at 783, 402 P.2d at 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
334. See, e.g., John Poulos, Liability Rules, Sentencing Factors, and the Sixth Amendment
Right to a Jury Trial: A Preliminary Inquiry, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 643, 647-52 (1990)
[hereinafter Poulos, Inquiry]; John Poulos, The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment:
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cy of equal punishment for equal criminality was one of the principal
driving forces for the judicial creation of these two offenses and for
maintaining them as separate crimes for centuries. Culprits who
commit murder are more deserving of severe punishment than those
who commit manslaughter. From the perspective of punishment, the
goal for sorting criminal behavior into one category or the other is to
achieve equality of punishment.
This general policy is still at work today, even in California,
which has an extensive penal code. Justice Traynor, for example,
recognized new categories of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter
in his famous People v. Conley opinion in 1966.336 In addition, the
California Supreme Court added another category of manslaughter
after Justice Traynor retired from the bench.337 This latter category
of manslaughter, known as manslaughter on the theory of imperfect-
self-defense, was recently reaffirmed by a majority of the California
Supreme Court 3
This policy of equal punishment for equal criminality is one of
the driving forces behind Justice Traynor's judicial creativity in
Washington and Vogel. Although the felony-murder rule complied
with the equal punishment policy at the time that category of murder
was first created by the common-law judges in England, by Washing-
ton's time the felony-murder rule had evolved into a doctrine that was
seen as being woefully out of step with that policy. Justice Traynor's
Washington opinion sought to bring the felony-murder rule into
conformity with this equality policy insofar as it was possible to do so
within the strictures of the legislative embrace of the felony-murder
rule. "The felony-murder rule ... erodes the relation between
criminal liability and moral culpability," he tells us in Washington,
"[a]lthough it is the law in this state ... it should not be extended
beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve." '339
The Rise and Fall of Mandatory Capital Punishment, 28 ARIz. L. REv. 143, 146-58 (1986).
335. Poulos, Inquiry, supra note 334, at 647-52.
336. 64 Cal. 2d 310,411 P.2d 911,49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966). 1 have not included Conley
in this study as Justice Traynor's creativity with the diminished capacity defense is reserved
for discussion in another article.
337. People v. Flannel, 25 Cal. 3d 668, 603 P.2d 1, 160 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1979).
338. In re Christian S., 7 Cal. 4th 768, 774, 872 P.2d 574, 577, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33, 36
(1994).
339. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d at 783, 402 P.2d at 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 446 (citations
ommitted).
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Justice Traynor's Vogel opinion is also partly driven by the equal-
punishment-for-equal-criminality policy. Vogel was subjected to
significant felony punishment for conduct that was not accompanied
by a morally culpable mental state.l If one honestly and reason-
ably believes that he is free to remarry, the only mental state
accompanying that conduct is the wholly innocent intent of remarry-
ing. 4 It is thus a violation of the equal-punishment-for-equal-
criminality policy to place that person into a punishment category
composed of actors who perform the criminal conduct with morally
culpable mental states. Justice Traynor's solution, one which
conforms the law of bigamy to that policy, was to create a culpable
mental state that must accompany the prohibited conduct.342 Actors
who do not honestly and reasonably believe they are free to remarry
may be subjected to the punishment prescribed for bigamy for their
punishment is seen as equal to the punishment prescribed for other
equally culpable actors.
The equal-punishment-for-equal-criminality policy is one of the
driving forces that moves Justice Traynor's judicial creativity in
Washington and Vogel.
iii. the evolving mens rea policy
The next policy found in several of our example cases concerns
the role of culpable mental states-mens rea-in criminal law.
As a general proposition, the old common law focused on the
actus reus of crime. The culprit's conduct and the result it produced
in the physical world were the primary concerns of the early common
law. Little attention was given to mens rea. The felony of rape, for
example, was defined without an explicit mens rea requirement.3
When the mens rea of an offense was drawn into question, the typical
response was to imply a mental state with respect to the act or
omission, but to no other aspect of the actus reus. Indeed, there is
little indication that the early common-law conception of crime
included the possibility of a mental state for anything other than the
act or omission proscribed by the actus reus of the crime. Hence the
340. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d at 804, 299 P.2d at 854-55.
341. Id. at 803, 299 P.2d at 854.
342. 1l at 801, 299 P.2d at 852-53 (footnote omitted).
343. Professors Perkins and Boyce offer the following definition: "Rape is unlawful
sexual intercourse with a female person without her consent." PERKINS & BOYCE,
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 141, at 197.
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absence of mens rea language in the definition of the crime did not
mean that no culpable mental state was required. It did mean,
however, that in times long past the courts would imply a mental state
only with respect to the act or omission described in the actus reus.
Thus despite the absence of mens rea language in the definition of
rape at common law, the courts implied a culpable mental state only
with respect to the act of sexual intercourse. The older statutes,
including the California Penal Code of 1872,1 used the common-
law pattern: Most of the crimes defined in the code do not mention
mens rea. They are defined solely in terms of the prohibited conduct.
Slowly the policy of the common law of crimes began to change.
The mental elements of crime began to assume greater importance in
our conception of the criminal law. The homicide offenses provide a
ready example. In the later stages of the development of the homi-
cide offenses at common law, the various crimes are sorted into
greater and lesser offenses according to the mental state with which
the homicide is committed. Murder, for example, is a homicide
committed with an intent to kill; an intent to inflict great bodily harm,
when the killing is caused by the actor's extreme recklessness; or by
application of the felony-murder rule. But an intentional killing
during the heat of passion engendered by legally adequate provoca-
tion is classified by the common-law judges as the lesser offense of
voluntary manslaughter. The distinction between murder and volun-
tary manslaughter is thus the additional mental state required by the
rule of provocation. Without that additional mental state, the crime
is murder, not manslaughter. What we now call involuntary man-
slaughter differs from murder by the absence of a mental state
sufficient for murder and the presence of criminal negligence that
causes the homicide or by an application of the unlawful act-man-
slaughter rule. The mental state with which the homicide is commit-
ted is thus the sole basis for distinguishing among murder, voluntary
manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter.
For reasons that remain to be explored, the development of the
mental elements of crime, so evident in the evolution of the homicide
offenses at common law, has not followed an even, consistent path.
The law, both statutory and judge-made, produced an inconsistent and
often incomprehensible body of doctrine on the role of culpable
mental states in criminal law. Thus criminal law at the end of the last
344. CAL. PENAL CODE (1872).
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century and for half of this century resembled more of a patchwork
quilt of ad hoc definitions of the various crimes than it did a carpet
that reflects "the grace of coherent pattern."
3 45
While there was little interest in culpable mental states during
Traynor's first decade on the bench, this began to change during the
second decade. This renewed interest in themental elements of crime
is one of the hallmarks of what I have called the American Renais-
sance in modem criminal law. The Model Penal Code, which
epitomizes the change in thinking during this era, identifies the mental
states relevant in criminal law, simplifies their definition, and creates
clear rules governing the use of these mental states for each aspect of
the actus reus of any crime.' For example, the Code creates the
general rule that each element of the actus reus must be performed
with a culpable mental state.347 This modern renewal of interest in
the mens rea of crime is driven by concerns for justice and fairness to
the individual offender tempered by society's need for just punish-
ment and crime prevention.
This new-found interest in the common law's policy concerning
the mens rea of crime was one of the forces pushing Justice Traynor
to imply culpable mental states beyond the mens rea traditionally
required for the act or omission at common law. In California's pre-
Vogel law, bigamy was defined in accordance with the common law.
The only mental state required was with respect to the act prohibited
by bigamy: marrying a second time. There was no culpable mental
state concerning the continuation of the first marriage. Severe
punishment was thus imposed on a person who honestly and
reasonably believed he was fully complying with the law. The
imposition of severe punishment in these circumstances could not be
justified on the ground that the offender chose to do wrong-the
foundation of retribution; and it is unclear that deterrence functions
when citizens believe they are acting according to the law. The
absence of fault inherent in the traditional definition of bigamy erodes
the relationship between culpability and punishment upon which
modem criminal law and society rely. Bigamy can be made to serve
345. The phrase is taken from one of Justice Traynor's articles discussing the duty of
judges to evolve the common law. The phrase was not specifically aimed at the evolution
of the criminal law. Traynor, Interweavers, supra note 112, at 203.
346. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 (Official Draft and Revised
Comment Part 1, 1962).
347. Id. § 2.02(4). This is true unless a contrary intent appears on the face of the
legislation.
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both the justice interests of the offender and society's goals for the
crime by creating a culpable mental state with respect to the existing
marriage. That is why Justice Traynor and the court held in
Vogel 48 that an actor's honest and reasonable mistaken belief that
the actor is free to remarry excuses the actor from criminal liability.
In other words, under the modern definition of the offense, bigamy
also has a mens rea element with respect to the existence of the
second marriage.
Justice Traynor's Vogel opinion epitomizes the modem approach
to criminal law. It also provides the basis, the precedent, for the
judicial creation of mens rea elements in other offenses.349 The
most prominent example of Vogel's influence is the California
Supreme Court's recognition of a new mens rea element for the crime
of rape?50 Following the traditional view, the California Supreme
Court's pre-Vogel law defined rape as requiring only a mental state
with respect to the act proscribed by the actus reus of that of-
fense-sexual intercourse. After the Traynor opinion in Vogel and in
direct reliance upon it, the court revised the definition of rape to
include a mental element with respect to the victim's lack of consent.
An honest and reasonable mistake as to the victim's consent to sexual
intercourse now operates as an excuse to a charge of rape. The
reasoning upon which the court created this new mens rea require-
ment is precisely the same as that which Justice Traynor used in
Vogel. 351
Justice Traynor's opinion in Benson gives us another interesting
example of how the resurgence in the common law's mens rea policy
influenced the creation of new law. Benson claimed that the offense
he importuned was impossible of commission, and therefore he should
not have been convicted of solicitation.352 In essence, Benson
asserted that the defense of "legal impossibility," which is usually
asserted in prosecution for the crime of attempt, should be recognized
in California as a defense to solicitation.353 As we have seen, Justice
Traynor rejected Benson's submission and held that legal impossibility
348. 46 Cal. 2d at 801, 299 P.2d at 852.
349. E.g., People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d 143,154-55, 542 P.2d 1337, 1344-45, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 745, 752-53 (1975) (common-law forcible rape); People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529,
534-35, 393 P.2d 673, 676-77, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 364-65 (1964) (statutory rape).
350. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d at 154-55, 542 P.2d at 1344-45, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 752-53.
351. Id.
352. Benson, 57 Cal. 2d at 243,368 P.2d at 117, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
353. Id.
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is not a defense to this crime." Solicitation is an offense that is
largely concerned with the offender's culpable mental state. This is
also true of other modem crimes such as assault, attempt, and
conspiracy. These offenses are creations of modern criminal law.
None of them could have been developed until the courts, and
legislatures, gave increased attention to the role of the mental
elements in furthering the policy of the criminal law. In the older
tradition, the actus reus wagged the mens rea tail, at least when the
tail had not been completely bobbed, as it had been with the crime of
bigamy. Under the new policy, as it was rapidly evolving when
Benson was decided, the mental element of crime is as important as
the actus reus.
The impossibility defense tendered by Benson relates to the actus
reus of the crime, the possibility that the target criminal conduct can
indeed be produced by the culprit's acts. But since solicitation focuses
on the mental state of both the actor and the victim, the impossibility
defense is irrelevant. That is what Justice Traynor meant when he
wrote that "[p]urposeful solicitation.., is sufficiently indicative of a
disposition towards criminal activity to call for liability."355
Vogel and Benson are products of the modern concern with the
role of the mental elements in criminal law. Justice Traynor created
new law concerning the culpable mental states, the mens rea, of
various other crimes in nine additional cases. 56 Thus eleven of the
twenty Traynor lawmaking opinions created new mental element law
during the renaissance years in California. These opinions, which
354. Id. at 243-44, 368 P.2d at 117-18, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 517-18.
355. Id. at 243, 368 P.2d at 118, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 518 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 5.02 cnt. 82 (Tentative Draft No. 10, 1960)).
356. People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444,462 P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969) (developing
the diminished capacity defense); In re Murdock, 68 Cal. 2d 313, 437 P.2d 764, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 380 (1968) (defining the mens rea necessary for a motor vehicle offense); People v.
Butler, 65 Cal. 2d 569, 421 P.2d 703, 55 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1967) (further defining the mens
rea of robbery); People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966)
(developing the diminished capacity defense); People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386
P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963) (developing the diminished capacity defense); People v.
Modesto, 59 Cal. 2d 722,382 P.2d 33,31 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1963) (developing the diminished
capacity defense), overruled by People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631,388 P.2d 33,36 Cal. Rptr.
201 (1964); People v. Stuart, 47 Cal. 2d 167,302 P.2d 5 (1956) (recognizing that a culpable
mental state is required for unlawful-act involuntary manslaughter); People v. Baker, 42
Cal. 2d 550, 268 P.2d 705 (1954) (developing the diminished capacity defense); People v.
Martinez, 38 Cal. 2d 556, 241 P.2d 224 (1952) (refusing to extend the diminished capacity
defense).
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Traynor tells us "reflect new insights into human behavior, 357
interpret the statutory definition of the various offenses "in the
interest of justice."3 8 Commenting on several of these cases, Justice
Traynor explains that the court "necessarily [had] to be creative in
interpreting incompletely coordinated provisions with due consider-
ation for the public interest in both crime prevention and protection
of the innocent." '359 In other words, he sought to replace the
fragmented, patchwork quilt of existing mens rea law in California
with a modem body of law that protected the interests of both society
and the accused in an integrated, rational, and elegant way.
The common law's evolving policy on the importance of the
mental elements of crime is thus an important driving force in the
creation of new judge-made substantive criminal law. Vogel, Benson,
and the other nine Traynor opinions substantially contributed to the
evolving modem law on the role of the mental elements in criminal
law.
iv. systemic consistency in legal policy
The final policy seeks to assure that each part of the legal order
promotes the system's common goals. Recognizing that the criminal
law is a part of this larger system, insofar as it is feasible, criminal law
should support the system's common goals. The doctrine under
scrutiny in any particular case is but a single component in a complex
system of law, composed of other criminal laws and a number of
other nonpenal provisions which are aimed at furthering the same or
related policies. When a given criminal law doctrine works at cross-
purposes with other doctrines, pressure is created for judicial change.
Justice Traynor was particularly sensitive to this type of pressure.
He saw the common law as a seamless, ever changing whole. The
"perennial problem of a court," he told us, "is how to integrate the
bits and pieces ... into a going system of common law,',36' and how
to integrate new precedent "into the often rewoven but always
durable network of common law., 361 We see this policy at work in
Vogel, where Justice Traynor sought to integrate the law of bigamy
357. Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 112, at 747 (footnote omitted).
358. Traynor, Comment on Breitel, supra note 316, at 65.
359. Id.
360. Traynor, Transatlantic, supra note 275, at 259 (speaking specifically about the
integration of statutory law into the system).
361. Id. at 262.
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with California's family law.3 62 In his opinion, the best way to do
so was to create the new mens rea requirement we discussed at length
above.
The policy of coordinating the common law into a single system
that promotes common goals is undoubtedly as old as the common
law itself. It is a force that urges the creation of new law.
We have now looked at the predominantly creative forces that
urge the judicial creation of new law, including the judicial creation
of new substantive criminal law. But in Justice Traynor's theory of
the judicial process, these predominantly creative forces, though
necessary for creating new judge-made law, are not alone sufficient to
induce a judge to do so. There are critically important countervailing
forces that counsel the judge to leave well enough alone. It is to
these countervailing forces that we now turn.
3. The predominantly restraining forces"
a. introduction
It may be helpful at this point to stop and remind ourselves of
the context of our discussion. Justice Traynor's theory of the judicial
process predicates judicial lawmaking upon arriving at a point of
equilibrium between two types of countervailing forces: the creative
forces and the restraining forces. We have just completed our
examination of the creative forces as they are illustrated in the four
example cases in which Justice Traynor created new substantive
criminal law. We are now about to look at the restraining forces to
see how they operate in the four example cases. Later we will see
how Justice Traynor uses analysis and reason to assess the relative
weight of each of the countervailing forces and arrives at a decision
on whether new law should be created, and how it should be formed.
The predominant restraining forces are: (1) stare decisis; (2) the
common-law tradition; (3) the tenet of lag; (4) the retroactive effect
of judicial decisions; (5) deference to the legislature; (6) the internal
institutional restraints; and (7) the external institutional restraints.
362. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d at 803-04, 299 P.2d at 854-55.
363. Poulos, supra note 4.
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b. stare decisis 4
Stare decisis expresses a series of concerns that counter creativity
in the judicial process. Courts generally are bound to follow
precedent for the following reasons: It promotes the equal treatment
of litigants; it provides stability and predictability in the law, which in
turn nurtures certainty in the planning of one's affairs and protects
the reliance interests of the parties; it fosters judicial economy;
36s
and it enhances "the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial
process."366 But in most American jurisdictions, "[s]tare decisis is
not an inexorable command ... [or] a mechanical formula of
adherence to the latest decisions": It is a "principle of policy."'3 67
The binding effect of the doctrine varies by subject matter and with
the views of individual judges.3s6
"The serviceable consistency of stare decisis," Justice Traynor
tells us, "rightly discourages the displacement of precedent, absent
overwhelming countervailing considerations."'3 69 Stare decisis "not
only benefits the long-range evolution of the law, but also affords
substantial protection against arbitrary judicial decision.""37
"Overwhelming countervailing considerations" caused Justice
Traynor to nudge stare decisis aside and overrule existing authority
in Vogel,371 Pierce,3  and Washington.373  These "overwhelming
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
367. Id. at 828.
368. Poulos, supra note 4.
369. Traynor, Hard Cases, supra note 259, at 229.
370. Roger J. Traynor, The Well-Tempered Judicial Decision, 21 ARK. L. REV. 287,291
(1967) [hereinafter Traynor, Well-Tempered].
371. Traynor's Vogel opinion overruled People v. Hartman and disapproved of an
inconsistent opinion by the court of appeal: "For the foregoing reasons People v.
Hartman, which was overruled sub silentio in Matter of Application of Ahart, is now
expressly overruled and People v. Kelly disapproved." Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d at 805,299 P.2d
at 855 (citations omitted).
372. As in Vogel, Traynor's Pierce opinion overruled existing California Supreme Court
precedent and disapproved of an inconsistent opinion by the court of appeal: "In view of
the fact that the fiction underlying the rule in question has long been dead, we overrule
People v. Miller and disapprove People v. MacMullen." Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d at 882,395 P.2d
at 895-96, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 847-48 (citations omitted).
373. More accurately, the Traynor opinion "disapproved" of language appearing in
People v. Harrison, 176 Cal. App. 2d 330, 1 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1960), which was "inconsistent
with this holding." Washington, 62 Cal. 2d at 783,402 P.2d at 135,44 Cal. Rptr. at 446-47.
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countervailing considerations" were the creative forces discussed
above.
On the other hand, the logical extension of precedent was used
to create new law in Benson. Benson demonstrates that the adher-
ence to stare decisis is not inexorably a restraining force. But the
type of law created in Benson, the rejection of a tendered defense
based upon existing authority, is the least problematic of all of the
judicial lawmaking paradigms. It should also be noted that stare
decisis prevailed in all of Justice Traynor's error-correcting decisions
and in most of his law-maintaining opinions as well.
c. the common-law tradition374
Although stare decisis plays a major role in the common-law
tradition, there are other equally important components to the culture
in which American judges work. Justice Traynor reminded us that
the judge "invariably takes precedent as his starting-point; he is
constrained to arrive at a decision in the context of ancestral judicial
experience.""37 Even in a case of first impression, the judge "arrives
at a decision in the context of judicial reasoning with recognizable ties
to the past; by its kinship thereto it not only establishes the unprece-
dented case as a precedent for the future, but integrates it in the often
rewoven but always unbroken line with the past.
376
The tradition also counsels the judge to weave the rule, whether
entirely or partly new, into the fabric of the law, giving it "the grace
of coherent pattern as it evolves. ' '37  Viewed in context, the com-
mon law is evolutionary, even when individual cases appear revolu-
tionary. If the new rule cannot be integrated into the warp and woof
of the law, tradition warns the judge to cast it aside as defective yarn.
By definition his language remains rooted in customary
legal analysis and expands only with caution to become
sufficient unto the judgment day. Such circumspection can
do more than deter ill-considered charts for the future. It
can also deter ritual invocation of an obsolescent precedent,
a judgment that will barely do or will die on the morrow.
Only then is a judge free to arrive at a rational transitional
judgment, reasoning why every inch of the way.
374. Poulos, supra note 4.
375. Traynor, Well-Tempered, supra note 370, at 290.
376. Id.
377. Traynor, Interweavers, supra note 112, at 203.
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•.. [J]udges [are] interweavers in this perennial reformation
of law. They can work only case by case on whatever
repairs and renewals appear necessary. Even so, there are
few respites for interweavers.378
Justice Traynor thus believed that the common-law tradition
demands that judges constantly inspect the fabric of the law to make
sure that the existing work remains in good repair, that the current
day's effort flawlessly weaves complementary changes, and that
tomorrow's work will predictably relate to what has been done before.
The common-law tradition also teaches the judge to arrive at her
decision "within as straight and narrow a path as possible." '379 Even
when the judge does not hew entirely to the patterns of the past and
thus takes "graceful leave of a dark landmark," the new rule must
follow the design closely enough to provide a smooth transition from
the abandoned detail to the new, evolving motif?' The common
law is humble in its strength. It is confined by the record and focused
on the issues. The opinion addresses the task at hand and nothing
more.
Finally, although the creative forces may urge the judge to make
law at breakneck speed, Justice Traynor warns us that:
A decision that has not suffered untimely birth has a
reduced risk of untimely death. Insofar as a court remains
uncommitted to unduly wide implications of a decision, it
gains time to inform itself further through succeeding cases.
It is then better situated to retreat or advance with a
minimum of shock to the evolutionary course of the law, and
hence with a minimum of shock to those who act in reliance
upon judicial decisions. The greatest judges of the common
law have proceeded in this way, moving not by fits and
starts, but at the pace of the tortoise that steadily makes
advances though it carries the past on its back.381
It is thus the burden of judges to evolve the law with "the grace
of coherent pattern," with straight, precise weaving, but with the pace
of the tortoise 3 ' No better examples of this grace can be found
378. Traynor, Transatlantic, supra note 275, at 259 (footnote omitted).
379. Roger J. Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicial
Responsibility, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 533, 537 (1977) [hereinafter Traynor, Quo Vadis].
380. Traynor, Well-Tempered, supra note 370, at 291.
381. Traynor, Interweavers, supra note 112, at 203-04.
382. Donald P. Barrett, a staff attorney at the California Supreme Court for 33 years,
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than in Justice Traynor's opinions in Vogel, Pierce, Washington, and
Benson.
Since each of these four opinions create new law, how does the
common-law tradition restrain judicial creativity? First, and most
obviously, it confines the judge's lawmaking to the process of deciding
cases. Judges have no roving commission to do good. They do not
"make law on a massive scale, as legislat[ors] do."3" Their creativi-
ty is limited by the dispute submitted to them, by the record in the
case, and by language "rooted in customary legal analysis [which]
expands only with caution to become sufficient unto the judgment
day. 384 This is a contextual limitation that does not usually appear
in opinions, unless the judge is asked to rove outside the judicial role
and create law on some ill-founded ground. This limitation is thus
not mentioned in any of the four example opinions. Nevertheless,
each of the four falls squarely within the environmental limitation
imposed by the common-law tradition.
Second, the role of precedent within the tradition, the customary
language and analysis, the interweaving goal, and the obligation of the
appellate courts to decide cases by written opinions operate as subtle
constraints on judicial lawmaking. Some opinions will not write and
others will write only in certain ways. We know these constraints
influenced each of our four example opinions, but we cannot tell
precisely how these subtle forces played out their roles.
d. the tenet of lag38
Related to the pace of the tortoise is what Justice Traynor calls
"the tenet of lag":36 "[T]he law must lag a respectful pace back of
popular mores, not only to insure its own acceptance, but also to
delay formalization of community values until they have become
seasoned."38r  In other words, "the function of courts is not to
innovate changes but only to keep the law responsive to significant
worked closely with Justice Traynor as Traynor's chief of staff. He confirms that this is
not simply academic talk. "Judge Traynor," Mr. Barrett tells us, "was particularly
concerned with keeping the pattern of the law straight." Barrett Interview, supra note 111,
at 21.
383. Traynor, Transatlantic, supra note 275, at 258.
384. AL at 259.
385. Poulos, supra note 4.
386. Traynor, Interweavers, supra note 112, at 205.
387. Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 112, at 744.
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changes in the customs of the community. 3 8 And if the legislature
fails to react to these significant changes, "a judge may eventually find
it incumbent upon him to articulate rules responsive to long prevalent
values and customs." 9 "The tenet of lag ... is deservedly respect-
ed,"" but it should not be used to "retreat from painstaking
analysis within their already great constraints to safe and unsound
repetitions of magic words from antiquated legal lore." '391 Consider-
ing what Justice Traynor called "the advanced status of married
women in this state" in 1964,' 92 and "the fact that the fiction under-
lying the rule in question has long been dead,"393 the tenet of lag
was fully honored in Pierce. Much the same can be said for Justice
Traynor's decision in Benson.394 Neither Pierce nor Benson prema-
turely crystallized prevalent values and customs into judge-made law.
On the other hand, the tenet of lag arguably operated as a
constraint in both Vogel and Washington, though it was overcome by
countervailing creative forces in both cases. The defense of honest-
and-reasonable-mistake-in-freedom-to-remarry was controversial in
1956, when Vogel was decided; to a surprising extent, it remains
controversial to this day.395 Insofar as Justice Shenk's dissenting
opinion is based upon a substantial division in community values on
this issue, the tenet of lag would counsel the majority to refrain from
embodying ambivalent values in judge-made law. This may have been
the reason that, after observing that "bigamy involves moral turpitude
388. Traynor, Well-Tempered, supra note 370, at 292.
389. It; see also Paul J. Mishkin, Foreward: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the
Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 60 (1965) (stating that "even when
'new law' must be made, it is often in fact a matter of the court articulating particular clear
implications of values so generally shared in the society that the process might well be
characterized as declaring a preexisting law" (footnote omitted)).
390. Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 112, at 744.
391. Id.
392. Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d at 882, 395 P.2d at 895, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
393. It
394. 57 Cal. 2d 240, 368 P.2d 116, 18 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1962). In that opinion, for
example, Justice Traynor observes that the rule which states it is immaterial that the crime
solicited is not possible of fulfillment at the time when the words are spoken or becomes
impossible of commission at some later date has existed in Massachusetts for nearly a
century. Id. at 243, 368 P2d at 118, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 518. It is thus extremely unlikely that
a rejection of this very idea in California in 1962 would risk pouring the concrete before
the forms were set.
395. See, e.g., PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 141, at 1050-54.
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on the part of the bigamist, 396 Justice Shenk argued that "[a]ny
change in this regard should be made by the Legislature." '397
Justice Traynor and a majority of his colleagues probably gave
more than a casual ear to the tenet of lag's advice to leave well
enough alone. But in weighing that counsel-along with the other
forces of repose-against the creative forces, the creative forces
prevailed. Justice Shenk simply struck a different balance.
A similar analysis seems appropriate for Washington. The scope
of the felony-murder rule, like the mistake defense in bigamy, was
highly controversial and plagued by a variety of inconsistent ap-
proaches at the time Washington was decided.398 Insofar as Justice
Burke's dissent, which was joined by Justice McComb, expresses
values held by a substantial portion of the community, the tenet of lag
urged the court not to innovate change."' But the Traynor opinion
struck a different balance.
It is interesting to note that Justice Traynor's opinions in Vogel
and Washington are regarded as leading opinions in the United States
on the new law they created;4°° they remain the law of California to
this day. 1 Neither the legislature nor a subsequent majority of the
court have abandoned either rule. Thus, although the tenet of lag
apparently restrained judicial creativity in both cases, the balance
ultimately struck by Justice Traynor's opinions, which preferred the
creative forces over the forces of repose, has endured.
Of course, the creative forces always prevail when new law is
judicially created. When that is so, the tenet of lag is overcome by
the forces of creativity. But in many of the opinions I eliminated
from this study, especially those classified as error-correcting cases,
the tenet of lag apparently prevails. A single example should provide
us with a ready reminder that the tenet of lag sometimes wins the
day. In People v. Quicke,"2 a third decade case I classified as
predominately an error-correcting opinion, Justice Traynor refused to
abandon the M'Naughton test for criminal insanity in California. That
396. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d at 807, 299 P.2d at 857 (Shenk, J., dissenting).
397. Id at 808, 299 P.2d at 857 (Shenk, J., dissenting).
398. E.g., LAFAVE & SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 141, at 742.
399. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d at 785, 402 P.2d at 135, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 447 (Burke, J.,
dissenting).
400. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 253 n.2 (1969).
401. See People v. Conely, 48 Cal. App. 3d 805, 808-09, 123 Cal. Rptr. 252, 253-54
(1975).
402. 61 Cal. 2d 155, 390 P.2d 393, 37 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1964).
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rule was initially adopted by the court one hundred years before
Quicke was decided' and reaffirmed in 1873, a year after the
current California penal code was adopted. Justice Traynor
disposed of the issue in two short sentences: "Defendant ...
contends that we should replace [the M'Naughton] test by the one
proposed in 1962 by the Special Commissions on Insanity and
Criminal Offenders. We are not persuaded to do so, however, and
adhere to our numerous decisions on the subject." 5
Nash, the latest opinion cited by Justice Traynor in which the
court refused a similar submission, contains the following important
statement relating to the tenet of lag and the court's refusal to replace
the M'Naughton test with some other formula:
These strong persuasions of society... cannot be adjudicat-
ed out of existence and we think that legal formulae
designed to deal with them should come from the broad
base of the Legislature, which is presumably more closely in
touch with and sensitive to the views of the citizenry on this
controversial subject than are the courts."
Justice Traynor apparently relied on this excerpt from Nash as part
of the rationale for summarily rejecting the law-creating argument in
Quicke. It is thus a fair inference that Justice Traynor believed that
the tenet of lag, along with the doctrine of stare decisis, outweighed
the creative forces at work in Quicke.
While stare decisis, the common-law tradition, and the tenet of
lag restrain all judicial lawmaking, the next restraining element, the
retroactive effect of judicial decisions, has special impact in substan-
tive criminal cases.
e. the retroactive effect of judicial decisions
It is a venerable principle of our common-law tradition that
judicial decisions relate back to the time the dispute arose and thus
govern the relationship between the parties, even though the
governing rule is newly created by the court. This "makes a great
403. See People v. Coffman, 24 Cal. 230 (1864).
404. See People v. M'Donnell, 47 Cal. 134 (1873). For an excellent short history of the
insanity defense in California, see Justice Schauer's opinion for an unanimous court in
People v. Nash, 52 Cal. 2d 36, 43-49, 338 P.2d 416, 421-24 (1959) (a second decade case).
405. Quicke, 61 Cal. 2d at 159, 390 P.2d at 395-96, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 619-20 (footnotes
omitted).
406. Nash, 52 Cal. 2d at 49-50, 338 P.2d at 424.
407. Poulos, supra note 4.
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deal of common sense," Justice Traynor tells us, "if taken with the
essential grain of salt, that a judicial decision is not hopelessly
backward."'
The retroactive-application rule generally applies to all judicially
created law regardless of whether the court creates a pristine new
rule, replaces existing precedent, or simply applies existing doctrine
to resolve the dispute at hand. But when new law is created that
overrules previously governing precedent, the rule may cause
substantial hardship. Justice Traynor believed that judges appropri-
ately give retroactive effect to their decisions, provided they consider
making exceptions for any undue hardship that normal retroactivity
may impose.4 9
In Justice Traynor's world of judicial creativity, the retroactive-
application rule thus begins to restrain judicial lawmaking when it
creates undue hardship for a party to the litigation:
A judge is mindful of the traditional antipathy toward
retroactive law that springs from its recurring association
with injustice and reckons with the possibility that a retroac-
tive overruling could entail substantial hardship. He may
nevertheless be impelled to make such an overruling if the
hardships it would impose upon those who have relied upon
the precedent appear not so great as the hardships that
would inure to those who would remain saddled with a bad
precedent ....40
The idea that justifiable reliance may prevent the court from
exercising its creativity, as when the hardships the new rule would
impose are greater than the hardships that would accrue to those who
would remain saddled with a bad precedent-to borrow from Justice
Traynor's example-is grounded in several of the same policies
supporting stare decisis. 411 It is thus easy to imagine that many
judges will refrain from exercising their creative powers when to do
so would trammel the reliance interests of one of the parties to the
litigation.
408. Traynor, Well-Tempered, supra note 370, at 289.
409. Traynor, Quo Vadis, supra note 379, at 535-36.
410. Traynor, Hard Cases, supra note 259, at 231; see Traynor, Transatlantic, supra note
275, at 264-70; Traynor, Limits, supra note 289, at 10-11; Traynor, Well-Tempered, supra
note 370, at 291-300.
411. Traynor, Hard Cases, supra note 259, at 229.
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An injustice also may be caused when a court gives retroactive
effect to new doctrine it just created. This may be true, for example,
when a new judicially created rule retroactively imposes criminal
liability on the appellant. In this situation, even if there is no reliance
interest at stake, most judges would conclude that the retroactive
application of a rule "imposing or expanding criminal liability would
be inherently unjust."4"' Again, the harm imposed by the normal
retroactive application of the newly created rule may restrain judicial
creativity.
Of course, both types of hardship-the frustration of justifiable
reliance interests and the injustice caused by the retroactive applica-
tion of a new rule-may be encountered in a single case. Indeed, this
was the situation Justice Traynor faced in his first substantive criminal
law opinion which addressed the process by which judges rightly make
new law-his dissent in In re Halcomb.413
Under the California Penal Code section 4532, as it read in 1941,
it was a felony for a "prisoner charged with or convicted of a felony"
to escape from custody.41 4  Grady Halcomb was convicted of a
misdemeanor and sentenced to one year in the San Bernadino County
jail.415 While working on the county jail road gang, he escaped.416
He was recaptured and charged with the felony of escape.
417
Although he pleaded guilty to the felony-escape charge, he challenged
the conviction in state habeas corpus proceedings on the ground that
the statute did not apply to a prisoner incarcerated on a misdemeanor
conviction.4 8 Relying on a seventeen-year-old case interpreting
similar language in the previous escape statute, In re Haines,419 a
majority of five justices held that the felony-escape provision, despite
its clear wording to the contrary, applied to an escape by a prisoner
serving a term in jail on a misdemeanor conviction!'
In essence, the court created a new crime: the felony of escape
from misdemeanor imprisonment. The majority's principal rationale
412. Roger J. Traynor, Conflict of Laws in Time: The Sweep of New Rules in Criminal
Law, 1967 DUKE L.J. 713, 716 [hereinafter Traynor, Conflict].
413. 21 Cal. 2d 126, 130, 130 P.2d 384, 387 (1942) (Traynor, J., dissenting).
414. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4532(b) (West 1941).
415. Halcomb, 21 Cal. 2d at 126, 130 P.2d at 385.
416. Id. at 126-27, 130 P.2d at 385.
417. Id at 127, 130 P.2d at 385.
418. Id. at 127-28, 130 P.2d at 385.
419. 195 Cal. 605, 234 P. 883 (1925).
420. Id-
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was that the legislature is presumed to have known of the court's
precedent and had it in mind when it subsequently enacted section
4532 by using practically the same language of the previous provi-
sion.421 A court of appeal opinion reaching the opposite result was
overruled, and the conviction was upheld.4'
Justice Traynor, joined by Justice Edmonds, dissented. He would
interpret the statute as it was written and he would overrule Haines:
Misdemeanants are excluded because felons are singled out
in a qualifying phrase that states what it means in the
simplest terms. The court cannot reject its obvious interpre-
tation without denying all assurance that an act of the
Legislature will be interpreted to mean what it says. It is for
the Legislature and not the court, to confirm the omission if
it was intended, or to correct it if it was not .... The court's
refusal to read it as it is written makes it impossible for any
one to rely upon the written word of the Legislature.
In re Haines ... should be overruled. Age has not
hallowed [its] error. The qualifying phrase that [it] sought
to conjure away still stands in plain, unmistakable words to
mock the interpretation that would interpret away its
existence. The failure of the Legislature to change the
language of the statute thereafter, far from being an adop-
tion of the court's revision, represents merely a failure to
undertake its own revision .... The fiction that the failure of
the Legislature to repudiate an erroneous construction
amounts to an incorporation of that construction into the
statute not only commits the Legislature to embrace some-
thing that it may not even be aware of, but bars the court
from re-examining its own errors, consequences as unneces-
sary as they are serious."
Though a misdemeanor-escape crime undoubtedly was needed,
Justice Traynor refused to create that crime by contorting the plain
language of the statute and by resorting to a fiction that converted
precedent into statutory law that bound the court, for better or for
worse. He would follow the recent opinion of the court of appeal and
keep the law within the bounds of the legislative language.
421. Hakomb, 21 Cal. 2d at 129, 130 P.2d at 386.
422. In re Ramirez, 49 Cal. App. 2d 709, 122 P.2d 361 (1942).
423. Halcomb, 21 Cal. 2d at 131-32, 120 P.2d at 387-88 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
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Except for cases like Halcomb which present the problem of the
judicial creation of a new crime in a debatable situation, there is
nearly general agreement today that our judges no longer have the
power-once freely exercised by common-law judges-to create new
crimes.424 This understanding frequently is codified in statutory
form, as it is in California.' or it is set forth in judicial deci-
sions.4  Significant issues of constitutional law are also raised when
judges create new crimes out of whole cloth.427 But Justice Traynor
never addressed these issues in an opinion, for his philosophy of the
judicial process precluded him and most of his colleagues from
creating new crimes from the bench. His dissent in Halcomb is the
single situation in which Justice Traynor spoke directly to this issue.
The forces that restrain judicial creativity, justifiable reliance
"upon the written word of the Legislature"4' and the injustice of
retroactively imposing the criminal sanction on conduct that was not
a crime when it was performed, so significantly overwhelm the
creative forces that Justice Traynor did not even advocate the judicial
creation of a completely new crime in his thirty years on the bench.
He thus resolved the troubling issues surrounding the judicial creation
of new crimes by the common-law process, not by invoking constitu-
tional doctrine.429 In other words, as early as 1942, his second year
on the bench, Justice Traynor had concluded that the entire common-
law power to create wholly new crimes had been transferred by the
judges to the legislative branch of government.
Nevertheless, Justice Traynor did create new substantive criminal
law, law that varied the elements of existing crimes, and law that
recognized or disavowed defenses. Judges still retain the power to
create substantive criminal law, for the development of the criminal
law "has rested with the courts since time immemorial,""43 but the
law they create must be less than entirely new crimes. The retroac-
tive effect of judicial decisions still invokes the restraining forces of
424. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness and the Construction of Penal Statutes,
71 VA. L. REV. 189, 189 (1985).
425. CAL. PENAL CODE § 6 (West 1988).
426. See Jeffries, supra note 424, at 227-29.
427. See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481
(1970) (decided shortly after Justice Traynor retired from the court); see supra text
accompanying notes 1-6.
428. Halcomb, 21 Cal. 2d at 131, 130 P.2d at 387.
429. See Traynor, Conflict, supra note 412, at 730.
430. Traynor, Comment on Breitel, supra note 316, at 56.
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undue hardship: the frustration of justifiable reliance interest and the
injustice caused by the retroactive application of a new rule.4 1 Yet
these two restraining considerations may be outweighed by the
creative forces urging the court to make new substantive criminal law
in the case at hand. This was so in all of the cases in which Justice
Traynor created new substantive criminal law during his thirty years
on the bench.
Returning to our four example cases, we see how Justice Traynor
actually struck the balance among the competing forces. In Vogel432
he created the honest-and-reasonable-mistake defense to bigamy, and
in Washington4 33 he altered the elements of the felony-murder rule
to require that the killing be committed by one of the felons. Since
the retroactive effect of each of these rulings favors the defendant
over the state, there is no danger of injustice, or government
oppression, to either the accused or the citizenry in either case.434
Furthermore, the retroactive application of these rules does not
trammel the reliance interests of either defendants Vogel or Washing-
ton, but it does subvert any possible reliance interests of the state.
If we assume state reliance interests were implicated in both
cases, the question is whether those interests should prevail over all
of the creative forces that were operating in Vogel and Washington.
In Justice Traynor's words, it is whether "the hardship that would be
caused by a retroactive application of a new rule would outweigh the
benefits."435 Without specifically discussing this issue in either case,
Justice Traynor obviously concluded that the forces of creativity
overwhelmed any possible countervailing weight attributable to the
state's reliance interests.
436
This balance appears to have been influenced by Justice
Traynor's belief that "normally,... reliance plays an inconsequential
role, if any, in criminal cases, as in tort cases." 37 Nevertheless, it is
nearly certain that the state relied on the precedent overruled in both
cases in exercising its prosecutorial discretion and in preparing and
presenting its case against both Vogel and Washington. But reliance
on existing precedent to commence and shape the litigation itself
431. Traynor, Transatlantic, supra note 275, at 266-67.
432. 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956).
433. 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
434. Traynor, Quo Vadis, supra note 379, at 548-53.
435. Traynor, Transatlantic, supra note 275, at 265.
436. Id. at 264.
437. Traynor, Quo Vadis, supra note 379, at 549.
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cannot be given significant weight in the law-creating process. New
judge-made criminal law is always created in a prosecution in which
the state relies on existing doctrine. If such reliance is counted in the
lawmaking decision, judicial creativity in the criminal law would come
to an end. Thus, both the state and the defendant must rely on
existing law in some other way than in the litigation at hand. This is
probably what Justice Traynor means when he says that reliance
normally plays an inconsequential role in criminal cases. There was
no indication of such additional reliance in either Vogel or Washing-
ton.
Likewise, there was no justifiable reliance by either the state or
the defendant in Benson.438 The Court refused to create Benson's
proposed defense of impossibility.439 It is inconceivable that Ben-
son's nonlitigation conduct was influenced in any way by existing law.
There was no law on the topic when Benson solicited the crime in
question and the Court's decision simply confirmed that the defense
was unavailable at that time. The retroactive application of the
Court's decision in Benson thus did not disparage any reliance interest
in existing law.
Since Justice Traynor's opinion neither expanded nor contracted
Benson's criminal liability, there was no possibility of injustice or
government oppression in following the traditional common-law rule
and allowing the opinion to be fully retroactive.
Justice Traynor's lawmaking opinions in Vogel, Washington, and
Benson thus gave little or no weight to the restraining forces
grounded in the retroactive application of judicial decisions. Neither
reliance interests nor government oppression were significant factors
in the lawmaking calculus, and there is no perceived injustice in
allowing the decision to be fully retroactive in any of the three cases.
A much different situation is presented in our final example, People
v. Pierce.44 In Pierce, the Traynor opinion changed existing law to
extend criminal liability to spouses who conspire solely among
themselves. When the Pierces made their otherwise unlawful
agreement, the rule announced in People v. Miller4' granted them
immunity from prosecution."2 The retroactive application of Justice
438. 57 Cal. 2d 240, 368 P.2d 116, 18 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1962).
439. l at 243, 368 P.2d at 118, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 518.
440. 61 Cal. 2d 879, 395 P.2d 893, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1964).
441. 82 Cal. 107, 22 P. 934 (1889).
442. Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d at 880, 395 P.2d at 894, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
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Traynor's opinion, which overruled Miller, operated to make the
Pierces' conduct criminal, though it did not amount to a crime when
done. 3  Thirteen years after Pierce was decided, Justice Traynor
tells us that the "traditional defenses against retroactivity of new rules
of criminal law that would adversely affect a defendant are still firmly
entrenched."' 4 Why then did he allow the rule in Pierce to operate
retroactively?
As we have seen, Justice Traynor did not believe that reliance
plays a major role in criminal cases. There is no evidence that the
Pierces read and relied on Miller when they conspired with each
other. But given the unusual procedural posture of Pierce-it was an
appeal from an order of the trial court dismissing the conspiracy
count-any facts indicating actual reliance by the Pierces on Miller
would not have been presented to the court. It is not completely
implausible, however, that there might have been some form of actual
reliance on Miller by Mr. and Mrs. Pierce."5  The effect of the
overruling of Miller and the reversal of the trial court's order
dismissing the conspiracy count was to send the case back to the
lower court for trial on the crime of conspiracy. Perhaps Justice
Traynor was willing to allow possible "proof" of a claim of actual
reliance to be litigated under a mistake-of-law defense at trial. That
defense would not appear to be precluded by his opinion in
Pierce."6 Or perhaps he thought that any actual reliance on Miller
would have been unreasonable as a matter of law for "the fiction
443. ld. at 882; 395 P.2d at 895-96, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 847-48.
444. Traynor, Quo Vadis, supra note 379, at 553.
445. Justice Traynor seemed unwilling to factor in the possibility of actual reliance by
the defendant on the overruled case in deciding whether the opinion should be given full
retroactive effect, at least when there was no actual evidence in the record. For example,
in James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961), a conviction for willfully and knowingly
evading payment of an income tax on embezzled money was challenged on the ground
that embezzled funds are not taxable income. In an earlier case, Commissioner v. Wilcox,
327 U.S. 404 (1946), the High Court had so held. Six members of the United States
Supreme Court voted to overrule Wilcox, but the Court refused to apply the holding
retroactively so as to make the defendant criminally liable for failing to pay the tax on the
embezzled funds. James, 366 U.S. at 221-22. In commenting on this opinion, Justice
Traynor tells us, after observing that "reliance plays an inconsequential role, if any, in
criminal cases," that "[i]t is hardly persuasive that James failed to report his income in
reliance on the old rule; there was an equal likelihood that he concealed his income to
avoid prosecution for embezzlement." Traynor, Quo Vadis, supra note 379, at 549. Since
this is a question of fact, it seems odd that Justice Traynor would not be willing to consider
this possibility in the lawmaking equation.
446. See People v. Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d 879, 395 P.2d 893, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1964).
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underlying the rule [in Miller] has long been dead."" 7 In any event,
Justice Traynor did not give much, if any, weight to possible reliance
interests in Pierce.
Although in another context Justice Traynor thought it
"inherently unfair," and thus impermissible, for a court to give
retroactive effect to a new rule imposing or expanding criminal
liability,"8 he was willing to do so in Pierce."9 It is true that the
only distinction between the Pierces and those who are liable for
conspiracy for the same conduct committed with the same state of
mind is the marital status of the Pierces. Siblings or lovers who
conspire only between themselves share equal guilt with conspiring
strangers. But personal status is the principal distinction between a
prisoner convicted of a felony who escapes from custody and his
cellmate, who has been convicted of a misdemeanor, who accompa-
nies the fleeing felon. In his Halcomb dissent, Justice Traynor
thought it improper for the court to extend criminal liability for
escape to the fleeing misdemeanant."' Why would he object to the
extension of liability in Halcomb but not in Pierce?
Can a meaningful distinction be drawn between the expansion of
an element of the offense, which is what the court did over Justice
Traynor's dissent in Halcomb, and the expansion of liability in Pierce
by the withdrawal of the marital-immunity defense? That distinction
would need some justification, and none was ever forthcoming from
Justice Traynor.
It is true that there is little possibility of government oppression,
at least in terms of the government's lashing out at given enemies or
at a powerless, unpopular group, when a special immunity is abolished
and criminal liability is allowed to fall upon the shoulders of all who
commit the conduct with the required state of mind. The expansion
of liability in Pierce simply made the exempted group-spouses-
subject to the same law that governed all other persons in California.
And for precisely the same reason, the expansion of liability of
spouses to equal the liability of all other people does not seem to be
significantly "unfair" in the context presented in Pierce-where one
spouse conspires only with the other spouse. If this is so then the
forces of repose that stem from the retroactive expansion of criminal
447. l& at 882, 395 P.2d at 895, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
448. Traynor, Quo Vadis, supra note 379, at 549.
449. See Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d at 882, 893 P.2d at 895, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
450. Halcomb, 21 Cal. 2d at 131, 130 P.2d at 387 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
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liability can readily be seen as failing to outweigh the creative forces
that support the creation of new judge-made substantive law-the
abolition of the spousal exemption from conspiracy liability.
Apparently this was the reasoning that supported the retroactive
application of the new substantive rule expanding criminal liability in
Pierce.
If the choice was thus between suffering under the moribund rule
of spousal immunity created by Miller and making new law in the
ordinary course of the judicial process, then Pierce may be defensible
on the foregoing ground. But that was not-the only choice available
to Justice Traynor. Years before he wrote the Pierce opinion, Justice
Traynor championed the idea that judges could make their new
criminal law operate purely prospectively to protect the justifiable
interests that would be subverted by the usual rule of retroactivity:
[T]ime has the aspect of an hour-glass in criminal law. In no
other area.., is the problem of retroactive versus prospec-
tive application of such crucial importance. The time radius
of the decision may directly affect the freedom or the very
life of one accused or convicted of crime. An ex post facto
clause hence exerts its most dramatic prohibition against
retroactivity with regard to statutes that make conduct
criminal that has not been criminal before. Though there is
no comparable prohibition on a court, it usually also guards
against any retroactive application of a decision that marks
conduct as criminal for the first time.
Normally... reliance plays an inconsequential role, if any,
in criminal cases. . . . The decisive factor is usually the
injustice of retroactivity, dramatized by its penal consequenc-
es .... 451
Justice Traynor repeated this message on a number of occa-
sions.45 And on several of them he emphasized what he called the
"principle" that "the retroactive operation of a rule imposing or
expanding criminal liability would be inherently unfair [or un-
just]."'453 To protect against this injustice, the judge should provide
451. Traynor, Conflict, supra note 412, at 714-15 (footnote omitted).
452. E.g., Traynor, Conflict, supra note 412, at 714-22; Traynor, Quo Vadis, supra note
379, at 548; Traynor, Transatlantic, supra note 275, at 266; see Traynor, Hard Cases, supra
note 259, at 231-32.
453. E.g. Traynor, Conflict, supra note 412, at 716 ("inherently unjust"); Traynor, Quo
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that new judge-made law that imposes or expands criminal liability
should be made purely prospective in its operation. Thus, the force
restraining judicial creativity that springs from the normal retroactivity
of judicial decisions can be removed from the case by bifurcating the
controversy "into two concomitant but distinct issues. First, should
there be a new rule? If so, the second issue would be whether to
apply the new rule retroactively?"4 ' Because it generally is inher-
ently unfair or unjust to retroactively apply a rule imposing or
expanding criminal liability, presumably the second question will be
decided in favor of nonretroactivity in most of those cases.
We will never know why Justice Traynor's opinion failed to
consider using the nonretroactivity technique for the new substantive
rule he created in Pierce.455 But we do know that even with the
technique he devised for bifurcating the controversy into two separate
but related issues, the impact of the normal retroactivity rule still
exercises some restraint on the creative powers of the court.456 In
a closely balanced case, a case in which the creative forces and the
restraining forces are virtually evenly weighted, the normal retroactivi-
ty of judicial decisions may convince the court to refrain from creating
new law imposing or expanding criminal liability.457 In other words,
Vadis, supra note 379, at 549 ("inherently unfair").
454. Traynor, Transatlantic, supra note 275, at 269 (speaking generally about the when
and how a judge should decide the retroactivity issue).
455. To be sure, Traynor believed that this "admirable technique" was "open to abuse
by zealous advocates casting for new rules that escape rigorous analysis." Traynor, Limits,
supra note 289, at 11. Accordingly, he tells us that:
A judge must be on guard against invoking it carelessly to lend spurious grace
to a departure from the old rule without painstaking explanation.... Before
undertaking a dramatic leap forward, when it becomes clear that prospectivity
will be an issue, he should wait until the litigants have had an opportunity to be
heard on the issue via briefs and perhaps oral argument. By thus insuring that
a decision on prospectivity will not have to await another case, a judge precludes
the uncertainty that would otherwise bedevil counsel and other courts in the
interim.
Id.
Since prospectivity should be an issue in any case in which the court creates a new
substantive rule that imposes or expands criminal liability, one would have thought that
the technique would have been argued by counsel and discussed in the Pierce opinion.
456. I am suggesting, of course, that though the controversy may be conveniently
bifurcated for the purpose of focusing on the two issues, the impact of the normal
retroactivity rule affects both issues-the lawmaking decision and the decision on
retroactivity. Once the account is finally balanced, having taken the impact of the normal
retroactivity rule into account, and the court decides in favor of making new law,
retroactivity then becomes the focus of the second issue.
457. Although the prospective-ruling technique is usually applied when precedent is
overruled, it is also appropriately used when new law is created and there is no precedent
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the court does not typically create new law with those effects and then
routinely invoke the nonretroactivity solution. Only occasional cases
call for such a technique, but its rational use should foster public
respect for courts.45 Thus, in only two cases during his entire thirty
years on the bench did Justice Traynor write an opinion in which new
substantive criminal law was created which burdened the defendant.
One of these opinions is his Halcomb459 dissent. The other is his
opinion in Pierce.4" Justice Traynor never invoked the nonretro-
activity rule in any case in which he created new substantive criminal
law. That is undoubtedly because in all of the those cases the new
rule either restricted criminal liability-as in Vogel'61 and Washing-
ton'-or was neutral with respect to liability, as in Benson.4o
But we cannot know how many cases in which the restraining effect
of the normal retroactivity rule convinced Justice Traynor to refrain
from creating new judge-made law and decide the case as an error-
correcting or law-maintaining case.
f deference to the legislature4"
In our democracy, as it was at common law, the judiciary shares
authority with the legislature in creating new law. Although the
legislative branch of government has the final word-statutes may
freely replace or revise judge-made law-Justice Traynor believed that
courts have a responsibility to make new law and that judicial
lawmaking is an essential component of our democratic system.465
Furthermore, this lawmaking duty extends throughout the universe of
law, without exception. Substantive criminal law is thus as much
within the ambit of this duty as the law of torts.
In Justice Traynor's world, the courts had as much authority over
criminal law as legislatures do. And when lawyers would argue that
a challenged rule of substantive criminal law should be abolished only
to be overruled. See Traynor, Transatlantic, supra note 275, at 266. This occurs when, for
example, the forces of creativity are constrained by the normal retroactivity of the decision
to the point where the court would not create new law but for the fact that the court can
make its ruling operate purely prospectively. Id.
458. lIa
459. 21 Cal. 2d at 130-32, 130 P.2d at 387-88 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
460. 61 Cal. 2d 879, 395 P.2d 893, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1964).
461. 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956).
462. 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
463. 57 Cal. 2d 240, 368 P.2d 116, 18 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1962).
464. Poulos, supra note 4.
465. Id
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by legislation, he would typically respond that "[i]n effect the
contention is a request that courts abdicate their responsibility for the
upkeep of the common law. That upkeep it needs continuously, as
this case demonstrates.
' 46
Although courts have as much authority to make substantive
criminal law as they do in any field, the exercise of this jurisdiction is
constrained. These constraints are not grounded in democratic
theory. Except for constitutional and statutory limitations-which do
not concern us here-they simply reflect the differing nature of the
two branches of government. Courts make law only when they are
adjudicating cases. Their lawmaking powers are both supported and
restrained by the culture and the rules of litigation. On the other
hand, the lawmaking competence of the legislative branch of
government is legally restrained only by constitutional law.
The courts should not "abdicate their responsibility for the
upkeep of the common law," to borrow Justice Traynor's phrase,
simply because the legislative branch is commonly seen as the
lawmaking arm in our democracy.467 Courts should defer to the
legislature when the law they are requested to make falls beyond the
competence of the judicial institution. Justice Traynor identified three
instances, which are relevant to our current inquiry, where judges
should consider deferring to the legislative branch for making the law
in question. These three considerations concern: (1) the scope and
context of the proposed new law;46 (2) the tenet of lag;469 and (3)
the quality and quantity of the information available to the court.470
i. the scope and context of the proposed new law
There are occasions when judges are asked to create "new rules
of such scope that only the legislature, with its freedom and resources
for wholesale inquiry, can effectively formulate them.""47  Justice
Traynor thought that a court should not, for example, judicially
abolish contributory negligence and replace it with comparative
negligence, for it would require the court to enunciate principles of
apportionment; and, perhaps more importantly, it would adversely
466. Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d at 882, 395 P.2d at 895, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
467. Id.
468. See Traynor, Hard Cases, supra note 259, at 233.
469. See Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 112, at 744.
470. See Traynor, Transatlantic, supra note 275, at 280.
471. Traynor, Hard Cases, supra note 259, at 233.
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impact "the whole complicated-and partly regulated-structure of
insurance rates., 472 His refusal to abolish the M'Naughton test of
insanity and replace it with some other formula apparently was based,
at least in part, on similar considerations.473 The court would need
to articulate a new test for the insanity defense, and that new test, as
controversial as it would be, could best be hammered out in the
legislative halls. Accordingly, Justice Traynor deferred to the
legislature to make new law on the test for insanity, even though the
M'Naughton rule was incorporated into California law by judicial
decision.474
There was no such concern with the new law created in any of
our four example cases.
ii. the tenet of lag
Justice Traynor's tenet of lag, as we have seen, reflects his basic
conception of the judicial institution: Judge-made law "must lag a
respectful pace back of popular mores, not only to insure its own
acceptance, but also to delay formalization of community values until
they have become seasoned."'475 In other words, "the function of
courts is not to innovate changes but only to keep the law responsive
to significant changes in the customs of the community."476 The
tenet of lag plays an important role in the decision to defer lawmak-
ing to the legislative branch of government. If the values and customs
of the community remain in flux on a given issue, then the court
should consider deferring to the legislature for the making of law to
solve that problem. It is not the business of judges to make commu-
nity values. Instead, they respond to existing community values when
new law is made.
A word of caution is appropriate here. We are here concerned
with the existence of identifiable controversy in the community. It is
palpable controversy that usually invokes the tenet of lag. When
Justice Traynor refused the request to judicially abolish the
M'Naughton test of insanity and replace it with some new rule in
Quicke, the tenet of lag apparently figured in his assessment of
472. Id (quoting Wolfgang Friedmann, Legal Philosophy and Judicial Lawmaking, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 821, 841 (1961)).
473. Quicke, 61 Cal. 2d at 159, 390 P.2d at 395-96, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 619-20.
474. .1d
475. Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 112, at 744.
476. Traynor, Well-Tempered, supra note 370, at 292.
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whether to create the new law or defer to the legislature."a At that
time there was considerable controversy over the proper test for
insanity in California. The Model Penal Code project had recently
abandoned the traditional M'Naughton test for a modem restatement
of the rule, and California's "Special Commissions on Insanity and
Criminal Offenders" advocated a substantial change in the law in its
First Report, which was issued on July 7, 1962, less than two years
before Quicke was decided. 8 The Report apparently had not
solidified community support for a change in the law. Since the
controversy over the appropriate test for the insanity defense was still
raging in the community, the tenet of lag apparently cautioned Justice
Traynor to let the California Legislature resolve the matter.
On the other hand, when there is an absence of palpable
controversy in the community, the tenet of lag does not have a major
role to play. This was the situation in each of our four example cases.
The Court did not step into the midst of a raging public controversy
and attempt to settle it in Vogel, Washington, Pierce, and Benson, or
in any of the other cases in which Roger Traynor created new law.
iii. the quality and quantity of the information
available to the court
For the most part, judicial lawmaking must rely on information
produced according to the ordinary rules of litigation. The principle
exception to this restricted flow of information relates not to the facts
involved in the dispute but to what Justice Traynor calls "the
environmental data" or "the legislative facts" that form the factual
foundation upon which a law is built.47 9 "Though only a fraction of
cases," Justice Traynor tells us, "are of a complexity that calls for
inquiry beyond the facts about the parties and the available prece-
dents, those cases may be of major significance in the development of
the law."4 '
All too rarely, however, do the courts have the benefit of
Brandeis briefs comparable to the original. Absent the
presentation of such data, a court could well undertake
477. See supra text accompanying notes 266-70.
478. Special Commissions on Insanity and Criminal Offenders, First Report: July 7,
1962 (1962).
479. E.g., Traynor, Transatlantic, supra note 275, at 280; see Poulos, supra note 4, at text
accompanying notes 230-36.
480. Traynor, Transatlantic, supra note 275, at 280.
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independent scrutiny of extralegal materials if it appeared
that they might be useful to an analysis of the case. In that
event, a court should alert counsel accordingly to assure
them a fair hearing on whatever issues emerge from the
acquired data as the case develops.48" '
But if such environmental data are needed and if they are not
readily available, then the court should consider deferring to the
superior environmental fact-gathering capacity of the legislative
branch of government. Since none of our four example cases were
seen as being complex enough to require that process, we do not have
a ready example of the use of environmental facts in a substantive
criminal case.
Justice Traynor was thus willing to defer lawmaking to the
legislative branch of government only when the judicial institution
could not properly respond to the challenge presented by the forces
urging the court to make new law. The assessment of the court's
ability to make "good law" for "hard cases"4 is necessarily a
matter of degree. The relative weight of the three factors that we
have been discussing, all of which restrain judicial lawmaking, must be
considered in the accounting made to determine whether the court
should make new substantive criminal law.
But before we move on to the next of the forces that restrain
judicial creativity, we should heed some of the last advice Roger
Traynor would give us as to why courts should not generally defer to
the legislature in making new law. This observation seems particular-
ly relevant as it applies to the judicial creation of the substantive
criminal law today:
The argument then goes that innovation today rests with the
legislators by virtue of their unique sensitivity to public
moods, or what is sometimes called an ear to the ground.
The trouble with this view is that we certainly cannot afford
now, if we ever could, to play the law entirely by ear. There
are a number of objections to such improvisation. The most
obvious is that one who relies on the ear without attendant
reflection offers no assurance of sensitive hearing. In the din
of a largely urban society, he may hear the bellowing of
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pleaders, but not the murmurs of other individuals. He may
be quick with a generous dispensation of public funds to
groups for ostensibly worthy projects, so long as such
dispensation attracts little public notice. He is given to
assessing the effect of a given action upon his chances for re-
election. His will for lawmaking is a will of many wisps. It
is the exceptional legislator who is guided by fiat lux rather
than the murky light of ignis fatuus.
483
g. internal institutional restraints"
In addition to the constraints imposed by the common-law
environment in which American judges work-such as the restraints
associated with stare decisis, the common-law tradition, the tenet of
lag, the normal retroactivity of judicial decisions, and the rare
situation in which deference to the legislature may be wise-there are
institutional constraints imposed by the litigation process itself The
nature of the judicial institution constrains the judge's creative
powers. Judges cannot reach out and make substantive criminal law
though it is required by season and circumstance. The judge's powers
are exercised only in response to properly presented claims:4"
Their lawmaking is dependent upon the work of the police, the
prosecutors, and defense counsel. Thus, as a general rule, a judge's
creativity in the realm of criminal law is limited to the cases actually
prosecuted in court. Within those cases, the judge is tethered by the
record on appeal,4 86 by the issues and arguments presented by
counsel,487 by obtaining the agreement of a majority of the judge's
colleagues, and by the written-opinion requirement.
Ultimately, to make new criminal law the judge must persuade
her colleagues to join in the creative act. Though the task of judging
is solitary work, judge-made law is seldom woven by a single judge.
483. Traynor, Limits, supra note 289, at 8.
484. Poulos, supra note 4.
485. Thus Justice Traynor wrote: "Many forces constrain review within extremely
narrow limits. The most immediate constraint is the controversy itself that calls for
decision; even the unprecedented controversy automatically precludes any ambitious
excursion beyond its own context." Roger J. Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do It
Justice, 49 CAL. L. REv. 615, 620 (1961).
486. Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 112, at 742.
487. See Roger J. Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate
Courts, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 211, 217 (1957). Justice Traynor believed it was permissible
for the court to frame issues not raised by counsel as long as the court gave counsel the
opportunity to submit additional briefs. Id. at 219.
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The burden of convincing a majority of one's colleagues is a signifi-
cant impediment to judicial creativity by an appellate court judge.
The decision and the resulting opinion thus bear "the marks of battle"
in the tempering process generated by the collegial process of a multi-
judge court.4' And there is always the possibility of a separate
opinion, usually a dissent, that will display any weakness in the
opinion for all to ponder.48
As we shall see, reason is a central element in Roger Traynor's
theory of the judicial process. His lectures dwell on the reasoning
requirements for appellate opinions and for the orderly development
of law. "After a generation of experience," Justice Traynor tells us
in one of his last articles on the judicial process, "I believe that the
primary obligation of a judge, at once conservative and creative, is to
keep the inevitable evolution of the law on a rational course."
490
Appellate opinions that announce a new rule "must be supported
by full disclosure ... of all aspects of the problem and of the data
pertinent to its solution.',491 They must be reasoned "every inch of
the way,"4' and they must specify the reasons for choosing one
policy over another.493 Although some academics would question
the efficacy of these requirements as constraints on judicial creativity,
for any decision can be cast in the language of reason,4 94 Justice
Traynor obviously believed they affect both the quality and the result
of a court's decision. They constrain creativity to the realm of
rationality. And they counsel caution: "A reasoning judge's
painstaking exploration of place and his sense of pace give reassur-
ance that when he takes an occasional dramatic leap forward he is
impelled to do so in the very interest of orderly progression.
',411
Finally, logic and reason are the tools that allow the other internal
488. Such a tempering process is that of a group, not that of a justice alone. One
who takes part in it knows the marks of battle in the opinions that bear his
name. He ceases to mourn the loss of a frugal phrase that contained his
meaning exactly, and comes to accept the prolix replacement for its easier way
with a hard idea. And he can sometimes rejoice that the questions of others
cleared the mists from his own thinking.
Il at 217.
489. Id at 218-19.
490. Traynor, Limits, supra note 289, at 7.
491. Traynor, Interweavers, supra note 112, at 205.
492. Traynor, Limits, supra note 289, at 11.
493. Id. at 12.
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constraints to function. Without them, lawyers could not persuade
judges and judges could not persuade colleagues to make or reject a
proposed new rule.
Though reason and logic are essential parts of the judicial opinion
and the process that produces it, the written-opinion requirement
yields additional restraints. The process of writing the opinion focuses
the inquiry of judges, affects their analysis, and influences the way it
is crafted. According to Donald Barrett, Traynor's chief of staff for
a number of years, Traynor "felt the real test of a solution to a legal
problem was whether you could put it down convincingly in writ-
ing''4 6 in words capable of being understood by children.4" Only
then can the judge penetrate to the heart of the problem and resolve
it convincingly. Opinions containing "repetitions of magic words from
the legal lore" signal that the judge has retreated from the painstaking
analysis required for the task of judging.498
Since these internal restraints inhibit judicial creativity in the
criminal law in essentially the same way as the external institutional
constraints, we will look at our example cases in the ending portions
of the following discussion.
h. external institutional restraints499
These restraints are created by the anticipated scrutiny the opin-
ion will receive once it is published."° Once published, the opinion
496. Barrett Interview, supra note 111, at 13.
497. Justice Traynor would occasionally admonish his law clerks to" 'write it [referring
to the clerk's draft of the opinion] so Joe or Mike could understand.' These were his two
young children at the time." Id- at 11.
498. Traynor, Interweavers, supra note 112, at 205. It is interesting to compare Justice
Traynor's opinion-writing style with his off-bench writing style. Donald P. Barrett notes
that Justice Traynor's
style of writing an opinion was entirely different from the style he might use in
writing a speech or a law review article. He would never put some of those titles
in an opinion. He was very reluctant to have anything flip or humorous in an
opinion. You didn't try to put anything like that in an opinion because it would
get stricken out. Since he so thoroughly indoctrinated me in how an opinion
should be written, I never had any success in trying to help to write any
speeches. Sometimes I could get him some legal material he could use but as far
as drafting them that was a totally different world.
Barrett Interview, supra note 111, at 27.
499. Poulos, supra note 4.
500. An opinion should aim at convincing the losing party that justice is done despite
the loss. But for our purpose here, other than the legal procedures such as a request for
rehearing, scrutiny by the losing party is thought to ensure that some members of the
bar-the lawyers for the losing party-and at least one member of the public-the losing
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is available for scrutiny by the public, the press, the bar, and the
academy.5"' With his typical good humor, Justice Traynor notes, for
example, that
[s]cholars inspect the output of the appellate process as if it
were dynamite, and they comment exhaustively on innocu-
ous defects as well as on patent dangers. There are law
journals enough to train searchlights upon the courts
everywhere in the land, and they are quick to note the
errant ways of appellate decision from the most righteous
sentimentalism to the most wrongheaded standpattism.5°
And, in a similar vein, he observed that an opinion, if possible, should
allay the suspicion of any man in the street who regards
knowledge of the law as no excuse for making it. There is
usually someone among them alert to note any misunder-
standing of the problem, any error in reasoning, an irrele-
vance in data, any oversight of relevant data, any premature
cartography beyond the problem at hand. Every opinion is
thus subject to approval. It is understandable when a judge,
faced with running such a gauntlet, marks time instead on
the line of least resistance and lets bad enough alone.0 3
party-will scrutinize the opinion.
501. Traynor, Interweavers, supra note 112, at 205 ("There is usually someone among
them alert to note any misunderstanding of the problem, any error in reasoning, any
irrelevance in data, any oversight of relevant data, any premature cartography beyond the
problem at hand. Every opinion is thus subject to approval.") Id.; see Roger J. Traynor,
To the Right Honorable Law Reviews, 10 UCLA L. REV. 3, 8-10 (1962) [hereinafter
Traynor, Law Reviews] (in addressing a group of law review editors, Traynor acknowl-
edged that few court opinions are shielded from law review criticism).
502. Traynor, Affairs, supra note 243, at 486. Justice Traynor's observation of the
impact of scholarly comment on the judicial process, made in the same lecture, is worth
noting:
There is no way of measuring the effect of constant law review critiques on the
appellate process. Nevertheless, the increasing reference to them in opinions and
briefs indicates that they are carrying increasing weight with judges and lawyers
alike. It is no modem judge who still prides himself on some obscurely stated
rapport with the reported authorities that in his mind render other learning
expendable. It is no modem lawyer who still disdains the critiques, content to
rest easy in hard cases with the undemonstrative Shephards of the what-has-
been, with all that has been indiscriminately stuffed into the overstuffed concept
called authority. There is a pall on the once formidable Confr6rie de Chevaliers
Pontificaux in the practicing bar given to heeding and speaking no preachments
other than what they have practiced.
Id. at 487; see also Traynor, Law Reviews, supra note 501, at 8-10.
503. Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 112, at 744.
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It is here that reason again performs a vital function: It provides
the standard by which the opinion, and the judge who wrote it, may
be evaluated by the reader. A court's power and influence, and the
reputation of the judge crafting the opinion, depends upon the skill
with which it is reasoned, for that is the universal measure of
disinterested decision making. "Sustained, impartial... criticism of
[a court's] opinions," we are told, "would deter decisions made
through excess or by fiat."5" On the other hand, a well-reasoned,
well-tempered opinion "may serve to quicken public respect for the
law as an instrument of justice.""5
The same may be said for its author. The accountability that
flows from the publication of the opinion and the scrutiny it will
receive, though unmeasurable, is one of the important countervailing
forces in Justice Traynor's philosophy of the judicial process."
We will now return to the internal restraints and the four
example cases.
Little needs to be said about the impediments to judicial
creativity that are part of the environment in which judges work.
Judges can only create law out of the "bits and pieces that blow into
their shop on a random wind." 7 Judges are bound by the record
on appeal and by the issues it presents. For example, Justice Traynor
was able to create the honest-and-reasonable-mistake defense to
bigamy in Vogel because the district attorney prosecuted the case and
defense counsel filed the appeal and raised the issue before the court.
Of course, there is some room for discretion within these constraints.
Although judges are strictly limited by the cases brought before them
and the record created in the lower courts, the judges are not as
confined by the issues raised by counsel as they are by the record on
appeal. As long as the issues spring from the record, judges can
request briefing on a point omitted by the lawyers, and they are not
bound to decide the case under the rubric of counsel's argument. In
504. G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential
Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REv. 279, 291 (1973).
505. Traynor, Interweavers, supra note 112, at 204. The accountability that flows from
public scrutiny of a court's opinion may, of course, be less than completely rational. See,
e.g., Roger J. Traynor, Lawbreakers, Courts, and Law-Abiders, 31 Mo. L. REv. 181,194-96,
200-01 (1966).
506. Traynor, Affairs, supra note 243, at 487.
507. Traynor, Limits, supra note 289, at 12. In a similar vein, Justice Traynor tells us
that "[a] judge ... cannot speak unless he is spoken to, and he must mind his musing
when he does so." Id. at 11.
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Washington, for example,, defense counsel sought a rule that would
limit the scope of the felony-murder rule by the identity of the person
killed.5° Justice Traynor rejected that submission and created a
rule that made the identity of the killer the critical element of felony-
murder.50
How do the internal institutional constraints associated with a
multi-judge court impact on judicial creativity?
When a judge writes a lawmaking opinion for at least a majority
of the court, the internal institutional restraints transform the
"cleansed," "judicial" choice of the individual judge into an opinion
with the force of law, supported now by the cleansed judicial choice
of a majority of the judges.510 ,Though we speak about a judge's
opinion in a given case as though it represents his or her individual
judgment, that professional habit obscures the role of the internal
constraints and how they force compromise that may, at best, only be
acceptable to the writer of the opinion. The opinion, in other words,
may or may not reflect the writer's uncompromised views on the
issues resolved in the opinion. The more colleagues who join the
opinion, the more likely it is that the opinion represents the compos-
ite views of his or her colleagues, rather than the pristine thinking of
the author. A unanimous opinion clearly speaks for the court as an
institution. It is not clear how authentically it represents the writer's
views. However, it should be safe to assume that there are limits to
the judge's willingness to compromise. Thus the fact that the judge
remains the author of the opinion indicates that the opinion is an
acceptable statement of the author's views on the new law made in
the case-and the views of all of the other judges who join the
opinion.
Justice Traynor sought to minimize the extent of compromise that
might be necessary to secure the votes of a majority of his colleagues
by working through his first draft as carefully as possible:
He didn't like to waste time in circulating drafts that he
knew must be revised. He would prefer not to expose his
thinking to the rest of the judges until he could give them
his best answer. He liked to have his calendar memo be as
508. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d at 780, 402 P.2d at 132, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
509. Id at 780-83, 402 P.2d at 132-35, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 444-47.
510. See supra text accompanying notes 203-09.
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close to what he would deem a possible final opinion in the
case.
511
Error-correcting opinions may be regarded differently from
lawmaking opinions."' Justice Traynor, we are told, treated them
so:
If Traynor did not feel the issue was critical to the pattern
of the law and the court wanted to go the way he didn't, he
might say he didn't care and he'd write the opinion however
the majority wanted it. I remember once he circulated an
opinion and the majority wouldn't go along with him. It was
one of these sufficiency of the evidence cases and Judge
Traynor wrote it the other way. Then Judge Shenk said,
"well, I liked the first one better." Traynor said, "so did I."
Then he said, "I'll put the second one out By The Court and
I'll dissent to myself." Traynor had both opinions. One was
By The Court and then a dissent by Traynor. 13
Justice Traynor's opinions in Pierce and Benson were joined by
all members of the court. There were dissents to his opinions in
Vogel and Washington. Justice Shenk dissented alone in Vogel.514
Justice Burke, joined by Justice McComb, dissented in Washing-
ton.5 One can assume that the internal constraints associated with
acquiring the votes of a majority of the judges are at their apex when
there is a dissent to the judge's opinion. If this is so, the countervail-
ing power restraining judicial creativity was stronger in Vogel and
Washington than in Pierce and Benson.
The internal restraints created by the fact that appellate judges
are required to decide the case by a written opinion seem obvious
enough. Justice Traynor, we are told, believed that "the real test of
a solution to a legal problem was whether you could put it down
convincingly in writing." '16
Judge Traynor liked to believe that if you worked hard
enough you could find the only right answer to every case.
Now, I think he must have known sometimes he just had to
make up his own mind. Sometimes there is no way you can
511. Barrett Interview, supra note 111, at 24.
512. This includes, of course, any error-correcting portions of a lawmaking opinion.
513. Barrett Interview, supra note 111, at 26.
514. 46 Cal. 2d at 806, 299 P.2d at 856 (Shenk, J., dissenting).
515. 62 Cal. 2d at 785, 402 P.2d at 135, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 447 (Burke, J., dissenting).
516. Barrett Interview, supra note 111, at 13.
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say this is or that is the right answer, but certainly before he
reached that point he wanted to be sure he had completely
exhausted every available avenue.17
Justice Traynor's opinions in the four example cases obviously
evidence the operation of these constraints.
Reserving our discussion of the role of reason as a constraint on
judicial creativity for the moment, how did the external institutional
constraints possibly function in the four example cases?
These constraints are grounded in the anticipated scrutiny the
published opinion may receive by the public, the press, the bar, and
the academy. Justice Traynor "followed the law reviews assiduously.
Every issue that came to the court library was first sent to him before
being shelved," '518 and his opinions frequently rely on scholarly
commentary.19 In Vogel, for example, Justice Traynor cites law
review articles written by Professors Sayre, Hall, and Wechsler."
In Washington, he relies on seven learned treatises"' and two law
review articles.5" He refers to the Model Penal Code and a learned
517. It at 14.
518. Id. at 22.
519. See James R. McCall, Roger Traynor: Teacher, Jurist, and Friend, 35 HASTINGS
L.J. 741, 742 (1984). Professor McCall tells us that Justice Traynor "elevated the
importance of legal scholarship by initiating the practice of citing law review articles in
California Supreme Court opinions." Id. In this respect, Justice Traynor was following
a trend set by others. In 1928, the year after Roger Traynor graduated from Boalt Hall,
his colleague Professor Max Radin published a law review article discussing and approving
of the existing use of law review articles by lawyers and judges as sources of the law. Max
Radin, Sources of Law-New and Old, 1 S. CAL. L. REV. 411, 413 (1928). Three years
later, Justice Cardozo made similar comments in his introduction to the A.A.L.S. volume
on readings in contract law: Benjamin N. Cardozo, Introduction to ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vii, ix
(1931). This trend was part of the legal realism movement. See JOHNSON, supra note 305,
at 61-65 (describing the beginnings of the use of law review articles as authoritative sources
of law). One suspects that Justice Traynor was influenced to rely on law review articles
by his Boalt Hall colleague Max Radin, by Cardozo, and by the legal realism movement.
520. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d at 801 n.2, 299 P.2d at 853 n.2.
521. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d at 781-83, 402 P.2d at 133-34,44 Cal. Rptr. at 445-46. The
opinion cites MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2 cmt. 4 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959); PETER
BREIT, AN INQUIRY INTO CRIMINAL GUILT (1963); H.L.A. HART & A. HONOR9,
CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959); 0. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881); REPORT
OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, Cmd. No. 8932 (1949-1953); 3
JAMES F. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883).
522. Norval Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA.
L. REV. 50 (1957); Herbert L. Packer, The Case for Revision of the Penal Code, 13 STAN.
L. REV. 252 (1961).
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treatise in Benson.52
His reliance on scholarly writing in his opinions and his constant
perusal of the periodical literature demonstrate that Justice Traynor
took scholarly commentary seriously and that he had scholarly
commentary in mind when he wrote his opinions. Indeed, his chief
of staff tells us that Justice Traynor "was very sensitive to areas where
he knew the professors thought the California Supreme Court theories
were cockeyed."524
His insistence that opinions should be written in plain English
capable of being understood by his children, without the use of
"magic words" or legalese that was common in his time, empowered
the lay public and the press to keep an eye on the law. This enhances
judicial accountability and evidences Justice Traynor's concern for
these external institutional restraints.5"5
We have now discussed the major constraints on judicial
creativity: stare decisis, the common-law tradition, the tenet of lag,
the retroactive effect of judicial decisions, deference to the legislature,
and the internal and external institutional constraints. These
constraints exercise their countervailing power against the forces of
creativity through the mediating power of reason.
4. Reason526
Reason plays a central role in Justice Traynor's judicial philoso-
phy.52 It is the power that mediates between the creative and the
restraining forces. Reminiscent of statements made by Coke and
Blackstone, Justice Traynor calls reason "the soul of law,"'" and he
constantly refers to the "reasoning judge,"" to "the rational devel-
opment of the law,"53 and to "judicial reasoning."531 "A govern-
523. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(a) cmt. 31 (Tentative Draft No. 10, 1960); GLAN-
ViLLE L. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1961).
524. Barrett Interview, supra note 111, at 22.
525. Accountability is typically considered as a restraint on arbitrary authority. It is in
this sense that the external institutional constraints restrain judicial creativity. Scholarly
commentary, and perhaps lay commentary, can also stimulate judicial creativity. For the
most part, however, it seems that generally creativity is stimulated as a reaction to critical
commentary.
526. Poulos, supra note 4.
527. See supra text accompanying note 517.
528. Traynor, Limits, supra note 289, at 7.
529. E.g., iL at 6; Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 112, at 743.
530. Traynor, Lost Causes, supra note 239, at 566.
531. E.g., Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 112, at 742; Traynor, Interweavers, supra note
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ment of laws," he writes, "suggests an ideal, a legal process as rational
in all its ramifications as it has traditionally been in the courts.1
53 2
With reason as both the catalyst and the caldron, the judge
assesses the mixture of forces presented in the case. The individual
factors, the elements of creativity and constraint, push and pull against
each other until an equilibrium is reached. This equilibrium is the
judgment on the issue in dispute. All of the factors, of course, are not
present in each case; even when they are, a different result may be
reached because of a change in their relative weights. Ideally, in
Justice Traynor's world, each judge calculates the point of equilibrium
on each issue in the case. The product of these individual calcula-
tions, produced by the same process of give and take, represents the
final joint calculation-the judgment of the court.
When the calculus favors restraint, the opinion is traditionally
couched in terms of precedent and stare decisis. There is no change
in doctrine. This is what happened, for example, in People v. Quicke,
in which Justice Traynor refused to abolish the M'Naughton test of
criminal insanity and create new substantive criminal law. 33 When
the creative forces prevail, new law is made.
The calculus also dictates the direction of the change. When the
creative forces are joined by powerful forces of repose, the law
changes to what it was at some time in the past. When the creative
forces strongly predominate, new law emerges. But in Justice
Traynor's view, it is never entirely new. The forces of repose are
always present and influential. New judge-made law is thus always
rooted in the common law. Like a new child, it owes its existence to
its parental past and it carries the genetic code of its ancestors into
the future. "Rational lawmaking," Justice Traynor reminds us,
"involves far more than case by case response to such dramatic
changes as have characterized our century.' 5"
We should not forget that in deciding hard cases in new
fields, a court is the one institution entrusted by peace-loving
people to envisage a beneficent evolution of law for the long
run. It must guard against the danger that evolution will
take an ugly turn, back to an age of dim-eyed creatures
112, at 203.
532. Traynor, Statutes, supra note 243, at 427.
533. Quicke, 61 Cal. 2d at 159, 390 P.2d at 395-96, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 619-20.
534. Traynor, Transatlantic, supra note 275, at 283.
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grounded in dogma or off course to an age of bats in blind
pursuit of panaceas. 35 ' " - . ... . .
Reason is thus the transmitter of the genetic code, the atomic force
that binds the elements of law together. The judge,
invariably looks for precedent as his starting point. He is
constrained to arrive at a judgment in the context of
ancestral judicial experience: the given judgments; or
lacking these, the given dicta; or lacking these, the given
clues. Even if his search of the past yields nothing, so that
he confronts a truly unprecedented case, he still arrives at a
judgment in the context of judicial reasoning with recogniz-
able ties to the past. By that kinship, a judgment not only
establishes the unprecedented case as a precedent for the
future, but integrates it into the often rewoven but always
durable network of common law.
536
This is what happened in our four example cases: Vogel, Benson,
Pierce, and Washington. The creative forces overpowered the forces
of repose and new substantive criminal law was created. But the new
law in each case emerged from the pattern of existing law, born of
judicial reasoning with recognizable ties to the past, and tightly
integrated "into the often rewoven but always durable network of
common law.
'5 37
I do not mean to suggest that Traynor's theory of the judicial
process employs a grand multiple regression formula that produces
the correct legal rule when all of the relevant factors are included and
are assigned their proper weight. When judges make law, they
exercise their own power of choice. But that choice is not arbitrary,
irrational, or based upon the personal interests of the judge. It is the
product of "professional skil,... legal reasoning and legal imagina-
tion,5 38 after deep inquiry and "reflection enough to arrive at last
at a value judgment as to what the law ought to be." 39 In other
535. I
536. Id. at 262.
537. id.
538. Traynor, Hard Cases, supra note 259, at 235. This idea was repeated in Traynor,
Interweavers, supra note 112, at 213.
539. Traynor, Hard Cases, supra note 259, at 234. The quotation continues as follows:
When at last [the judge] reaches a juncture where he feels bound to commit
himself to one value judgment or another, the intellectual quest merges with a
yearning for something more than the mere orderly disposition of problems, a
yearning often approximately defined as a sense of justice and culminating in
what Edmond Cahn calls The Moral Decision.... We should be aware of how
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words, judges exercise judicial, not personal, choices when they make
new law.
V. THE LEGACY OF ROGER TRAYNOR
By word and deed Roger Traynor teaches us that judges share
responsibility with the legislative branches of government in making
substantive criminal law. Each branch has its own realm of lawmak-
ing competence, its own essential perspective. Each complements the
other.
The courts examine the law from the bottom up: Judges begin
with the facts, examine how the law actually works, and create new
doctrine needed to resolve the dispute at hand, but always in the
context of the common law and always with an eye toward evolving
a rational, coherent, just, and efficient body of criminal law.
Legislatures make law from the top down: They begin with
abstract concepts and end with abstract doctrine-law designed to
govern future conduct and to prevent future disputes. Though
legislators gather the information they use to create new law from a
variety of sources, one of the most important in our mature system of
criminal law is the information gleaned from the work of courts. The
courts serve as laboratories for the creation and testing of criminal
law that fits carefully into both legislation and the common-law
system. And because of the trumping power of legislation, judge-
made law can always be displaced by statutory enactments.
From much of what Justice Traynor wrote, we may infer that
both legislatures and the citizenry are hampered when judges fail to
discharge their responsibility "of assuring the rational continuity of
the law,"5" and for "the recurring formulation of new rules to
difficult it is to come by. As Harry Jones sensitively observes, "just decision
requires both an intellect that perceives the good and a will that resolutely
perseveres in the good course intellectually perceived."
Id at 235 (footnotes omitted). In another revealing passage, Justice Traynor wrote:
He comes to realize how essential it is also that he be intellectually interested in
a rational outcome. He must then deepen his inquiry and reflection enough to
arrive at last at a value judgment as to what the law ought to be and to spell out
why. In a strictly limited sense he thus becomes result-oriented, an honest term
to describe a concern that the judgment itself be justified by its promise of
optimum grace and strength for the long run. Ineluctably, it is an account
rendered of values that beamed so strongly from the controversy as to determine
the final outcome. Would we have it otherwise?
Traynor, Transatlantic, supra note 275, at 281.
540. Traynor, Limits, supra note 289, at 8.
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supplement or displace the old. '541 "Regardless of how a legislature
is headed, toward a high or low road or pell-mell toward swamps, a
court still has the obligation to establish beacon lights of reason so
consistently reliable as to aid wanderers out of the swamplands."'542
There are limits, of course, to the competence of both institu-
tions. But it is clear from all that Justice Traynor did and said about
the judicial creation of new law that lawmaking by judges, even in the
substantive criminal law, is consistent with the fundamental principles
of our democracy. He shows us that even the judicial creation of new
crimes may be permissible, provided the judges protect the reliance
and justice interests at stake by making the new law apply only
prospectively. This same technique also should be used when the new
law expands existing criminal liability. There are no similar concerns,
however, with the creation of new substantive criminal law that is
neutral, as in Benson, or that limits criminal liability, as in Vogel and
Washington.
Justice Traynor also teaches us that the choice exercised by
judges when they make new law is consistent with our dedication to
the rule of law, as long as the judge: (1) is personally disinterested in
the outcome of the case; (2) exercises "cleansed" personal judgment;
and (3) makes decisions by finding the point of equilibrium between
the creative forces and the restraining forces at play in the case.
Although the choice is initially the judge's, this process transforms the
judge's decision into the judgment of the court-the choice that has
been exercised by judges throughout our common-law heritage.
Finally, we have seen how Justice Traynor discharged his judicial
responsibility in our common-law system. In Vogel and Benson, and
in a number of other cases, he replaced what he could of the
fragmented, patchwork quilt of mens rea law we inherited from
earlier times with a modern body of doctrine that protected the
interests of both society and the accused in an integrated, rational,
elegant way. In Washington he curtailed the function of the felony-
murder rule, insofar as statutory law permitted him to do so, by
trimming it to fit more closely the pattern of our law that distributes
punishment according to the moral culpability of the offender. And
in Pierce he restored "the grace of coherent pattern"5 43 to our
541. 111 at 12.
542. Traynor, Transatlantic, supra note 275, at 283.
543. See Traynor, Reasoning, supra note 112, at 742.
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criminal law by removing material that offended us and no longer
served our goals for the criminal law.
Whenever the forces of creativity outweighed the forces of
repose, Justice Traynor created new substantive criminal law
throughout the second and third decades of his judicial career.
During these years, the common law of crimes thrived in California
in large part because of Roger Traynor's work on the California
Supreme Court. His labors establish him as one of the most
important judges in the history of American law. His opinions also
establish him as a leader of the modem renaissance in substantive
criminal law.
